

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



INDEX

VOLUME 32

Nos. 1-4

October 1953 - July 1954

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

New York 21

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 32

OCTOBER 1953

No. 1

THE BRICKER AMENDMENT AND AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS

By Arthur H. Dean

ON June 15, 1953, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary favorably reported to the Senate by a vote of nine to five a constitutional amendment which would provide the legal basis for radically altering the present division of powers between the legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government in respect to the formulation and conduct of this country's foreign policy, and for necessary participation by State Governments in the execution of such policy in certain areas.

The proposed amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 1, was introduced by Senator Bricker on January 7, 1953, and is a revised version of Senate Joint Resolution 130 which he had introduced last year in the Eighty-Second Congress. The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary held extensive hearings in both 1952 and 1953 on the proposed amendment. The text of the revised amendment, as reported to the Senate by the Judiciary Committee, is as follows:

Section 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.

Section 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.

Section 3. Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.

Section 4. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

Section 5. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.

This proposed amendment, supported most actively by Senators Bricker and Watkins, Republicans from Ohio and Utah, has caused consternation in the minds of those who wish us to con-

tinue as a sovereign Power with the initiative for foreign affairs in the hands of the President. President Truman's department heads and advisors vigorously opposed the original version of the Bricker Amendment at the 1952 hearings. President Eisenhower's appointees have been equally emphatic in their opposition to the new versions at the 1953 hearings. Further, many Congressmen, led by Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, a Republican and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, have announced full opposition.

On July 22 President Eisenhower announced his "unqualified support" of a compromise amendment introduced by Senator Knowland of California, the Republican Senate Majority Leader. The compromise amendment reads as follows:

Section 1. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with the Constitution shall not be of any force or effect. The judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases, in law or equity, in which it is claimed that the conflict described in this amendment is present.

Section 2. When the Senate consents to the ratification of a treaty the vote shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against shall be entered on the Journal of the Senate.

Section 3. When the Senate so provides in its consent to ratification, a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress.

Section 4. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within 7 years from the date of its submission.

Senator Bricker did not accept the Knowland compromise and no floor action was taken on either amendment prior to the adjournment of the First Session of the 83rd Congress on August 4, 1953.

The proponents of the Bricker Amendment rest their case for amendment on the great danger of executive abuse of power, aided and abetted from time to time by an alleged unwary Senate, in imposing upon the nation legal obligations that will deprive the people of constitutionally guaranteed rights, and will invade the domain of power reserved to the States.

The opponents of the amendment vigorously deny the force of the first danger. As to the second, they confess and approve the power of a proper treaty to replace inconsistent State law. There is general agreement as to at least the theoretical legal risk of the President's bypassing Congressional control through his power to conclude executive agreements. But sharp difference

of opinion exists as to the extent of the risk and the necessity for remedial action.

II. OUR FOREIGN POLICY TODAY

The primary function of the Federal Government in the conduct of our foreign relations has always been—but is much more consciously so today—that of providing a policy that will assure national survival. The manner in which survival will be brought about, whether by aggressive wars of conquest, by Quaker methods of submission and good will, or by some diplomatic compromise between those two extremes, is of vast importance.

We have chosen a combination of national strength and active diplomacy, achieving a compromise between the theory—perhaps exploded by scientific assaults on time, space and the atom—of an isolated continental fortress and the theory of some supranational polity. This compromise has appeared to most persons to be the only practical way of life in an age of global military problems in which the free nations of the world must jointly meet the threat of a monolithic totalitarian dictatorship ruling one-third of the peoples and natural resources of the world.

In the broadest sense, then, the policy of the past decade has been that of an active diplomacy backed by military preparedness. This course has required active Congressional support. The means selected by the Executive to carry out the active diplomacy, and heretofore supported in larger outline by the Congress, have been of three main sorts:

First, continuous communication and exchange of ideas and negotiation of differences through an enlarged Foreign Service and the United Nations agencies;

Second, a broad program of economic, technical and military aid for those peoples who needed and wanted it and seemed likely to be friendly Powers;

Third, an extensive network of treaties and executive agreements sometimes made *ad hoc* for problems of the instant, sometimes carefully planned as long-range solutions of continuing problems.

As to the first and second means selected, no pressing constitutional problems have arisen. It is clear that the President will nominate our principal diplomats. The Senate will then either consent to the nomination or not (consent is more likely if the President has sought the advice of interested Senators before-

hand); and if the individual is consented to, the President will then appoint him. His conduct, once appointed, may be subject to occasional Congressional questioning, but it is the direct responsibility of the President alone.

For the economic and military aid program, the constitutional course is equally clear. The President will recommend a program. But the Congress must appropriate the money. The spending of the money by the Executive Departments along the lines established by the Appropriations Act is then a clear path so far as constitutional practice is concerned.¹

It is the third primary means of conduct of our foreign relations—the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements—that raises the constitutional debate. Initiated and negotiated by the executive, international agreements requiring the appropriation of moneys must be implemented by Congress whatever their formal nature (*i.e.* treaty or executive agreement); if cast in treaty form, then the Senate must give its consent by vote of two-thirds of the Senators present, before the President may ratify. Eventually a treaty or executive agreement may be tested in court as to its validity or meaning, but the great majority of international agreements are never subjected to judicial consideration.²

The policy of active diplomacy used in recent years to coordinate the military and economic strength of the free world in

¹ It is all but impossible to challenge in court the constitutionality of expenditures from general funds for any given object sanctioned by Congress. The doctrine is that a taxpayer's suit to enjoin United States' governmental spending on the grounds of an act being in violation of the Constitution will not be heard by the court. The judicial explanation of this doctrine is that no one taxpayer (nor even any state as *parens patriae*) has such an interest in the matter as to give him "standing to sue." This proposition, by no means self-evident (and indeed the rule is otherwise as to municipal corporations), is now well established. The result is that the Judicial Branch has by its own restraint almost entirely removed itself from this large area of constitutional law. The construction of the Constitution in this area is thus left to Congress and the Executive.

² President Washington asked the Supreme Court for advisory opinions on a number of international legal problems. The Court firmly but politely refused to give such advice, pointing out that its constitutional rôle was restricted to the consideration of actual cases and controversies, and that the Constitution expressly authorized the President to secure advisory opinions from his departmental officers. The Federal Judiciary has never departed from this practice, though the concept of what is a "case or controversy" has been in continuous development.

The provision in the Knowland Amendment that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in which it is claimed that a treaty or other international agreement conflicts with the Constitution would not appear to extend judicial jurisdiction beyond that already granted by Article III of the Constitution. Nor is any relaxation of the "case or controversy" requirement indicated.

meeting the threat of Soviet power has produced a series of treaties and executive agreements of vast importance. Secretary of State Dulles in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee estimated that some 10,000 executive agreements had been entered into in relation to the NATO Treaty alone. However, the treaties and other international agreements which have been or are being drafted by the United Nations or its specialized agencies, particularly the Human Rights Covenant and the draft statute for an international criminal court, have been those which the proponents of the amendments have cited as the most convincing examples of the necessity of constitutional protection against international agreements which deny or abridge the fundamental rights of American citizens or interfere in matters that are regarded as essentially local in character. These fears are expressed despite the fact that the agreements most criticized have neither been ratified by the United States nor has the executive branch indicated any intention of becoming a party to such agreements.

In view of the great volume of testimony before the Senate Committee, the countless newspaper articles, the numerous reports by various law associations and other interested groups and the veritable maze of periodical literature on the subject, the interested layman may be pardoned if he assumes, though in error, that the subject of the Bricker Amendment is an infinitely complex one about which only lawyers can talk with any degree of rationality and that it does not concern him.

In point of fact the basic issues which the Bricker Amendment presents, in terms of a proposed shift in the constitutional power of the various branches of the Federal Government and as between the Federal Government and the several States, are fundamental and may be simply stated: the provision included in both the Bricker and Knowland Amendments that any treaty which conflicts with the Constitution shall not be of any force or effect is essentially a provision for assuring that the Judiciary's power to review the constitutionality of legislation and other governmental actions is also a power to review the constitutionality of treaties and executive agreements.

The provisions of the Bricker Amendment that neither a treaty nor an executive agreement shall be effective as internal law in the United States without the passage of implementing legislation by Congress together with the provisions that all

executive agreements are to be subject to Congressional regulation are essentially proposals designed to increase Congressional control (and consequently to lessen executive authority) over international agreements in particular and the conduct of foreign relations in general.

Finally, the so-called "which" clause of Section 2 of the Bricker Amendment would limit the effectiveness of a treaty or an executive agreement or federal implementing legislation as "internal law" to the area in which Congress, absent any treaty, could legislate. This is essentially a proposal to provide for vesting exclusively in the several States the power to effectuate our international commitments affecting matters not otherwise within the scope of federal constitutional power.

It is these proposed transfers of power which underlie the greatest debate about the constitutional ordering of our foreign relations since 1788.

III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS CONFLICTING WITH THE CONSTITUTION

The provision that no international agreement which conflicts with the Constitution shall be of any force or effect, which is included in both the Bricker and Knowland Amendments, is viewed by its proponents as establishing—or at least removing all doubts as to—the power of the Judiciary to declare inoperative as domestic law an international agreement which conflicts with the Constitution. This proposal does not involve any shift in the constitutional division of powers with respect to foreign affairs. Indeed it is merely declaratory of existing law.

The whole history of our constitutional law, beginning with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in *Marbury v. Madison* (1 Cranch 137, U. S. 1803), indicates that the Court will not enforce governmental acts, be they executive acts or congressional acts, in violation of constitutional provisions. Why have a complex procedure of constitutional amendment if a simple statute, treaty or executive agreement can override a contrary constitutional provision? As Marshall pointed out at that time:

The Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.

If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law: if the latter part be true, then written constitu-

tions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature unlimitable.

Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void.

This reasoning applies in at least equal measure to treaties and executive agreements. The danger that the Judiciary will permit a treaty to override a conflicting constitutional provision is no greater than that the Supreme Court will overrule *Marbury v. Madison*, or that Congress will use its constitutional power to control the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to bar inquiry into the constitutionality of international agreements, or that the President will ignore the Court's determinations.

While the Supreme Court has never struck down a treaty provision as in conflict with the Constitution, it has never held or even suggested that a treaty might override the Constitution.³ Further, a long series of dicta in judicial opinions⁴ has stated the rule for treaties as fully consonant with the doctrine of *Marbury v. Madison*. Thus, in *The Cherokee Tobacco Case*, 11 Wall 616, 620-621 (1870), the Supreme Court declared that:

It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument.

Since it is established doctrine that a subsequent act of Congress will override the operation of a treaty as the law of the land, a contrary rule would lead to the anomalous result that a statute, itself clearly subordinate to the Constitution, could repeal a treaty superior to the Constitution.

It has been suggested by the proponents of the Bricker Amendment that the freedoms of speech, press and religion may not be protected against impairment by a treaty or executive agreement since the First Amendment in terms applies only to abridgment of those freedoms by Congressional legislation. However, the Federal Courts have regarded the First Amendment as limiting the other branches of the Federal Government as well, and it appears

³ The proponents of the amendment say *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) was such a case. However, no constitutional conflict was involved in that case, the facts of which are set forth on p. 17 and 18. Justice Holmes merely held that the treaty-making power was not subject to limitation by the Tenth Amendment since the Tenth Amendment by its terms only reserves to the States powers not delegated to the Federal Government and the treaty-making power is a delegated power. The Supreme Court has dealt similarly with challenges to the commerce power based on the Tenth Amendment: *U.S. v. Darby*, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

⁴ See the testimony of Atty. Gen. Brownell at the 1953 Hearings, p. 907-8, collecting those dicta.

reasonable to assume that they would regard it as also limiting treaties and executive agreements.

The same freedoms may also be protected by the Fifth Amendment which by its terms reaches every branch of the Federal Government under the provision that "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Clearly this does not admit of evasion by treaty or executive agreement. While the concept of due process of law certainly has not yet reached its ultimate judicial definition, the Supreme Court has held the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids abridgment by the States of the freedoms of press, religion and speech. Thus the similar "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment presumably forbids such abridgment by any branch of the Federal Government and by treaties and executive agreements.

IV. CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

The vast majority of formal executive agreements, that is to say written instruments embodying an international agreement or understanding of a somewhat formal and important nature, are entered into pursuant to prior legislative authority or are implemented by subsequent action by both houses of Congress, and are appropriately designated as "Congressional executive agreements." Most executive agreements involving the sole action of the Executive branch—*i.e.* "Presidential executive agreements"—are not formal instruments but rather agreements and understandings arrived at in the course of the day-to-day conduct of United States foreign policy. They have been described by John Bassett Moore as follows:

The conclusion of agreements between governments, with more or less formality, is in reality a matter of constant practice, without which current diplomatic business could not be carried on. A question arises as to the rights of an individual, the treatment of a vessel, a matter of ceremonial, or any of the thousand and one things that daily occupy the attention of foreign offices without attracting public notice; the governments directly concerned exchange views and reach a conclusion by which the difference is disposed of. They have entered into an international "agreement"; and to assert that the Secretary of State of the United States, when he has engaged in routine transactions of this kind, as he has constantly done since the foundation of the Government, has violated the Constitution because he did not make a treaty, would be to invite ridicule. Without the exercise of such power it would be impossible to conduct the business of his office.⁵

⁵ *American Political Science Quarterly*, v. 20, p. 385, 389-390.

The power of the Federal Government to enter into international agreements other than treaties is implicit in Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution providing that "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation . . ." and "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power. . . ." This power to enter into both Presidential and Congressional executive agreements has been expressly recognized on various occasions by the Supreme Court.

Congress now has the legislative power to regulate executive agreements within the scope of its expressly delegated powers. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution provides in part that

The Congress shall have power—

- To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises;
- To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations . . . ;
- To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization;
- To establish Post Offices . . . ;
- To define and punish Piracies and Felonies Committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
- To declare War . . . ;
- To raise and support Armies . . . ;
- To provide and maintain a Navy;
- To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.

Under these provisions, it clearly appears that Congress already has the power to regulate vast areas of possible international agreement: 1, taxation and tariffs; 2, commerce; 3, crimes under maritime and international law; 4, immigration and naturalization; 5, military procurement of personnel and supplies, and military justice. Furthermore, the prohibition in Article I, Section 9, that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . ." assures Congressional participation in the implementation of any executive agreement requiring the appropriation of moneys.

Congress has not been hesitant to exercise its admitted power to regulate executive agreements within the scope of these delegated powers. The first Congressional executive agreements were authorized during President Washington's first administration by the action of Congress in authorizing the Postmaster General to make suitable arrangements with foreign postmasters for the reciprocal receipt and forwarding of mail (1 Stat. 239 (1792)). Re-

ciprocal trade agreements are, of course, made under and in conformity with the Trade Agreements Act and the various amendments thereto. In the case of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, Congress spelled out in detail the provisions of an Executive Agreement to be entered into with the Philippine Republic (60 Stat. 141 (1946)).

Many proponents of the Bricker Amendment go further and assert that Congress now has full power under the Constitution to regulate all executive and other international agreements and that the provision in Section 3 of the Bricker Amendment expressly subjecting executive agreements to Congressional regulation is merely declaratory of existing law.

The Constitutional basis of this asserted plenary power in Congress is said to be the "necessary and proper" clause of the Constitution (Article I, Section 8) under which Congress is given the power "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers [the specific delegated powers of Congress], and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any Department or Office thereof."

It is very doubtful if Congress now enjoys this asserted plenary power with respect to the regulation of executive agreements. The wording of the necessary and proper clause would seem to contemplate implementation and not regulation or even prohibition of the exercise of other powers expressly granted by the Constitution.

The making of executive agreements is a national power which typically has for its constitutional basis the merger of the separate powers of the President and Congress. In view of the fact that they have exercised their power jointly in all but a relatively small number of cases involving executive agreements of any significance or long duration, it cannot be definitively stated what the President's powers might be in the event of a test of power between the executive and legislative branches. Perhaps the most helpful approach is that suggested by Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in the *Steel Seizure* cases, *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579 (1952):

The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that prac-

tice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical situations in which a President may doubt, or others may challenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal consequences of this factor of relativity.

1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. . . .

2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.

3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive, must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system. (343 U.S. 635-638)

In what areas does the President have independent power to enter into executive agreements? The President's position as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States" clearly carries with it the independent constitutional power to conclude such executive agreements as may be necessary to the effective discharge of his command responsibilities. Secondly, the diplomatic power of the President, including his power to appoint and receive Ambassadors and other public ministers (Article II, Section 2), gives him the power to recognize and then communicate and negotiate with foreign states and governments "as the sole organ of the Federal government in the field of international relations" and conclude international agreements incident thereto. See *United States v. Curtiss-Wright*, 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). The President's power to "take care that the

Laws be faithfully executed" (Article III, Section 3) also gives him a certain power to enter into executive agreements, particularly those which are essentially administrative in character, implementing Congressional legislation where there is no express grant of authority in such legislation to enter into executive agreements pursuant thereto. The President requires these independent powers to enter into executive agreements both to meet national emergencies⁶ and to handle the routine conduct of foreign affairs.

Congress on the other hand would appear to have preëminent constitutional power with respect to executive agreements within the scope of its delegated powers other than the "necessary and proper" clause. Thus, an executive agreement contravening the provisions of a prior act of Congress in an area subject to regulation by Congress under its commerce power was held void by Chief Judge Parker writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the case of *United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.*, 204 F. 2d 655 (1953). Moreover, the Constitution expressly vests "All legislative Powers herein granted" (Article I, Section 1) in the Congress. The majority opinion in the *Steel Seizure* cases confirmed that this constitutional language means exactly what it says—i.e. that Congress and not the President is the "lawmaker" within our constitutional division of powers. Thus it would appear that to the extent any executive agreement is operative as law in the United States, Congress has primary constitutional power, and may, as in the case of a treaty, override the operation of the agreement as law by a subsequent statute.⁷

The present article is not intended to be technical, and its object is not to delimit exactly the respective scope of Presidential and Congressional authority with respect to executive agreements. "The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white." (Dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes in *Springer v. Philippine Islands*, 277 U.S. 189, 209.) However, this article is intended to demonstrate that the present constitutional scheme with respect to the entering into of executive agreements is one not of legislative dominance but

⁶ Consider the international arrangements for the Berlin air lift.

⁷ This will not, of course, relieve the United States of its obligation under international law to the other contracting nation. To the extent such obligations are not otherwise discharged, the United States may be subject to an international claim, which may be pressed through diplomatic or international arbitral or judicial channels.

rather of shared power between the President and Congress as coördinate branches of the national government.

It may be urged that it is only the residual or ultimate power that the Bricker Amendment would transfer to the Congress. That is to say, until Congress directed the President not to enter into specified executive agreements, or to enter into them only on certain stipulated terms, he could continue to do so, as heretofore. But residual control is of the highest importance in a system of checks and balances.

This was sharply demonstrated after the Civil War when a well-nigh all-powerful Congress not only came within one vote of convicting an unpopular President in impeachment proceedings but also tampered mightily with the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court during the very pendency of an appeal to that Court. *Ex Parte McCordle*, 7 Wall. 506 (U.S. 1868) was an *habeas corpus* case which would have tested the validity of much post-Civil War reconstruction legislation. The test of Congressional power never arrived; the Congress had regulated out of existence the power of the Court to review the legislation. It is thus, at times of stress between the separate branches of government, that these residual powers become crucial. As *Ex Parte McCordle* demonstrates, Congress is not free from the temptation to abuse power,⁸ and the burden of proof is on those who assert the necessity for altering the present system of shared power in favor of Congressional supremacy.

Easily the most difficult aspect of the entire problem of constitutional control of international agreements—that of defining the respective areas in which a treaty, a Congressional executive agreement, or a Presidential executive agreement is the proper or indeed the only permissible form in which a given international understanding should be cast—is totally unanswered by the Bricker Amendment. That is, except to the extent that charging Congress rather than the President with the responsibility for making the determination may be regarded as a solution.

The doctrine that treaties and executive agreements are wholly interchangeable instruments of national policy may be heady fruit for an executive bent on bypassing the Senate heedless of the policy of coöperative action which is a logical, if not neces-

⁸ See for the subsequent history of that battle, "The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts," by Henry M. Hart, Jr., *Harvard Law Review*, v. 66, 1362, June 1953.

sarily a legal, corollary of the Constitutional separation of powers.

However, it is difficult not to agree with Secretary of State Dulles that "This is an area to be dealt with by friendly coöperation between the three departments of government which are involved, rather than by attempts at constitutional definition, which are futile, or by the absorption, by one branch of government, of responsibilities which are presently and properly shared.⁹ Moreover, the pledge that he was authorized to make on behalf of the President—that "when there is any serious question of this nature and the circumstances permit, the executive branch will consult with appropriate congressional leaders and committees in determining the most suitable way of handling international agreements as they arise"—bespeaks full awareness of the implicit constitutional principle of maximum coöperation consonant with the President's discharge of his diplomatic and military responsibilities.

V. TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AS "INTERNAL LAW"

Section 2 of the Bricker Amendment providing that "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation . . ."¹⁰ represents in part at least an attempt to afford additional protection against the adoption of unwise treaties by providing for participation by the House of Representatives in the implementation of all treaties. In view of the fact that no treaty may enter into force unless two-thirds of the Senators present¹¹ have consented to its ratification, the added protection achieved, if any, would not seem to justify the delays and procedural problems attendant upon the automatic imposition of this second legislative step in all cases. If with respect to any given treaty, participation of the House of Representatives (in addition to that which would be necessary in any event if appropriations

⁹ Statement of Hon. John Foster Dulles, Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on S.J. Res. 1, p. 828 (83:1).

¹⁰ The surface similarity of Section 3 of the Knowland Amendment providing that "When the Senate so provides in its consent to ratification, a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress" is misleading. The Senate already has full power to attach reservations to its consent to ratification—a power which it has frequently and recently exercised. See footnote 13 on p. 18.

¹¹ Section 2 of the Knowland Amendment which, in effect, requires that a treaty-consent vote in the Senate should always be a record vote—thereby ensuring the presence of a quorum—seems entirely sound. No treaty should be slipped through via opportunistic timing. It appears, however, that a change in Senate Rule XXXVII prescribing the treaty-consent procedure would be sufficient to ensure the presence of a quorum.

are required) is desired, a provision may be inserted in the treaty or the Senate may attach a reservation that the particular treaty in question shall not be self-executing.

The requirement of Congressional legislation in all cases would also shift a certain amount of Senate power over foreign affairs to the House. In the future it would force the Executive in negotiating any treaty to consult House leaders in addition to Senate leaders. The dispersion of power would be particularly disrupting if the House majority were of a different party than the President and the Senate, a condition that has existed in 12 out of the last 90 years.

The application of Section 2 to Congressional executive agreements would not require a second legislative round if the Congress were to provide in the enabling act that such executive agreements would become effective as internal law when made by the President. Nor would much waste motion be involved in respect of those executive agreements inherently demanding further Congressional action anyway (*i.e.* a special appropriation).

While in respect of Congressional executive agreements, the proposed Section may be regarded as making a largely innocuous, but at the same time completely useless and unnecessary change, yet in respect of Presidential executive agreements it raises a more fundamental issue. It has been asserted that a Presidential executive agreement can operate as "internal law" affecting the rights and property of private individuals without Congressional action of any sort. If so, the principle recently reiterated in the *Steel Seizure* cases that Congress and not the President acting alone is the "lawmaker" within our Constitutional pattern would be a principle of narrower application than the language of the Constitution and the Court would suggest. The basis for the fear of executive lawmaking through the instrumentability of Presidential agreements is not the language of the Constitution itself, for executive agreements are not the "law of the land" under the Supremacy Clause. Rather it is the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in *United States v. Pink*, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) and other cases involving the Litvinov Assignment that a treaty is the "law of the land" and international agreements such as the Litvinov Assignment should be regarded as having "a similar dignity" (*Id.* at 230). The status of these cases as authority for the broad proposition that Presidential executive agreements are to be treated as the law of the land is weakened by the special cir-

cumstances there involved. The Litvinov Assignment was an executive agreement under which the Soviet Government assigned certain claims to the United States Government and it was entered into concurrently with the recognition of the Soviet Government. Furthermore, the Litvinov Assignment though technically a Presidential executive agreement had received tacit Congressional sanction. Acting in anticipation of the realization of funds under the agreement, Congress had passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the appointment of a Commission to determine the claims of American nationals against the Soviet Government, a legislative fact which the Supreme Court expressly noted in its opinion.

The ambiguity in the Supreme Court's doctrine is matched by the ambiguity in the term "effective as internal law in the United States." Would the Courts regard even Presidential agreements which were non-legislative in character as nullities if they became indirectly involved in a law suit? Would government officials in the United States feel constrained not to implement the terms of a Presidential executive agreement even though the necessary implementary action itself was clearly within the scope of their authority?

There has been neither a convincing showing that there is a real risk of lawmaking by Presidential executive agreements and judicial enforcement of such agreements in matters of private rights, nor a precise definition of the area in which Presidential agreements without supporting legislation would be treated as nullities. No compelling necessity or viable formula for amendment of the Constitution has been presented.

VI. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

Besides vesting full regulatory power over executive agreements in Congress, the major effect of the Bricker Amendment would be in the realm of Federal-State relations. The "which clause" of Section 2¹² in effect equates treaties and federal implementary legislation with federal statutory law by saying that the former shall be effective as "internal law" only where the latter would be. In view of the latitudinarian construction given by the Supreme Court in recent years to Congressional powers

¹² "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through legislation *which would be valid in the absence of treaty.*" The second sentence of Section 4 applies this rule to executive agreements as well.

and the increasingly marked State catholicity of outlook, this result may not be nearly so important as it might once have been.

The present constitutional arrangements in this area are illustrated by the case of *Missouri v. Holland*, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The facts of the case were that after two lower Federal Courts had held federal migratory bird statutes unconstitutional, the United States and the United Kingdom (acting for Canada) in 1916 entered into a treaty to protect from extermination many species of birds which annually migrated across Canada and the United States. On July 3, 1918, Congress passed a statute to enforce the provisions of the treaty. When Holland, a United States game warden, sought to enforce the statute, Missouri sued to enjoin him from doing so, on the ground that the Act was an unconstitutional interference with the rights reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, which provides that:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Justice Holmes answered this contention, and upheld the constitutionality of the Treaty and Statute, by reasoning as follows:

(1) If the Treaty is valid there is no question but that the Statute is, since under Article I, section 8, this is a law necessary and proper to execute a power—the treaty power—delegated to the Government of the United States, and expressly prohibited to the States.

(2) The Treaty, dealing with a subject of international concern, is valid as within the treaty power expressly delegated to the Federal Government by Article II, section 2.

(3) Since treaties made under the authority of the United States are the supreme law of the land the State of Missouri is bound by the Treaty and the enforcing act.

Justice Holmes said this was true whether or not it were assumed that the older lower court cases were correct that the same statute enacted by Congress, in the absence of a treaty, would have been unauthorized and unenforceable, pointing out that:

The treaty in question does not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. . . . No doubt the great body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.

He then cited various cases for this proposition and went on:

Here a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert with that of another

power. The subject matter is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States.

Under the Bricker Amendment's proposed reversal of the doctrine of *Missouri v. Holland*, while the Federal Government would still in theory be free to enter into a treaty on a subject of international concern, it would, to the extent the subject matter was not otherwise subject to the reach of federal power, be required to depend on the acquiescence of each of the 48 States to enact necessary implementing legislation. The reluctance of other countries to enter into a treaty with the United States where the fulfillment of the main purpose of the treaty would depend on the favorable action of 48 State legislatures would be understandable.

There are many other areas such as collection of foreign debts, the right to carry on a business and local taxation, in which the traditional ordering of legal relations has been by State law, but treaties have been concluded which are contrary to the State law. The most frequent such conflict has been over the right of aliens to inherit real estate. Despite the fact that of all legal matters, probably those dealing with real estate and rules of inheritance are most peculiarly within the reserved powers of the States, the Court has always held that through the treaty power, the Federal Government may provide effective rules of inheritance for aliens.¹³

The transfer of power from the Federal to the State Governments sought to be made by the Bricker Amendment (but not by the Knowland Amendment) is not as of great import as it once would have been in view of the Supreme Court's broad construction of the commerce clause and other constitutional sources of federal power. Nevertheless, the result in some situations might be to prevent effective treaties securing and granting reciprocal rights to our citizens and to citizens of the other treaty nations and to hamper seriously the Executive's power over foreign policy.

¹³ To the extent the Senate does not desire that a particular treaty provision override State law, an appropriate reservation to that effect may be included in its consent to ratification. As recently as July 22 of this year, the Senate, in granting its consent to the ratification of treaties of commerce and friendship, attached the reservation that the treaties should not grant to aliens the right to practise certain professions in any State that by law barred aliens from such practice.

Our need for the friendship and coöperation of many foreign nations in meeting the very real threat of Soviet aggrandizement suggests that this is not the time to add stumbling blocks to the implementation of our foreign policy or the time to disintegrate federal power when dealing with a monolithic power like the Soviet Union.

It was long ago decided that subjects of international concern should be dealt with on a federal level. To the extent it is thought desirable to check or reverse the trend toward centralized government, there are many other ways of shifting present federal duties and power to the States—primarily via internal fiscal reform. The attempt to do it in the international sphere would appear to be the least logical and the most dangerous to our welfare.

VII. CONCLUSION

The problem is simple and fundamental. It should not be reserved to lawyers to debate.

The locus of power to formulate and execute this country's foreign policy was intentionally concentrated by the founding fathers in the Federal Government, particularly in the President and Senate.

The specific provisions of the Bricker Amendment are in sum a proposal radically to shift this constitutional ordering of authority over foreign relations by augmenting Congressional powers and by requiring the necessary participation of the States for the execution of foreign policy in certain areas. The powers of a sovereign state would thus be emasculated.

The burden of proving strong and compelling necessity is incumbent on those who would so drastically alter the constitutional framework. That burden has not been discharged.

THE KREMLIN'S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE STALIN

By Philip E. Mosely

IN the months since Stalin's death the new leadership in the Kremlin has made serious efforts to break out of the East-West stalemate and has displayed an unaccustomed flexibility in wielding the almost disused weapons of diplomacy. It has brought its opponents, some reluctantly, some enthusiastically, to agree to participate in two major conferences, on Germany and on Korea. In so doing, it has chosen the terrain and the weapons for wreaking maximum damage against the vulnerable joints of the alliances which the West has shored up since 1948 against Soviet acts and threats of violence. As in the fable, the Soviet sun has suddenly taken to shining warmly; and the free-world wayfarer, having forgotten the north wind, is ready to throw away his cloak and bask in its rays.

Some of the first steps in carrying out the new Soviet line were little more than gestures. The decision to allow several Russian wives, married to American citizens, to leave Russia with their husbands makes no change, of course, in the unique Soviet law which, passed since their marriages, forbids Soviet citizens to marry foreigners. Except in the Kremlin, no one would consider this an act of grace. The Soviet "recommendation" to the Chinese Communist and North Korean Governments to exchange seriously ill and disabled prisoners-of-war could be regarded as an act of great generosity only by people who have unconsciously accepted the Soviet assumption that not only its own people but captured prisoners are the property of the captor, who has both the right and the duty to enslave them to his ideology. Moscow's intercession to secure the release of United Nations civilians illegally detained in Korea for almost three years would have been a routine action on the part of any Western Power. Yet each of these "gracious acts" held the headlines for many days, and, cumulatively, they have led many people to believe, as one analyst wrote recently, that the new Soviet leadership is "digging a tunnel of friendship to the West," and that the main obstacle to peace is that the West may not begin "digging from its end."

Some of the new Soviet gestures have simply meant the scrapping of a profitless obstinacy. For many months the Soviet posi-

tion in the question of selecting a successor to Trygve Lie as Secretary General of the United Nations had been a fruitless one, even from the point of view of Soviet interests. Moscow's attitude did not halt the work of the United Nations and it served to focus the fears and resentments of the nations of the non-Soviet world. Acceptance of a new Secretary General was a step to allay them.

Similarly, the recall of ambassadors from Belgrade and Athens had been acts of hostile pressure. Whatever internal tensions and divisions this Soviet gesture was expected to generate had long since been discounted, and a renewed exchange of ambassadors removed a useless annoyance. Meanwhile, the propaganda warfare against the Tito régime, the frequent border incidents, and the building of satellite forces ringing Yugoslavia go on unchanged. Renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel likewise liquidated a fruitless effort to intimidate a small state. In his announcement of July 20 Molotov stressed particularly that the Government of Israel had repeated its unilateral pledge not "to take part in any alliance or agreement pursuing aggressive aims against the Soviet Union."

In June Moscow dropped its postwar claims against Turkey's territory and sovereignty. By a note of May 30 it renounced its claims to Kars, Ardahan and Artvin, purely Turkish territories which it had demanded since 1945 as a token of "friendship." At the same time it abandoned its demand for "joint" Soviet-Turkish control of sea and air bases in and around the Straits; if accepted, this demand would have gone far to make Turkey a Soviet satellite by depriving it of control over its most strategic territories, including its largest city. The Soviet note went on to state that "it is possible to insure the security of the U.S.S.R. in the matter of the Straits on conditions equally acceptable both to the U.S.S.R. and Turkey." Without stating what conditions would be acceptable, the Soviet Government clearly implied that Turkey would be well advised to come to a direct agreement with Moscow in advance of 1956, the year in which signatories are free to withdraw from the Montreux Convention on the Straits. Two later Soviet notes complaining against United States and British naval visits to the Straits, rebuffed by Ankara, presumably serve to build up Soviet pressure to change the Montreux Convention before agreeing to its renewal.

The hard-headed Turks needed more than a note of this kind to believe in a Soviet change of heart, but this renunciation of a

prize which the Soviet leadership could not seize without risk of a major war allowed Malenkov to proclaim to the Supreme Soviet that "The Soviet Union has no territorial claims against any state whatever, including any of the neighboring states." In his speech of August 8 Malenkov also stressed the Soviet desire to maintain good relations with Afghanistan and to settle pending financial and border questions with Iran. He made no mention of Iran's long-standing desire to eliminate from the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1921 the clause which permits the Soviet Union to introduce its forces into Iranian territory in case its security is threatened by the forces of a third power stationed in other parts of Iran.

In its foreign trade negotiations the Kremlin has also displayed greater flexibility. It has recently concluded a whole series of new trade and clearing agreements without insisting on breaking down the U.S.-inspired restrictions on the export of strategic commodities to the Soviet bloc. Perhaps Moscow assumed that these controls would break down rapidly once the truce was completed in Korea. Soviet representatives made a striking gesture in the meetings of the Economic and Social Council. Muting their traditionally shrill attacks upon the United Nations' program of technical assistance to underdeveloped countries, they offered, for the first time, a Soviet contribution to the program, which has great prestige in the unindustrialized areas. In the trading sessions sponsored by the Economic Commission for Europe, the Soviet spokesmen have also shown recently a desire to talk business rather than mere propaganda.

The most striking shift in Soviet policy has been the conclusion of the Korean truce, the liquidation of one of Stalin's most glaring mistakes. From the moment the United Nations, and particularly the United States, struck back against the Soviet-inspired and supported aggression of the North Korean régime, it has, on balance, been to Soviet advantage to end the conflict sooner, rather than later, and the dragging out of the negotiations for more than two years after Malik's offer, in June 1951, of a truce, has compounded the original error of judgment. During this long and bloody struggle the Soviet bloc has been forced to abandon its original goal: the immediate annexation of South Korea and the elimination of Western influence from a key-area on the Asiatic mainland. Resistance to Soviet-instigated aggression has greatly improved the capacity of the United Nations to take collective action, and it has stimulated a rapid expansion of the war poten-

tial of the United States, a substantial strengthening of the NATO forces in Europe and a firmer attachment of Japan to the free world. It has focussed the attention of the free world more clearly on the international implications of the struggle in Indo-China. Since May 1951 it has resulted in a more effective enforcement of controls over the export of strategic goods to the Soviet bloc.

The only gains which the Soviet régime has made from prolonging the struggle have been primarily in the propaganda field, and that within the Soviet bloc or among Soviet-oriented segments of opinion elsewhere. It has developed to the full its accusations of "germ-warfare," and has enabled the Chinese Communist forces to win local offensive actions in the closing weeks and thus to assert that they had "forced" the United States and its allies to accede to a truce. Not even this great fanfare can conceal from the peoples in the Soviet bloc the fact that large numbers of North Korean and Chinese prisoners have refused to return to their Communist-dominated homelands and that the United Nations bloc has defended their right to refuse repatriation.

II

The Soviets assume that in Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism they possess the only valid "science" of prediction, but since the MacArthur hearings made clear the United States' determination to wage a limited war, the Soviet leadership seems to have followed a Micawber-like policy of waiting for something better to turn up. This was made evident in a striking statement by *Pravda* in January 1952. In an election year, said *Pravda*, it is probable that the "extreme imperialists" in America, who want to "conquer the world," will encounter many surprises, especially from the "reasonable imperialists," who favor the retraction of American ambitions to the Western hemisphere and who are urging an unconditional withdrawal from Korea. Thus, throughout all of 1952 Moscow watched eagerly for America to withdraw from the Korean struggle, leaving the Soviet Union free to take over the entire peninsula. The outcome of the election, and the growing demand in American public opinion to find new ways to break out of the self-imposed military deadlock, must have tipped the scales in favor of permitting or directing the conclusion of the truce, as Stalin hinted broadly but vaguely in his Christmas Eve written interview. Such is the power of self-deluding dogma that it required costly sacrifices of lives, between June 1950 and July

1953, to convince the Kremlin that the "decadent imperialists" were determined to thwart its plans of conquest in Korea.

With the conclusion of the truce, Moscow has recovered a wider range of diplomatic manoeuvre. The calling of a political conference for October opens the way to probe the political defenses of the West at their most vulnerable points. All the issues which divide the major Powers of the free world will come before the conference, whatever formal limitations of agenda may be sought. The allies of the United States are dubious of Syngman Rhee's willingness to be restrained from some new venture to force the unification of Korea and skeptical of the American ability to restrain him without weakening the precarious stability of South Korea. They are eager to seat Communist China in the United Nations, and to renew unrestricted trade with the Chinese mainland. They are doubtful of the value of maintaining indefinitely the Chinese Nationalist régime on Formosa. The allies, and especially the French, hope that by yielding to Peiping in all other issues they may persuade Mao to refrain from reinforcing the Communist-led Vietminh with Chinese troops and even to cut off its sole and indispensable supply of equipment and munitions. The Western Powers enter the political conference with a tacit commitment to avoid the threat and risk of a new war, and with rigid limits imposed on their field of manoeuvre by strongly held sentiments at home, sentiments which differ from country to country. Whatever the invisible strains behind the façade of the Soviet bloc, it derives immediate advantage from its monolithic freedom of manoeuvre in both policy and propaganda. The amazing thing is that the Soviet leadership held off the conclusion of the truce for two years, instead of attempting to exploit more actively the political divisions among the Powers which had joined to resist its aggressive plans.

In Germany the open defiance of Soviet power by the workers and peasants of the Eastern zone has dealt a body-blow to Soviet prestige and has hampered, for some time to come, Soviet freedom of action. Whatever doubt there was of the hatred of most East Germans for the Soviet régime and its puppets has been dissipated by the uprisings of June 17. The Soviet leadership, probably misled by the optimistic reports of its own agents and stooges, again misjudged the temper of its German subjects.

Any attempt to reconstruct the inner sequence of Soviet decisions is hazardous, but it seems clear that by May the new Krem-

lin leadership had reviewed the situation in Germany and had marked out a program designed, at best, to harness to its own purposes the desire of nearly all Germans for a reunited and independent country and, at the least, to turn the striving for unity against the Adenauer Government in the September elections, and against the attachment of Western Germany to the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic forces. To achieve this, the Soviet Government needed to stop the decline in living standards in Eastern Germany, restore the workers' and peasants' willingness to produce, and therefore slacken somewhat the recently tightened labor controls and reassure the individual peasants, the mainstay of the supply of food and raw materials, that there was no immediate intention for forcing them into the collective farms. Consulted as to whether this temporary relaxation could be carried through without risk, Beria and Zaisser, the police-head in the Eastern zone, asserted, presumably, that there was nothing to worry about. Instead, the rank-and-file in East Germany took the concessions as a sign of weakness and, in an unprecedented act of heroism, arose and destroyed all pretenses that the Pieck-Grotewohl régime had any popular support.

Back of the program of relaxation was probably a longer-range plan: by making the East German régime more tolerable to its own subjects, its chances of being accepted as a partner in any negotiations for the reunification of Germany would be improved. While the Soviet leadership continually talks of the primary responsibility of the four major Powers for bringing about the reunification of Germany (as in its note of August 16), it must realize that, at least in the Bonn Republic, the decisive voice in this matter has passed from the Western allies to the German people itself. In the long run the Western Powers cannot resist a strongly-pressed demand within the West German Republic that "Germans sit down with Germans" to resolve the question of reunification. It is probable that the proposed program of relaxation in Eastern Germany was intended not only to relieve the Soviet economy of onerous contributions of food and other supplies, and to strengthen, over the longer run, the economic and political stability of the puppet régime, but also to make that régime more acceptable to many West Germans as a negotiating partner and thus to facilitate the Communist campaign in favor of a direct arrangement between the two German republics.

The blow which the uprisings of June 17 inflicted on Soviet

prestige has been a sharp reminder to the Kremlin that behind all its propaganda smoke screens its domination over East Germany rests on the presence of Soviet troops and tanks and on MVD controls. Moscow cannot now rely on its German puppets to control even the East zone, much less to capture control of a united Germany. But the Soviet leaders have skillfully salvaged some advantage from this unforeseen blow. The East German uprisings have intensified the demand in West Germany for the earliest possible liberation of their brothers from Soviet domination and have raised, probably too high, their confidence that the puppet régime in the East can be thrust aside with ease. Thus, the June events in the East made the issue of unity the paramount one in the September elections in West Germany.

The Soviet note of August 16 and the Moscow communiqué of August 23 were cleverly calculated to draw advantage from this reaction, even though it is most unlikely that a victory of the Social Democrats over the Adenauer bloc would bring any gain to Soviet policy. "The incorporation of West Germany into a European army and into the North Atlantic bloc," the note stated flatly, "would render impossible the unification of West and East Germany in a united state." It went on to propose the conclusion of a peace treaty within six months and the cancellation of reparations and of postwar state debts, as of January 1, 1954.

The offer to cancel reparations was designed to remove the fear that a united Germany would be saddled with a crushing mortgage of reparation, which the Soviet Union would then use to force it into economic and political subjection. The Soviet communiqué of August 23 also promised the return to German ownership of 33 Soviet-seized enterprises, presumably leaving some 50 large plants in Soviet possession. These enterprises are controlled directly from Moscow, operate without paying taxes or customs duties, and also enable the Soviet Union to milk the East German economy on a huge scale. The offer to cancel the German indebtedness to the Allies touches an emotional rather than a practical matter, since outright gifts of American aid since 1945 have greatly exceeded loans. The offer to limit the occupation costs to 5 percent of the budget in each of the two German Republics is bound to be popular. Since the East German budget is a highly centralized one and also covers a wide range of investment and other nonadministrative expenditures, the proposed limitation would cause a relatively slight loss to the Soviet treasury and a

relatively severe one to the British and the French Governments.

One of the most striking features in Malenkov's speech of August 8 was the shifting of the Soviet appeal from the Germans to the French. In it he reverted to an earlier Soviet theme, that a united and independent Germany must provide solid guarantees to its neighbors in Europe against a revival of militarism and aggression. He expressed particular sympathy for French fears of a rearmed Germany, even reminding Paris of the Franco-Soviet pact of November 1944 directed against a revival of Germany. In May 1952 Moscow had urged that a united and independent Germany should have its own armed forces, but in August 1953 this ticklish subject was not mentioned by Malenkov or the Soviet notes on Germany. The Kremlin appears most worried over the prospect of a rearmed Germany integrated into the Western bloc, and since the blow of June 17 it counts on the fears, widely shared by nationalist and neutralist as well as Communist opinion in France, to block the ratification of the European Defense Community and the integration of a partially rearmed Germany into the defenses of the North Atlantic area.

The EDC and NATO remain, as before, the greatest bugbears of Soviet policy-makers. As Malenkov stated hopefully in his speech, "Aggressive circles also take into account that, if today, in conditions of tension in international relations, the North Atlantic bloc is rent by internal strife and contradictions, the lessening of this tension may lead to its disintegration." In concentrating its propaganda on German hopes of unity and on French fears of a reunited and revived Germany, the Kremlin aim is clear. It hopes, by outwardly conciliatory words, to bring to a halt and reverse the movement which has been provoked by its own actions and menaces since 1948, toward strengthening the defenses and the political and economic unity of Western Europe and the cohesion of the free world. The only unity of Europe which it can accept is a Soviet-imposed unity.

III

In the light of the Kremlin's skillful recovery from the June 17 fumble, it hardly seems necessary to discuss in detail the notion, assiduously propagated in some quarters, that the Soviet régime is weak, frightened and confused and that it is so eager to "appease" the West that it may withdraw voluntarily from East Germany and even relax its grip on the satellites, and that

Malenkov is pressing for a Four-Power meeting in order to lay down the Soviet conquests at the feet of the West. True, the Soviet leadership was at first taken aback by the events of June 17. In order to present the suppression of the uprisings of unarmed workers and peasants as a Soviet victory, Malenkov has been forced to ascribe far-reaching aims to the West and to confess that the situation was a most difficult one for his government. "They intended to strangle the democratic forces of Germany, to destroy the German Democratic Republic, which is a stronghold of the peace-loving elements of the German people, to convert Germany into a militarist state and to reestablish a hotbed of war in the center of Europe. There is no doubt that, had the Soviet Union not shown steadfastness and firmness in the defense of the interests of peace, the Berlin adventure might have led to quite serious international consequences. This is why one can consider that the liquidation of the Berlin adventure represents an important victory for the cause of peace."

After some delay the Soviet press took the unusual step of admitting to its own people that widespread strikes and demonstrations had occurred throughout East Berlin and the Soviet zone, that definite concessions, long since taboo in Russia herself, had been made to the German workers, that small private businesses are to be permitted and even encouraged, and that the German peasants are free to continue as individual farmers and to withdraw from the collective farms. These are not examples of "Bolshevist firmness" which the Kremlin relishes placing before its own people and those of the satellites.

In East Germany the Kremlin has recognized the special political and geographical situation, and has applied the classic Bolshevik tactic of "one step back, two steps forward." The absorption of the "Democratic Republic" into the pattern of "peace-loving nations" is obviously far behind schedule. However, none of the Soviet gestures of relaxation which preceded or followed the uprisings of June 17 suggests the abandonment of the basic controls exerted by the Soviet system over its most valuable and profitable puppet, much less a willingness to cut it loose and allow it to be attached to the West.

The basic question which has plagued Western opinion since Stalin's death is whether the Soviet régime has been seriously weakened. One school of thought maintains that the régime is on the verge of being torn to pieces by the struggle for power in the

Kremlin, that it must seek a breathing-spell while the inner-party struggle is played to the end, until a new absolute dictator is enthroned. Here this school divides. Some assert that this is the very time for the West to intensify its efforts, to gain the maximum of concessions and to limit Soviet power and potential permanently. Others, the great majority, react to the assertions of Soviet weakness in an opposite way. They assume that the Soviet purposes have been changed radically, that the new leadership seeks actively to "join the club," that the period of alarms and costly efforts is over, and that it is no longer urgent to strengthen the political and military defenses of the West. Perhaps it is time to take a cool look at this newly discovered "Soviet weakness" and attempt to see whether it is apparent or real.

It should be stated at the outset that there is no sign of a demobilization of the very large Soviet armed forces, which are maintained in a high state of readiness, or of a slackening in the forced growth of war industry. Military observers agree that Soviet aircraft and armored units are as good or better than any United States equipment now in use, and that Soviet electronics are surprisingly good. Western observers accept generally the Soviet claim to know the secret of the hydrogen bomb. The remarkable postwar upsurge of economic recovery and industrialization has continued without let-up.

The recent meeting of the Supreme Soviet and Malenkov's speech of August 8 devoted special attention to two of the weaker sectors of the economy: agriculture and living standards. Foreign analysts have maintained since the war that the failure of farm production, the main source of foodstuffs and raw materials, to develop equally with industrial output could, if not corrected, become a major bottleneck limiting future progress and the ability to wage a prolonged war. Malenkov and other speakers at the Supreme Soviet outlined detailed measures which, over several years, can be expected to level agriculture up, and if this program is tackled seriously, there is no inherent reason why it should not succeed.

Greater productivity in agriculture is a key to improved living standards, and Malenkov's speech laid special stress on the improvements which have been made since March, and which are projected, in the supply of consumer goods. There are no inherent reasons why the Soviet economy cannot support a continuing high level of investment and war preparation and at the same

time undertake a gradual improvement in agriculture, transportation and consumer standards. The material available since March suggests no faltering in the program of economic expansion; indeed, it suggests much closer attention to improving labor efficiency and consumer satisfaction through offering a wider range of incentives. In the field of international politics the brief review already given of Soviet actions since March indicates that the Kremlin is manœuvring with confidence, flexibility and speed.

The concept of the new Soviet "weakness" is thus reduced to the assumption that the Soviet dictatorship and Stalin were so completely synonymous that his disappearance was bound to lead to confusion and disintegration, that a "new Stalin" could not emerge except after a long struggle, and that during this struggle the Kremlin's policy, including its foreign policy, would be uncertain and wavering. In my opinion, this analysis errs in overpersonalizing the nature of the Soviet system and in overlooking the ways in which the present system recognizes the tendencies which would cause it to break up, and counteracts them, as did the Ottoman system during several centuries.

One basic misconception is that the Soviet system rests upon several independent and competing power-institutions—particularly the Party, the political police, and the armed forces. If this were true, Beria would have controlled the appointment of all echelons of the police and enjoyed their direct loyalty, Bulganin would hold a similar position in respect to the armed forces, and Malenkov or Khrushchev in relation to the Party. True, something resembling this "separation" of power did exist at the beginning of Stalin's struggle for absolute control. Lenin treated his Politburo as a continuing conference of deputy chiefs of staff; once a decision was made in the Politburo, each deputy was responsible for carrying out the common decision within his own institutional sphere. Each deputy, in turn, selected his subordinates and developed groups or coteries of loyal supporters. Thus, at the time of Lenin's death, Zinoviev was responsible for the Leningrad organization and the Comintern, Kamenev for the economic system, and Stalin for Party organization, in the rather narrow sense of control over personnel rather than of ideology or policy.

The basic purpose and result of Stalin's ruthless reconstruction of the Party was to destroy this habit of "pluralism" or "apannage-building" within the Party, to eliminate actual or poten-

tial centers of authority which might compete with the domination increasingly exercised by him through the Central Secretariat of the Party, and thus to establish a genuinely centralized and monolithic control from above. The "Old Bolsheviks" could not forgive Stalin for having become the "dictator over the Party," and Stalin took his bloody revenge on them in the 1930's. The system of unified Party control was Stalin's great "invention." Through it he drove the Party and the country to tremendous exertions. Prior to Stalin's death, Malenkov had been, for 14 years, Stalin's direct assistant and deputy in manipulating this ruthless mechanism of unlimited power. There is no evidence that he has dismantled it since March.

Much has been made of the relatively self-effacing rôle which Malenkov has been playing, particularly in comparison with the daily laudations of the living Stalin. However, if Malenkov has the reality of power, it is to his advantage not to imitate Stalin in this respect. If he is in control of the Party machinery, it is more useful for him to act as the spokesman of a collective "will of the Party." This technique was also applied by Stalin in the struggle to consolidate his power. He undermined, attacked and eliminated one potential rival after another, always defending the "unity" of the Party against "factionalism" and "splitting." It was not until the last rival power-centers within the Party had been eliminated that Stalin began the campaign of self-glorification as "the leader." The celebration of his fiftieth birthday in December 1929, after six years of struggle for monolithic control, was the first striking occasion of Stalin's personal glorification, with a great display of tributes and portraits.

Even if Malenkov is in undisputed control of the Party machine, and hence of all other levers of power, it is to his advantage to stress the difference between his alleged service to the Party as a whole and Stalin's highly personal, arbitrary and unpredictable habits of rule. Stalin's death has been followed by a strong reaction against his "manner of work." Even the funeral orations showed a rapid discarding of the enforced deification of the "all-wise" leader. Malenkov's speech of August 8, similarly, contained only perfunctory references to Stalin, no longer "the Great."

Most significantly, the Party declaration on the fiftieth anniversary of its founding, published in *Pravda* of July 26, gave only modest praise to Stalin's rôle. "Generalizing the wealth of experience in building Socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the experi-

ence of the modern international liberation movement, J. V. Stalin creatively developed the Marxist-Leninist doctrine in application to new historical conditions and enriched revolutionary theory with new theses on many questions." Cutting Stalin down to size makes the rule of his successor easier. Stalin's rôle is now pictured as subordinate to that of the Party as a whole, and the Party, like the entire power machine, has begun to breathe more freely since he has passed from the scene.

The need for "protection of the rights" of citizens and especially of officials is felt strongly in the Soviet structure; the higher the official, the more precarious his position and even his life. Malenkov, the man of the Party machine, has made reassuring gestures to the "apparatus." His moves to increase the flow of consumption goods also reflect the aspirations of the bureaucracy. When he promises more private cars and television sets, better quality clothing and household equipment, he is appealing, not to ordinary citizens, but to the hierarchy, which alone can expect to achieve these benefits.

What are the devices through which the Party leadership prevents the full-fledged development of competing institutions of power? First of all, Party responsibility, on the one hand, and police, military, administrative, economic and cultural responsibilities, on the other, have long since been fused. All activities of importance to the Party are subjected to a system of multiple supervision, through the hierarchy of Party cells, through the Party Control Commission, through the Central Secretariat, and through the personal secretariat which Malenkov presumably inherited from Stalin. All appointments above a certain level are subject to active initiation, review or veto by the Central Secretariat; this includes military personnel from the rank of colonel up, directors of factories, all commissioned officers of the secret police, county and city Party secretaries. The power of appointment, control and removal is actively exercised in the central locus of power, the Party secretariat.

Did Malenkov relinquish that central control when the office of Secretary General was eliminated and Khrushchev was appointed First Secretary? The change in title may simply indicate that Khrushchev was not to have the direct powers which Stalin had possessed but was to act as an agent of the Party Presidium, which Malenkov appears to dominate. Did the elimination of Beria, announced in July, mean that Malenkov was weakened, or

strengthened? The official statement on his arrest accused Beria of attempting to place the police above the Party. Perhaps Beria aspired to restore the system of power-sharing which had prevailed at Lenin's death, or perhaps Malenkov felt that Beria had been too long a competitor for the succession and was better out of the way.

Beria's downfall tends to confirm the picture of the supremacy of Party controls over all competing controls. Did the Army, which is dominated by Party-generals and is even easier to permeate with Party-controls than the secret police, take part in Beria's elimination? While reports speak of tanks rumbling through the streets of Moscow on June 27, there is no authentic information as to whether these were Army tanks, or whether they belonged to the special MVD army, controlled by Malenkov through Kruglov and used against its nominal chief, Beria.

In analyzing the structure of power in an on-going system, it is misleading to rely upon analogies with the past. In the system which Stalin had elaborated by 1929 and which he increasingly tightened in the following 20 years, strains of "separatist" institutional loyalty were recognized and deliberately contained. Under a system like this, individuals find it all but impossible to lay their hands on independent levers of power. What is important is not whether this or that prominent individual survives or is destroyed, but whether there is likely to develop a direct and mutually destructive clash between power-instruments. Will the army destroy the secret police, or the secret police destroy the Party? This is most unlikely. Present evidence requires us to assume that the Soviet system is going to continue as a tightly operated Party-dictatorship, though less personalized in a deified dictator. Its new leadership, which prefers to call itself "collective" for sound Soviet reasons, displays striking qualities of realism and flexibility. If this is so, then the challenge and the dangers which Soviet power and purposes present to the strength, cohesion and survival of the free world are definitely not on the wane, but are increasing. These dangers can be increased still more only if responsible opinion within the free world indulges in day-dreams of the "inevitable" self-destruction of the Soviet dictatorship.

LOCARNO AGAIN

By Byron Dexter

METHODS of keeping peace in a world threatened with war are again the subject of debate, and opinions differ as to whether new developments have brought us nearer to peace or to war. Sir Winston Churchill's suggestion, in his speech on foreign policy in the House of Commons on May 11, 1953, that the application of the Locarno idea might be suitable in the situation that would follow a truce in Korea and a change of mood in Russia, met what seemed to be a quick rebuff in an editorial in *Pravda*.

Sir Winston had said:

We all desire that the Russian people should take the high place in world affairs which is their due, without feeling anxiety about their security. I do not believe that the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Europe is insoluble. Indeed, if the United Nations Organization had the authority and character for which its creators hoped, it would be solved already. . . .

The Locarno Treaty of 1925 was in my mind. It was the highest point reached between the wars . . . it was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France we should stand with the French, and if France attacked Germany we should stand with the Germans. The scene today, its scale and its factors, is widely different and yet I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germany and Russia in the minds of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Europe as the key to the peace of mankind.

Pravda's reply of May 24 branded the word Locarno "notorious," and the Locarno policy as "one of the important factors which prepared the Second World War." It was so, the editorial declared, because "while restricting the freedom of action for Germany in the West, it gave her freedom of action in the East, thus directing German aggression toward the U.S.S.R." On the record, that is to say, Locarno is a bad word—and the Russians wished to keep the record straight.

But the substance of *Pravda's* argument, and the cordiality displayed toward the British Prime Minister (in distinction to the contempt for "Eisenhower's new speech") make it a reasonable surmise that *Pravda's* objection to the British Prime Minister's hint stopped at the word and did not necessarily extend to the thing. The writer of the editorial was obviously interested not in the agreement of 1925, but in a "new agreement" in 1953,

toward which Sir Winston had taken the initiative. And the point of the argument was that such an agreement must meet certain conditions. "While speaking of Locarno, Churchill did not say a word about the reconstruction of Germany's unity, which is of decisive importance not only for Germany herself but also for the cause of safeguarding the security of Europe and the whole world."

The preconditions of a new agreement, *Pravda* suggested, are the end of the Bonn Government, the end of plans for creating a European Army, the reorientation of German trade and "national culture," and an acceptance of the Soviet conception of the Yalta and Potsdam documents. An end to Western recalcitrance toward Austria and toward the "great Chinese Republic" was also mentioned: in short, the old conditions for a "real settlement"—Stalin's conditions (another unsavory word, tactfully omitted). Given such a settlement, the Soviet attitude toward the applicability of a "Locarno" system—namely, a series of restricted pacts which would freeze the Western borders of the Soviet Empire while leaving the Far Eastern situation open—might reasonably be expected to grow more receptive.

Further discussion of these conditions is to come, and Sir Winston will assuredly have forceful thoughts to communicate about them. But though these need not be anticipated, some review of the Locarno idea in its original setting seems relevant at this moment, for Locarno signaled the decisive shift in British policy from the League system of collective security to a policy of "limited risks" in the inter-war years. A similar decision has now apparently been taken by the British Government. Indeed, the British view was outlined to Americans by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, in his address at Syracuse University a year and a half ago (March 25, 1952).

II

"Undertakings cheerfully assumed in the optimism which followed the conclusion of the War took on a graver aspect when it became apparent that they might actually have to be fulfilled," notes the historian G. M. Gathorne-Hardy drily, in a sentence which sums up the diplomatic activities of the six-year period which culminated in the Treaty of Locarno.¹ That there should

¹ "A Short History of International Affairs 1920-1939," by G. M. Gathorne-Hardy. London: Oxford University Press, 1950 (Fourth Edition).

be second thoughts was wise, for the Versailles Conference had left much unfinished business. The failure of the United States, and hence of Britain, to ratify the Three-Power Guarantee Pact with France, signed by Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau in June 1919, was in French eyes the most significant of these items. France at once took the best substitute she could get—a treaty with Poland, in 1921. It represented an accurate estimate of the danger which confronted her, and the first tracing of a strategic design which might meet it, if resolutely developed.

Britain rested her policy on the Covenant of the League. But what, precisely, did that commit her to? The Covenant contained provisions whereby states promised to use peaceful means to settle conflicts, but it did not make obligatory a forceful settlement of a war; it prohibited some wars, but not all. Did it, France asked, at Cannes in 1922 and again at Geneva in 1922, commit Britain to *military* action in event of German aggression? Lloyd George was willing to say that Britain would guarantee armed assistance to France if a German army crossed the French frontier. But would Britain, Poincaré persisted, invest in a structure of security built on two walls of foundation, either under the League or outside it? Would she, in plain words, guarantee eastern frontiers also, and with them, as the practical requisite for the exercise of any military power by the western states in Eastern Europe, underwrite in explicit terms the provisions of the Covenant (Articles 42 and 43) demilitarizing the Rhineland? Here were real risks, and less than perfect justice: the Polish Corridor, Upper Silesia, the future status of Germany. Lord Curzon said “no.” France occupied the Rhineland.

This was a crisis for the League system of collective security, and, if not surmounted, meant also the end of any rational hope of disarmament. But the League was, in fact, deeply supported in Britain, and after a general election the new MacDonald Government took the problem to Geneva. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Security, which was based on the principle that a general guarantee of military aid for victims of aggression was the indispensable precondition for reduction of national armaments, and which attempted, farsightedly if somewhat awkwardly, to utilize regional alliances to enforce League decisions, did not come to fruition. But it pointed the way. It put the horse in the shafts of the cart. The question was the will and sense of direction of the driver. The Geneva “Protocol for the Peaceful Settlement of In-

ternational Disputes," drafted by a committee of the Assembly under the chairmanship of Edward Beneš, gave the clearest answer that the 40-year effort to construct a workable international organization for safeguarding the peace of the world has as yet produced.

The Protocol was designed in every particular to reinforce the Covenant, and to reinforce it where, if a world organization is to be a help and not a hindrance in the task of curbing warlike states, its strength must be centered—namely, in its readiness to fight. It made the obligations of League members precise. Paragraph one of Article 10 read:

Every state which resorts to war in violation of the undertakings contained in the Covenant or in the present Protocol is an aggressor. Violation of the rules laid down for a demilitarized zone shall be held equivalent to resort to war.

And every Signatory obligated itself to respond to the call of the Council "in resistance to any act of aggression" with both economic and military assistance. The obligation to coöperate "loyally and effectively" in defeating aggression applied not on one side of Europe only, or on one side of the world only, but everywhere. The original articles of the Covenant may or may not have been susceptible to such an interpretation. The Protocol was plain.

On this foundation, the proposed annex to the Covenant developed procedures for arbitration and disarmament, and, most interestingly in retrospect, gave a firm answer to the problem of the relationship of regional alliances to the larger and more cumbersome parental organization. It did so reasonably enough by giving the parental organization authority. It entitled the Council of the League to receive undertakings determining "in advance" the military, naval and air forces which they would bring into action against an aggressor. It empowered the Council to call upon the states which signed the Protocol to apply *all kinds* of sanctions "immediately." It granted them rights of a belligerent. But since effective military planning would be difficult or impossible within an organization of 50 or 60 states, the Protocol also accepted the necessity for more particular alliances and gave them an explicit rôle. When the Council had called for sanctions, the signatories of the Protocol were authorized to aid the victim of aggression with "their" military, naval and air forces, "in accordance with any agreements which they may previously have

concluded." Every member of the League could sign the Protocol if it wanted to.

No one at the time supposed that all the particulars were in finished form; there were obvious flaws in the arrangements for arbitration, for instance. And, of course, among these guarantees, there was none, and could be none, which made certain that had the annex been ratified, the states whose representatives put their signatures to it would, in fact, "loyally and effectively" have kept their promise. The sharp point of these words was simply this: that if there was going to be talk of collective security based on a Covenant, this was what it meant.

Geneva came to life. At the opening debate of the Assembly, from which resulted the resolution on which the Protocol was built, wrote P. J. Noel Baker:² "There were seventeen speakers. Four of them were Prime Ministers in power, including the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France. Four of them were Ministers of Foreign Affairs in power. Two others were Cabinet Ministers of highest rank. Two were ex-Prime Ministers, two others were ex-Ministers of Foreign Affairs—all recently in power, likely to come to power again, and speaking by instructions and in the name of their governments at home." The Protocol was signed by representatives of 17 governments and ratified at once by one country—Czechoslovakia.

But the telling acknowledgment of its merit was, alas, a left-handed one. The commitment was too precise for the British Government. In a speech at Geneva a few months later—March 1925—Austen Chamberlain, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, destroyed it with one stinging blow. Why? The Dominions were against it, Canada in particular. ("We live in a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials," Prime Minister Mackenzie King's delegate had said.) A new government had come to power in Britain, with Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister and Winston Churchill suddenly in his father's great office, Secretary of the Exchequer. Lord Balfour was said to be full of doubt. The principle of arbitration was stretched too broadly; in view of the extent of the British Empire the obligations were too great. "The fresh emphasis laid upon sanctions, the new occasions discovered for their employment, the elaboration of military procedure, insensibly suggest that the vital business of the League is not so much to promote friendly coöperation and reasoned harmony in the man-

² "The Geneva Protocol," by P. J. Noel Baker. London: P. S. King and Son, 1925.

agement of international affairs as to preserve peace by organizing war," the British Foreign Secretary said. More concretely, the British Government made plain that Eastern Europe was not an area of vital interest to Britain. Six years later, Sir Austen stated the general principle thus: "Only in the case where her interests are immediately at stake and where her own safety must be directly affected by the result of any changes has Great Britain ever consented to bind herself beforehand to specific engagements on the Continent of Europe."³

The British decision of 1925 was frank and final. Prime Minister Herriot pled and protested in a ringing speech; but to no avail. As an instrument of collective security the League was dead. What results the League would achieve in its alternative rôle as an instrument of mediation and conciliation, for which the British Foreign Secretary explicitly cast it, remained to be seen.

What was to take the place of the Protocol quickly emerged. The German Government had already three times proposed restricted agreements covering the Western frontiers, and at the suggestion of Lord D'Abernon, British Ambassador in Berlin, the suggestion was made once more. Briand came to office in France, the representatives of the Powers met in the sunshine of Locarno, and, with the decision to turn their backs to the distant clouds, rejoiced to see only clear skies. Chief among the set of documents comprising the Pact of Locarno was the treaty guaranteeing the Franco-German and German-Belgian boundaries. This was signed by Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy. There were also various arbitration arrangements: between Germany and Belgium, between Germany and France, between Poland and Germany, and between Germany and Czechoslovakia; and France took the opportunity to conclude treaties of mutual assistance with Poland and with Czechoslovakia. These were bilateral agreements. France was active in all; Britain in none. They built a house of paper.

That the public should have taken this as assuaging the ancient feud between France and Germany is perhaps not surprising, since everyone immediately concerned in Europe thought best to proclaim it. But that, even though it brought Germany into the League, it should have been hailed as "strengthening the League" seems extraordinary. Three moves on the chessboard of inter-

³ "The Permanent Bases of British Foreign Policy," by Sir Austen Chamberlain. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1931.

national politics followed from it at once: Belgium moved toward neutrality, Italy moved toward Germany (Mussolini had no illusions about what it had done to the League and to the balance of forces on the Continent) and, inexorably and terribly, Britain and France were put in the position of antagonists for the next ten years.

The instrument for pressing the quarrel between the two Powers whose unity could have maintained peace and whose disunity made certain another settlement of the German problem on the battlefield was the question of disarmament. On the assumptions of Locarno the logic of pacifism was irrefutable. How could "assuagement" proceed save by the elevation of Germany to "equality?" And what could that mean save the disarming of France? No more efficient instrument for the destruction of France and Germany both could have been devised than this settlement which paralyzed the one and offered every reward to the leader most capable of clandestine manoeuvre in the other.

The League of Nations was master of ceremonies in the act of conciliation played out from 1925 to 1939. The reader may be spared the repetition of the dialogue in the successive disarmament conferences, for which the cues are so familiar—"security," "equality," "defense;" "war potential," "trained reserves," "total tonnage;" "limitations by categories," "limitations by ratios," "the immediate abolition of all armaments." The last was Litvinov's clever joke. But the bitter jest was that during the period of Germany's secret (or, rather, unavowed) rearmament, the logic of Britain's policy of limited risks made both herself, and the League of Nations in which she was the guiding spirit, the implicit ally of their then most dangerous enemy, and for practical purposes the enemy of their indispensable friend. Any British support for France's position in these abortive disarmament conferences was hailed—by Lord Lothian, for example—as contrary to the spirit of Locarno. And with the Naval Agreement of 1935, a British-German front against France became overt.

But that was near the end of the road for Locarno. French attempts to arrange an "Eastern Locarno" in 1934, to which the Soviet Union would be a party, had been greeted with disdain by the Third Reich, whose Eastern ambitions, growing on what they had been fed, now ran far beyond the earlier prize of the Successor States of Central Europe. France, however, had obtained (for what it might be worth) a treaty of mutual assistance with the

Soviet Union, to which was appended the famous supplementary treaty between Russia and Czechoslovakia, whereby the U.S.S.R. promised to aid the Czechs in the event of German attack, if France first intervened actively in their behalf. Using the Franco-Soviet accord as a pretext, Hitler sent his troops into the Rhineland March 7, 1936, and declared the Locarno Pact ended.

Even Locarno had provided for this contingency, in words not as plain as those of the Protocol of 1924, but in the citation of Articles 42 and 43 of the Covenant. But ten years of paralysis seldom yield to health and vigor in an afternoon. France remained where Hitler, truly an expert in pathology, had foreseen she would remain—behind her growing Maginot Line. Mr. Churchill was outraged; but he had been out of office some years now, and Stanley Baldwin was quite sure that he could do without his help this time. Democracy's last and greatest resource—the ability of worried men to speak their minds—began to be summoned; and there were plain speakers in Britain besides her greatest warrior.

But this process, too, takes time. When, at length, the argument had fully retraced itself and arrived again at the issue of 1924—the guarantee for the Polish frontier—the issue was faced and the guarantee given by the British Government. But meanwhile Hitler had fortified the Rhineland. There was no way in which Britain and France could bring help to Poland in September 1939, and the pledge bravely redeemed was useless. The final verdict on the pretense of 1925 that Germany and France were equally likely aggressors was rendered in June 1940.

III

The question of the suitability of a Locarno arrangement today for coping with the problem offered by the Communist bloc has two major aspects: first, whether a guarantee of the European boundaries of the U.S.S.R. would help induce the change in Russia which Western policy must seek to promote; and second, the effect that adoption of a policy of limited risk (the obverse of the Locarno coin) would have on the policy of collective security which the U.N. fought in Korea to vindicate.

Seven years after the Second World War the scale and factors are different, as Sir Winston says. Whether we conclude that a tightening of pressure, or a relaxation of pressure, will speed a bona fide change in the régime in the Soviet Union depends on

the reading of the whole complex problem of Communist dictatorship. Perhaps, in the final analysis, it depends on the extent to which Soviet domestic objectives have changed, since it is the severity of internal discipline which seems to create the need for foreign devils. Thought of a Western guarantee of Soviet frontiers in Europe assumes, of course, that European boundaries worth guaranteeing have been established. Whether in this event it would be wise to base an arrangement on the assumption that the Soviet Government and the government of a unified Germany were equally likely aggressors offers too speculative a situation for analysis. Certainly the West would not care to guarantee the frontiers of a German Communist régime. The revival of Locarno reasoning has been especially welcomed by those who cling to the hope of a neutral Germany. And this seems also to correspond with the outlines of *Pravda's* conditions: the old conditions.

However this may be, the effect of such a policy on the United Nations, and on collective security, is clear as the morning sun. In 1953, as in 1925, a Locarno system would be explicitly intended to replace the system of collective security under Paragraph 1, Article 1, Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations. A theoretical groundwork for this shift in policy was developed by Sir Gladwyn Jebb early in 1952, and recapitulated a year later.⁴ Much foreshortened, it runs as follows:

The United Nations is not a world government and is not likely to be for a long time. We must deal with it as it is. Executive functions in the Security Council are paralyzed by the veto; and military planning under the Assembly is almost insuperably difficult. If persisted in, it would wreck the world organization, not only because it would drive out the members it was planning against (the Communist states) but also the members of the "middle" Arab-Asian bloc, who would conclude that the Western Powers were more interested in organizing World War III than in preventing it. These things being so, the proper function of the United Nations is not the enforcement of peace, but the negotiation of settlements, especially settlements of such wars as do break out, in order that they may be kept from spreading into

⁴ "The Free World and the U.N.," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1953. Sir Gladwyn Jebb warned that so complex a subject could not be justly dealt with in a brief article; but stated also that he had "some reason to believe that so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the general line . . . will be one which will be generally acceptable." Subsequent discussion in the British press leaves no doubt of this. And Sir Gladwyn's views carry particular authority with Americans, who know how skillfully he has championed the United States against frenetic Soviet talk in the U.N.

world wars. Thus the U.N. can use its moral power. Its most useful function is that of "safety valve."

The primary function of the United Nations, at any rate until such time as it becomes something much nearer to a world government than it now is, lies, therefore, I suggest, much more in the direction of avoiding war than in waging it. The United Nations should not abandon this primary function of conciliation in favor of concentrating on the very specialised tasks for which the collective self-defense and regional organizations, provided for as they are under the Charter, were designed. If the United Nations attempted to do this, that is to say if it laid too great emphasis on what can be done by means of collective security at the present time at the expense of conciliation, the result would I am sure be to put such a strain on the organization that it would almost certainly fall to pieces in the process.⁵

In short, the "quite distinct rôle" of "pacific settlement" has become "more important from a practical point of view." If there must be resistance to Soviet aggression, NATO—or regional agencies like it—will shoulder the task. In that event, the Assembly would probably support some recommendatory resolution.

In his supplementary exposition of the policy, Sir Gladwyn spelled out this last idea carefully. It goes to the heart of the matter. If aggression should take place in the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, collective self-defense obligations would, he noted, immediately come into play and war would result; "but the question would at once be taken up in the Security Council, and if there was any obstruction by, for instance, the Soviet representative, it would within a very short period be referred to the General Assembly which, in accordance with the admirable 'Uniting for Peace' resolution, can now be summoned within 24 hours." We should hope that any victims of aggression would be able to secure a resolution recommending all good Members of the United Nations to give them such aid and support as they could. This would be only a recommendation but, more especially if it were passed by a large majority, "it would have a real moral value and might well have the result that states other than those covered by the obligations of the Article 51 organisation concerned would enter the struggle in a physical sense."

Other states, he continued, might at least be induced, in accordance with the "collective measures" procedures already devised by the General Assembly, to assist in ways not involving the dispatch of armed forces to the spot. Moreover, a majority

⁵ Address at Syracuse University, March 25, 1952.

of the Assembly could indicate that in its view one or more member states should organize the campaign against the aggressor, and the United Nations High Command so established would be authorized to make use of the United Nations flag. "All this, as I say," concludes Sir Gladwyn, "would be valuable provided we realise that it is not possible in the United Nations to go beyond general planning for defense against aggression from any quarter and with no definite aggressor named. For (I repeat) strategic planning against specific aggression can be done only by regional or collective self-defense organizations."

As a theoretical exposition of the proper relationship of the parent organization to its enforcement arm—the regional alliance—this is most interesting. For the impeccable logic of the argument has defined that relationship precisely as the Geneva Protocol of 1924 sought to construct it. This is exactly the relation that the parent organization was to have to its subsidiary police agency; and the relation that, in a Rhineland crisis of the future, the U.N. would almost certainly occupy. At the crisis, the over-all organization—the final repository of the moral authority of the world—would, that is to say, take the driver's seat. Having been thrust out of the window, it would march back through the open door, quite as Sir Gladwyn has thus marched it. NATO in the West, or a Pacific "NATO" in the East, would seek the recommendatory word of the Assembly of the United Nations; action taken would gain its moral justification from the one existing organ of world opinion; the allied nations would use its flag and act in its name.

But suppose when a Polish or German or Korean or Japanese "Rhineland" guarantee was violated, the General Assembly of the U.N. passed a condemnatory resolution upon the gathering police forces? Or suppose it simply said "whoa?" And is that not almost unquestionably what the Assembly of the United Nations would say, if it had been taught over a period of years that its more important function—a function quite distinct from, and obviously the opposite of, the "general planning for defense"—was pacific settlement? After Locarno and its policy of limited risk, the League of Nations existed simply to say "whoa." For the League itself was not dead after Locarno. Only its function as an agency of collective security had been annihilated. Three times the question of action against aggression was brought before the League in the middle thirties—once after Mussolini had invaded

Abyssinia, once after Hitler had announced the intention to re-arm in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and once after he had violated the provisions both of the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Locarno in regard to the demilitarization of the Rhineland. And each time the League performed the rôle for which the policy of limited risk had redesigned it in 1925. It spread the velvet carpet for retreat. To refer a proposal for enforcement action to the League meant the ceremonious interment of the faint impulse toward resistance. And the organization was deliberately thus used by those who wished to avoid action.

For the world organization to carry the process of preparing defense against a likely aggressor as far as possible and then, if need be, to turn the task over to its enforcement arm with will and sense of direction unimpaired is one thing; to condition it to look in the opposite direction indeed leads to a distinctly different result. It leads to Munich.

The probable answer to the riddle of these British approaches to a new policy is, fortunately, less alarming a problem than that, though problem enough. Britain and the Commonwealth have stayed with us through the confusions of our Korean leadership—a war fought in an area where they had no immediate interests. That is the hardest thing on earth for a parliamentary nation to do. And plainly Britain hopes not to repeat the experience. For the fact is that Britain's interest and America's interest diverge in Asia. Britain approaches that vast land from the southwest—and reaches India. We approach from the northeast—and reach China (or, further north, come upon our near neighbor, the Soviet Union, 100 miles across the Bering Strait).⁶ There is no reason to believe that Britain wishes to avoid action everywhere in Asia in the event of future Communist aggression. On the contrary, she begs to remind us that there is a great danger of Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, and she wishes to protect her immediate interests there.

The system of overlapping regional alliances that a Locarno policy would substitute for the United Nations system of collective security is designed to do so. And this, as we know, has always been Sir Winston's picture of the most useful scheme of international organization. That it would meet particular British needs in certain respects must be considered a feature that recommends it to us, for it is to our advantage in entering into any se-

⁶ cf. "Will Britain and America Split in Asia?," by G. F. Hudson. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953.

curity system to provide our strongest ally with every possible inducement for maintaining it. Under a Locarno system of 1953, a line in Europe would be held. A line in Southeast Asia would be held. The rest of Asia would presumably be open—with perhaps a “Rhineland” guarantee to neutralize certain areas.

Britain could expect that such an arrangement would to some extent open China's trade to her—not the primary consideration for her, but a most desirable objective. More importantly, it would please India and draw her more firmly into the Commonwealth—an intangible interest yet the overriding one for Britain in the Far East. It would mean the end of what many in Britain have felt was a policy of American adventure—or, at any rate, of quixotic involvement—in Asia, which they have feared would pull them unnecessarily into a world war. As direct partner in the defense of our Pacific Ocean frontier, she would feel that she was in a better position to exercise a restraining influence upon us, especially since with the abandonment of the principle of collective security, the United Nations would become a force for conciliation in Asia, not a focus of resistance. The removal of pressure upon Communist activity in Northeast Asia would increase the resources for maintaining it in Southeast Asia and Europe.

The conflict of interests in all this can be argued rationally and amicably. And plainly, there is much here that would be found congenial to the conception of basic American interests held by influential Americans. Mr. Hoover seems to have much the same picture of what constitutes a realistic policy of defense for the United States. Sea and air power would guard our ocean frontier in the Pacific; and with Britain assuming the leadership of the European regional organization as a result of the guarantee of European boundaries, the possibility of withdrawal of American troops from Europe would become greater. There, too, our frontier would be off the shore of the Continent. And for both British and American exponents of this policy, the collapse of United Nations' efforts to enforce peace would be a blessed relief from nerve-wracking complications.

But the price that may be exacted for this surcease should not be minimized. In such a system of overlapping alliances supposedly covering the world with a guarantee of defense, the decision to “hold” or to “give” in any particular crisis is in the hands of the Power which can shift position most quickly. In the pastoral

society of the eighteenth century, Britain could exercise this balance of power upon the Continent; and in the seaman's world of the nineteenth century she exercised it to the great advantage of all. But in the twentieth century the system failed twice when Germany was the aggressive Great Power. It could be expected to fail a third time against the Soviets. For in one important particular the position of Germany in the inter-war years and the Soviet Union today *are* the same. In respect to the political and military forces of 1925, Germany was then the Central Power, not only figuratively but in the most literal sense. She is no longer. The center has moved a thousand miles east. Today the Soviet Union is the Central Power. But a system of overlapping rings has no center. That is why its members can be picked off one by one, and why a United Nations was organized. Under a new Locarno policy, the U.N. would be designed to put the decision to "hold" or to "give" against aggression into the hands of the "Arab-Asian middle states"—in practice, India's.

Against the threat of aggression by an expansive-minded Central Power, there is a fundamental rule for keeping the peace—the one laid down by the most farseeing strategist of this century, Sir Halford J. Mackinder: in plain terms, to face aggression with the certainty of a two-front war. But if a world organization exists primarily to conciliate, its influence will be used on the side of an expanding Power. That is the lesson of the League and of Locarno. Whether it is to be the lesson of the past two years in Korea is still unclear.

In the twentieth century, a world organization of nations seems hard to abolish and very likely to be used. Imperfect, unfinished, exasperating though it is, it is the court of last resort. The genie has been let loose from the bottle. Nor was it Woodrow Wilson who let him loose. It was Orville Wright with his flying machine, and Marconi with his wireless, and Bell with his telephone, and Bessemer with his steel, and Stephenson with his locomotive, and Arkwright with his spinning jenny; perhaps it was Ben Franklin with his kite. If we do not learn to ride these new forces which have swept us together, they will drive us. Like it or not, the center of world gravity lies in those towering buildings on the shore of the East River. It is there in our time that the struggle for power—for freedom and peace—will be decided.

THE GRAND ALLIANCE HESITATES

By Hamilton Fish Armstrong

STALIN died, if we accept the official announcement, on March 5, 1953; and within a matter of weeks his successors began a series of conciliatory moves toward the West. Western statesmen at once warned that these probably did not represent any change in Soviet objectives but simply a new strategy. Their diagnosis was nearly unanimous: Moscow aimed to disrupt the Western alliance by pretending that Communist tyranny, imperialism and expansion were being modified and that the costs and pains of joint defense were therefore no longer necessary.

Within three months most of them had forgotten their own warnings, and in every Western government there were officials who acted or prepared to act as though the Soviet menace were actually on the wane. Public opinion was overjoyed, of course, to think that the clouds were parting and that, in the new light of Soviet reasonableness, defense expenditures and efforts could be reduced and taxes cut.

American leaders still repeated that we must proceed warily; but while cautioning in principle against any letdown, many of them accepted it in fact. They excused cuts in taxes on the theory that they need not reduce the military potential; they found plausible reasons for changing target dates for European rearmament previously considered vital; they discovered that to shift appropriations from expensive to less expensive types of armaments would actually increase military efficiency: they were more ready to excuse the lag in arrangements to give warning of an air attack, more complacent about the fact that defenses against attack hardly existed and less willing to vote funds to remedy the situation; they became convinced that our Foreign Service and foreign information activities were too extensive for "peacetime" and could be cut arbitrarily across the board; they reduced foreign military aid and tied strings to new appropriations, the argument being that Europe had used previous American aid as a substitute for taxes to balance national budgets, ignoring the fact that we had urged increased expenditures for strengthening the common defense; they reduced programs for technical assistance for underdeveloped countries although, as one U.N. official put it, that

"would leave the world from Indonesia to Lybia strewn with unfinished projects, each a monument to the broken promises of the West;" they urged protectionist trade legislation without regard for its effect on the ability of our allies to continue doing business without our markets and without Soviet-controlled markets either.

Sometimes the proposals were based on reasoning, sometimes on rationalization. Sometimes they came from men experienced in the conduct of political and military affairs, sometimes from isolationists who were happy to be able to put their fundamentalist theories to work again in the old prewar grooves. The excuse, explicit or implied, was the same: the Soviet "soft policy," as it was called, might perhaps be only strategic, but the strategy itself had been forced on Stalin's successors by their innate weakness. When Beria, head of the secret police, was purged, the news was interpreted as confirming the diagnosis.

II

The death of a dictator is supposed to usher in a period of internecine strife among his heirs. Until the arrest of Beria, however, there had been no firm evidence that this had happened in Moscow. The picture seemed rather one of general relief that the jealous old tyrant was gone, that the incubus of uncertainty and dread which had hung over everyone in the Kremlin was lifted at last. Nor did the new régime behave as though it were wracked with dissension. Contrary to predictions, it was able to function, and not only to make policy but to change visibly the policies of the man who only yesterday was infallible. His very name almost vanished from the speech and writing of his disciples. The disappearance was given point by repeated injunctions against any "cult of personality" or "Talmudism," defined as sticking literally to a master's text rather than interpreting it in the light of new conditions. Lenin's name reappeared, but probably as an added reminder, as *The New York Times* remarked, that though there are gods, they change. As for the new policy itself, although its results were seen all over the globe—from the about-face on a Korean truce to the substitution of one Hungarian satrap for another on a contrary program—it was not haphazard but followed a pattern. Even if the new rulers in the Kremlin were ready to spring at each other's throats, they seemed to have agreed on the need for more restraint and suppleness in Soviet

policy so as to smooth down the antagonism caused everywhere by Stalin's unyielding megalomania.

These were not indications of confusion, nor does the fact that a member of the supreme triumvirate is arrested as a traitor mean that the new régime is so weak that it has no choice but to go on the defensive. In 20 years a succession of mighty political, intellectual and military leaders have been flung into Lubyanka prison and shot when their rivals felt strong enough or when circumstances made scapegoats or grim examples useful. The Soviet state went forward without Trotsky, beside whose name Stalin's had been insignificant, and without Bukharin, Lenin's favorite theoretician, and many, many others as eminent; and the Red Army went forward without Marshal Tukhachevsky. We certainly would be wrong to read all the omens to indicate coming misfortunes for our side, or make up our minds that Stalin's successors were carrying forward with his inexorable self-confidence. But neither must the usual tiresome insistence of Communists on the indestructibility of everything Communist affect our judgment too much in the other direction; and we must not conclude from their choruses of self-encouragement that the leaders are weak and tottering or that Malenkov, Molotov (if one dare put in cold type names that may at any moment join the long list of non-survivors) and their colleagues, whom-ever the lottery of time and the knack of avoiding lethal hypodermics decide they are to be, are engaged in anything but an operation in the cold war. To find Lenin quoted again is not in itself a cause for satisfaction. For it was Lenin who gave the orders for the New Economic Policy, a retreat from excesses that was only the preparation for a new and ruthless advance; and it was he who said categorically: ". . . the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the other will conquer. And until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."¹

By all the signs, what we face today is an operation in the cold war. It seems designed to gain time by the tactics adopted in other pauses in the development of Soviet imperialism. But Stalin's successors will seek to use the time so gained positively—not simply awaiting a more favorable world situation before forcing the

¹ Cf. "Stalin on Revolution," by Historicus. *Foreign Affairs*, January 1949, p. 204.

pace again, but working actively to bring that situation about.

We still do not know whether the operation is a peace "offensive" or a peace "defensive." It might be both. It would be a peace defensive to the extent that the Kremlin felt it must take account of the growing restlessness inside the satellite realm and the increased strength of the free world since the start of the Korean war. It would be a peace offensive to the extent that it aimed to exploit the differences among the Western governments revealed in the past year, encourage the Western love of peace, break the movement toward West European integration, stop the formation of a European army and create optimism among the Western peoples about the possibility of an over-all negotiation and settlement. In one case the action would be forced, on the reasoning that a frontal attack on the free world must be ruled out for the present and that a respite was needed at home and in the occupied countries to enable the expanding Soviet economy to raise the standard of living of workers and peasants.² In the other case the action would be expedient, on the reasoning that the rearmament effort of the Western Powers had overtaxed their resources and that the medicine they needed was a good excuse to let down their guard. Whichever was the leit-motif, Stalin's death came as a golden opportunity to give the switch in strategy the maximum plausibility.

The crux of the situation for us, then, is not whether the current ruling force in the Kremlin is a junta or a committee under a "chairman of the board" or a new personal dictator, or even whether it is "stronger" or "weaker" than Stalin was. A government can, after all, go to war out of a sense of insecurity as well as from reckless strength. What we should watch for most closely are indications whether the régime is more or less rational. We may not be sure for some time. A government that was more rational than Stalin's might be less dangerous in the short run, but in the long run much more so. Time and again Stalin was thwarted by his own pigheadedness—when he tried to destroy the Marshall Plan, when he tried to blockade Berlin, when he tried to coerce Tito, when he tried to seize Korea by force. In each case, if he had used more subtle means he might well have succeeded.

Has this lesson been taken to heart by Stalin's successors? If so, the new régime may be more considerate of the needs of its

² Cf. "The Soviet Economy Outpaces the West," by Peter Wiles. *Foreign Affairs*, July 1953.

subject peoples, restoring their previous standard of living to make them forget their lack of independence. It may be more willing to hear the truth from its representatives abroad and thus be more accurate in its appraisals and more skilful in playing its antagonists off against each other. It may be more conciliatory on unessentials in negotiating and less provocative in propaganda. It may make even a considerable payment in a limited sphere in order to gain a greater freedom of manoeuvre in a wider one. In a word, it may be more intelligent—not less persistent, simply more knowing and agile.

In his earlier phases Stalin showed that he knew the art of caution; the Spanish Civil War was a case in point. But his liability to error grew with his power and conceit. Shortly before his death it was predicted³ that if ever he should become convinced of the impossibility of splitting Russia's enemies he would as a last resort enter into negotiations for prolonged coexistence with them. Perhaps his successors have a more ambitious idea of the meaning of policy—and will use it not merely to remedy a bad situation, but to exploit a good one. If their preparatory work of softening up the Western coalition went well, if it opened the way to negotiations for a general settlement, they then would have two courses open. They could gamble on increased winnings at a conference, or they could resume the offensive in the cold war after an interval in which Soviet Russia had gained on the West in atomic weapons and economic power. That interval might be prolonged, of course, by preliminary but abortive parleys, not meant seriously. In case they pushed ahead to a full-dress conference the possible gains might be great. Thus if hopes for peace and increasing disharmony in the West led its governments to compromise on important principles—if, for instance, accepting Churchill's idea of spheres of influence, they left the Russian-occupied nations still within the Russian orbit—that would be a victory worth all the effort and risks that had been run to secure it. If, on the other hand, there were no compromise because the West could not agree on what payments to make for "peace in our time," the governments which proved intractable could be held responsible before vast sections of world opinion for the renewed fear of war.

If we knew that such were to be the consequences of Stalin's death and the "weakness" of his successors in contrast to his

³ "Challenge to the Kremlin," by Harry Hodgkinson. New York: Praeger, 1952, p. 178.

“strength,” would we reduce taxes, slow defense efforts and cut foreign aid? Or would we brace ourselves for a more intense trial of wits and strength than any that has gone before?

III

In the new strategy the Soviet Union will offer almost everybody something. In certain cases it will be something soothing but unessential, like an exchange of ambassadors or a social civility which by contrast with previous incivility seems significant. In others it will be something more tangible but actually inconsequential because it can be revoked at any moment, like freeing the Soviet zonal border in Austria from restrictions which we ended on the borders of our zone five years ago, an act which nevertheless brought almost reverent gratitude from certain Austrian officials. Or it may be of real importance, like signing the Korean armistice, to be written down in local or military terms as a loss but to be entered in a different currency in another column as a great gain.

Our chief allies were not included, at first, among the recipients of direct Soviet bonuses—though notice that these might come was seen in Malenkov’s reference in his speech of August 8 to the Franco-Soviet treaty of friendship and his offer to coöperate with France to prevent the revival of German militarism. Yet even the first indications that Moscow was slackening the cold war made a considerable impression both in England and France; while in Italy the propensity of those politicians who cannot unite and rule to divide and ruin received extravagant encouragement.

All Europe was restive to some degree over the way Americans set the pace in preparations for European defense. The Marshall Plan had called for a degree of psychological understanding on both sides that could not always be forthcoming. There had arisen in Europe a fear that we might plunge ahead recklessly in the Far East, involving all in a conflict of unknown proportions. Over all lay the dread of the atom bomb. Actually, American population centers and industries were about as vulnerable to surprise atomic attack as those of Western Europe; but the realities of atomic warfare had never been explained convincingly to the European public (or, for that matter, to European statesmen), and the mere fact of closer proximity to the source of danger made them figure, in old-fashioned terms, that they were much more exposed. For these and other obvious reasons they naturally listened eagerly,

even when unconvinced, to Soviet suggestions that the danger did not lie in Communist imperialism but in American provocation.

In France, the change in Soviet strategy was influential in adjourning once again the effort to ratify the European Defense Community agreements and in spreading a new epidemic of "neutrality." This is not to suggest, of course, that one large body of responsible French opinion which opposes EDC is to any extent friendly to Communism. Many Frenchmen, including some at the Quai d'Orsay, simply do not admit that Soviet Russia has supplanted Germany as the chief menace to France; and for this reason they have well-defined objections to the whole concept of the Schuman Plan and the European Army. They especially dislike substituting a close relationship with Germany for the old Anglo-French entente as the pivot of French policy. It is true that Britain and the United States are part of NATO and that the texts of the NATO and EDC agreements interlock; further, that the British have tried to give special reassurances to nervous friends across the Channel. Thus Churchill said on May 11 of this year: "We accept the principle that there is a specifically close relationship between ourselves and the EDC. In anticipation of the coming into effect of the EDC Treaty we are already working out with the members of the Community the measures that will be necessary, both on the military and on the political side." French doubters reply that it is not the text of military agreements that matters when the political spirit is changing. They feel that to put French soldiers under an international command and flag and to mingle French and German soldiers in that command would affect the orientation of French policy more permanently than French membership in NATO. Germany outmatches France in manpower and industrial potential, and the disparity will grow. So long as American soldiers are on the Continent, they say, the balance will be maintained between France and Germany. But afterwards? Will not France find herself gradually entangled in the execution of German policies, perhaps to regain by force the German lands lost to Poland or—the opposite tack—to get them back by a deal with the Russians? To those who shrug off a possible German-Russian entente they recall Germany's collaboration with Russia after two other great wars—Tauraggen in 1812 and Rapallo in 1922.

The Frenchmen who argue so are not, of course, neutralists, for they would like to see British and American action on the Con-

continent continue and would accept German collaboration in NATO or any grouping that included Britain and the United States and did not leave them face to face with their old antagonists in such a narrow setting. The true French neutralists are the children of the "Third Force" idea—the idea that Western Europe must (and can) make a life for herself by herself, outside the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. She can do it, they claim, if she avoids taking sides between them—intellectually, emotionally or materially; by husbanding her men, materials and money; and by devoting her energies to internal social reform and economic development.

The French neutralists maintain further that, even supposing France wished sentimentally to side with the United States, it would not be safe for her to link her fortunes with a nation with such a curious Constitutional division of powers and such immature public opinion. They saw wide disharmony in American policy in the Far East as Secretary Acheson or General MacArthur gave it voice or put it into action; and since our 1952 election they claim that the general American course has been unpredictable because Secretary Dulles has had to take account of the divergent elements in the Republican Party represented by President Eisenhower (the world is round), the isolationist and "Asia first" Senators (half a world is better than none) and Senator McCarthy (love me and the world is mine). Some of the French who argue thus are frankly anti-American, others stand very far to the left. Those who are neither find the most cogent part of their argument in the increasing feeling that even if France wished it she simply cannot afford, even with American help, to continue the present rearmament effort in Europe and the costly fight against Communism in Indo-China; and they turn to neutralism because there is no other theory behind which they can take refuge.

In the long cabinet crisis early this summer Pierre Mendes-France, who favors rigid economy and a compromise in Indo-China, and though not a true neutralist had neutralist and left-wing support, missed being named Premier by a narrow margin. The Radicals (even Edouard Herriot) have opposed EDC; they are not neutralist, however, and do not oppose NATO. The Socialists (who supported the candidacy of Mendes-France) are the only great party with leaders who play openly on the theme expressed to the writer by one of them, a former Premier, that

"France should make a deal with Russia over Germany's back"—not to mention (at least he did not) the backs of France's present allies. The same source went so far as to suggest that Soviet and satellite territorial gains in Eastern Europe might be guaranteed by the West in return for a Soviet agreement to neutralize and disarm Germany and make a start toward general disarmament. Meanwhile the French Communists, capitalizing on the easing of East-West tension, agitate for a new "Popular Front" that would let them share again in the government of the Republic. The directives for this, of course, come from Moscow.

Similar directives went to Italy, and there the obedient propaganda had even more pronounced effect. The chief gains in the recent elections were on the left, for the Nenni Socialists, the allies of the Communists, and on the right, for the Monarchists and Neo-Fascists. The rightists saw no harm in playing the Communist game to the extent of defeating De Gasperi, the man who had saved Italy from Communism, and in thwarting the policies of European collaboration made possible by the Marshall Plan and NATO. The coming struggle will probably be left versus right, with the center in danger of being pulled to pieces in both directions. Left and right both exploit opposition to De Gasperi's "Atlantic policy."

In these events, Americans once again learned to their grief the uncertainties and disappointments of foreign policy; nothing seems to fail like success.

IV

Prime Minister Churchill spoke on May 11 of the Soviet "change of attitude and, as we all hope, of mood;" and this concept, though it did not create new departures in British policy, did harden certain trends already in evidence. Outstanding, of course, was increased British willingness to end the Korean hostilities without bothering much about the detailed guarantees insisted on by the United States. It had been settled British policy also to develop trade in non-strategic goods with the Soviet bloc and China; and now there were indications that after the war in Korea formally ended there might be a move to drop all limitations on East-West trade. Other established tendencies included a determination to write off Chiang Kai-shek as without present or future virtue or value, and to neutralize Formosa; a desire that the Communist régime's absolute control of China be acknowl-

edged as a hard fact and that room be found for it in the United Nations; and a hope that the United Nations might be used increasingly as a forum for discussion and conciliation as against further efforts to emphasize its other basic function as an instrument of enforcement (at any rate, against possible Communist aggression). To these were now added two specific suggestions made by the British Prime Minister, both significant of the general direction of British thinking. One was that the Locarno approach might be useful in settling the relationship of Western Europe, Germany and the Soviet Union. This contained the germ of the idea, some thought, that the Oder-Neisse line might be guaranteed (since there is no prospect at present of revising it peacefully) and that Soviet hegemony elsewhere in Eastern Europe might be recognized in some form. Churchill's other suggestion was for a top-level Four Power conference, not with an agreed agenda of specific problems but to explore informally the possibilities of an over-all settlement.

Most of these subjects have been thoroughly canvassed already; but two may deserve a fresh look in light of what we suppose are the purposes of current Soviet strategy.

The chief mission of Soviet representatives to the United Nations—apart from using its meetings as a sounding board for propaganda—has been to make sure that Western efforts to equip the organization to enforce peace will fail. Soviet obstruction made it impracticable to proceed by the means outlined in the Charter—creation of a Military Staff Committee, allotment of quotas from national armies to be ready for U.N. duties, etc. A substitute course was then adopted in the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution of November 1950, providing for independent action in the General Assembly when a Soviet veto in the Security Council blocked action against an aggressor. Recent statements of British policy reveal a rather defeatist view of this or any other attempt to give the United Nations teeth. Indeed, the impression one has today is that the British look on the peacemaking rôle of the United Nations as worth supporting but that they think the enforcement rôle probably is not, and this for two reasons. One is that an efficient enforcement agency, NATO, has now been created in the region of most direct British interest, Europe. Besides satisfying Britain's principal defense requirements, a regional defense agency has the merit of not raising such difficulties within the Commonwealth—*e.g.* with India—as are involved in plans to

resist aggression under a general pledge like that in the Charter. Here probably is the second reason why British official statements now minimize the value of the Charter's enforcement provisions and stress the difficulty of applying them. If a world-wide organization is to fulfil any enforcement functions at all it must operate both East and West. Britain would prefer to see the United Nations concentrate its attention on the economic, financial and welfare problems that come before its various committees, leaving responsibility for enforcement in Europe to NATO and in Eastern Asia mainly to the United States.

An historical note might be interjected at this point. During the San Francisco Conference of 1945 much thought was given to what would happen to the United Nations if one of the Great Powers possessing the veto were itself guilty of aggression. The first tendency was to say that the United Nations would fall apart, leaving members to act as though it had never been. If the specific act of aggression were against a small member, the other Great Powers might ignore it; that would make clear the organization's impotence and reduce it to the rôle of the League of Nations after the rejection of the Geneva Protocol in 1925. If the aggression were against another Great Power, no written provision would prevent the Power attacked from fighting back. Article 51 aimed to legalize this action in self-defense. But legal or not, the result would also be the end of the United Nations. When Soviet Russia's behavior in liberated Poland revealed the extent of her rapacity and ruthlessness, Senator Vandenberg, the leading Republican member of the American delegation, raised very sharply in private conversation with the writer the question whether it was worth while for the United States to go forward with an organization in which Soviet Russia had a veto. The point was made to him that even though an act of aggression committed or supported by Moscow might some day break up the United Nations, the organization nevertheless would have justified itself; for there would still exist a potential coalition of those who remained faithful to the Charter and were ready to act together as it prescribed. To settle any doubt that this would be legal the text of Article 51 was enlarged to cover joint as well as individual rights of self-defense.

This satisfied Senator Vandenberg. It also appealed to the British representatives, who remembered that although the United States had come to the assistance of the European Allies

in two World Wars it had done so only after they were bled white and in sight of defeat. The advantage of laying the basis for immediate joint action in another crisis was obvious. They might be reminded of this view today and asked to consider whether it is to the advantage of Britain and the Commonwealth to allow doubts to arise as to whether they still think well of the same general pattern. If they do not, Americans might begin to feel that they were left alone in various areas where their vital interests are involved and where the general intention to stand together against aggression may again, as in Korea, be put to the test; and they might wonder, even though irrationally, whether the automatic character of regional defense organizations should not be minimized to the same extent that this had happened in the parent organization.

All this, of course, is in addition to more general considerations often discussed. Two at least of these are highly important. It is one thing, for instance, to argue that conciliation is the right course when aggression is not clear or when there is a chance of persuading both sides to cease fire and talk. It is quite another thing when it is used as a prepared excuse for failure to act against clear aggression when the risks and costs are high. Secondly, unless there is a sanction of possible force in reserve, potential aggressors are less likely to accept peaceful measures of settlement and these are less apt to be effective. The duty to accept conciliation and the duty to act against aggression go together. Subtract either, and the essential symmetry of an international organization to maintain peace is lost. We hope it will not be. But if it is we shall no longer be able to make collective security under the United Nations what three Presidents have called it, the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Some differences could be detected recently, also, between British and American views regarding the future of the so-called satellite states. China cannot be termed a Soviet satellite in view of her vast area and population, the distance separating Moscow and Peking, and the fact that the Chinese Communists came to power without direct foreign assistance. The present relationship of the two principal Communist régimes is far from clear; but if we are to judge by the relationship of any two individual Communists we would not suppose that there is any particle of sincerity in it and we would expect it to last while it is profitable to both and not an instant longer. Mao Tse-tung is certainly a Com-

munist; so was—and is—Tito. If Mao felt it would serve his own interests and those of China as a nation to cut loose from Moscow he doubtless could do it; but we have no ground for hoping that if he did he necessarily would take the same attitude toward the West that Tito's National Communist régime has taken. Nevertheless, there are similarities as well as differences between the two régimes, both in origin and situation, and it seems unwise to act as though any *modus vivendi* between Communist China and the United States is in the nature of things forever impossible. What seems the nature of things can change. In present circumstances the American objectives are to continue frustrating Chinese aggression in Asia and to continue making China's partnership with Russia as unfruitful and unsatisfactory as possible. This does not mean that either we or the British have been wise to entrench ourselves in hard-and-fast contrary attitudes toward China in the unforeseeable future. The drastic change in what we required of Germany in 1945 and what we ask of her today; the unexpected transformation in our relationship with Yugoslavia; and the developments which make us now press Japan to follow an armaments policy which is exactly the one General MacArthur tried to make sure she would not follow—these should warn statesmen and legislators not to predict tomorrow's problems too confidently or try to tie their successors to fixed solutions.

But our differences with the British about China are not the same either historically or as a practical matter as our differences about the future of the East European countries now under Soviet control and in two cases garrisoned by Soviet troops. Britain's tradition of maintaining a balance of power on the Continent makes her think of spheres of influence as natural and useful; and she notes that the United States seems to do so too in the Caribbean. When Churchill and Eden visited Moscow in October 1944 they agreed with Stalin on a division of interests in the Balkans—the Soviet Union would have a 75–25 predominance in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, while the joint interest in Yugoslavia would be divided 50–50. This agreement made Secretary Hull most unhappy. In May of that year he had opposed a British suggestion to let the Russians have a controlling interest in Rumania if that would secure Britain a controlling interest in Greece. He argued now with President Roosevelt that this new deal was contrary to the principles of any broad

system of collective security like that projected in the United Nations.⁴

After the war, the British Government showed, in proposals regarding Iran, that they still were unconvinced that spheres of influence are iniquitous. And recently, in his speech of May 11, Prime Minister Churchill has intimated that he would be prepared to recognize a special Russian interest and position in Eastern Europe, including specifically Russia's right to make sure of having friendly régimes in states on her borders. What he said was somewhat speculative. But if he meant that a Four-Power conference might consider this a natural price to be paid for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area, he is running counter to what Mr. Dulles said a year ago about the liberation of the East European nations and also to President Eisenhower's more cautiously expressed but firm determination that they shall be able to regain their independence.

This is an instance of why there should be prior agreement among the Western Powers on the hard core of each item that appears on the agenda of a Four-Power conference. Churchill's remarks may have been misinterpreted or he may change his mind. But in no case should Eastern Europe be allowed to become an obstacle to Anglo-American harmony on the main outlines of a European settlement; and it need not, if we understand our objectives clearly and explain them well. They are based on the fact that nationalism has been a dominant force among the peoples of East Europe and the Balkans since the days when they fought for and won independence from the Ottoman, Hapsburg and Tsarist Empires. Tito's rebellion against Moscow in 1948 arose out of this nationalist feeling and succeeded because of it. Reminders of how universal it is, and how intense, have been coming since last June from East Germany and the other Soviet-occupied countries; and Malenkov has been trying to offset its effects by promising better living conditions for the peoples who have been working for the benefit of the Soviet economy and the Soviet military machine.

This is our cue to make nationalism and independence the watchwords of our East European policy. Western democracy has offered a contrast to the Soviet terror behind the iron curtain; we should help Western Europe to continue offering also a contrast to Soviet living standards (*e.g.* in Berlin, our best "show win-

⁴ "The Memoirs of Cordell Hull." New York: Macmillan, 1948, v. II, p. 1451 and 1458.

dow"). But the most effective thing of all is to make sure the peoples of Eastern Europe know that we are determined they shall have what the Russians do not give—national freedom.

It is not necessary to label the policy "liberation," which Communist propaganda has made to mean a war begun by the United States. In Western Europe people are afraid of an ally with a program which, they are told, increases the risk of war; and East Europeans themselves, having experienced "liberation" at the hands of the Red Army, might find another term more attractive. The substance of what these peoples want is, however, unmistakable—freedom of the individual, freedom of the nation. That must be the basis on which we promise to recognize and support the revolutionary régimes that some day will supplant the present slave régimes. Besides encouraging them morally and intellectually we can help them in other ways when the chance offers, as it did in the Soviet zone of Germany and in West Berlin this past summer. We can offer hope for a new life in America to those brave and ingenious enough to escape from behind the Iron Curtain (as we have done on a small scale in the bill so bitterly opposed by Senator McCarran)—a strong propaganda weapon for democracy against Soviet tyranny, as well as a minimum of Christian fellowship and a method of gaining new citizens of outstanding character. But the effectiveness of everything we do and say will be greatly diminished if we give the impression that we are trying to commit these peoples to a particular social pattern for the future.

An experienced observer of Communist activity in Asia told the writer recently that the Communists make headway there only when they can label their foes as anti-nationalist. We need not allow them this advantage in Eastern Europe. It is more important to encourage the occupied countries to free themselves from Russia than it is to settle in advance their forms of government after they have done it. We must avoid being caught in ideological controversy about types of régime that one social extreme would consider reactionary and feudal and types that the opposite extreme would call radical and revolutionary. The single greatest inducement that we can sincerely offer these peoples is that, unlike the Russians, we are going to help them establish the sort of society *they themselves* want, and that we are actually taking steps to make sure that this is what will happen.

Agreement now among the Western Powers and neighboring

states on a common policy to be followed after the puppet régimes have disappeared would be the sort of concrete evidence that our broadcasters could put to effective use. The commitment should be to follow a strict hands-off policy, with one exception: there must be international control, administered by the United Nations, to protect the rights of different political and social elements, ensure a free discussion and see that the whole people are able to vote for the representatives of their choice. If they should choose a form of national Communism, independent of Moscow, we would have hoped for something better but still could consider that this was progress over what they have today; if they should choose parliamentary government of the Western type, that would not be what Marshal Tito and many local Communists hoped, but still it would be much better than what exists today. Maybe it would be something between the two.

If we can reach an open agreement with Marshal Tito that there are to be free elections under United Nations control in the freed satellite states in his neighborhood (as the writer has reason to believe we could do today), we shall avoid misunderstandings and perhaps grave dangers in the future. Nor is that future necessarily very distant. Little Albania, for example, even without incitement from outside, may at any time liquidate her puppet ruler, Enver Hoxha. This would face the West with difficult decisions that so far have hardly been thought about, let alone discussed among the Western Powers or by them with neighboring Greece and Yugoslavia. The advantages of having a clear set of principles to apply in such a case, as well as to use generally to strengthen our propaganda for freedom, should win over our British allies also, even at the cost of abandoning preparations to sweeten a future negotiation by recognizing any Russian proprietary rights outside the Russian boundaries of 1938.

A Soviet withdrawal to the boundaries of 1938 should not be contingent on the world's recognition of any privileged position for Russia beyond those boundaries but rather on an assurance that within them the Russian Government, whatever its nature, will be safe from foreign attack. The only assurance to this effect which a Great Power like Russia would accept would be reciprocal—not something granted but something shared. It can be found in a system of general security that really functions. This is the proper basis of freedom for the nationalities of Eastern Europe and of security for Russia on her western borders.

The Soviet reply of August 5 to the Western suggestion that the four Foreign Ministers meet to discuss Germany showed once more the difference between Western and Soviet concepts of what is to be gained in a conference. The Soviet note, after criticizing the Western idea of free German elections and complaining about the "militarization" of Western Germany (which, it stressed, must be most disturbing to neighboring nations), went on to say that the Soviet Government nevertheless was prepared to discuss the German problem. Then came the "but." The Soviet Government (the note continued) wished to take advantage of the favorable atmosphere created by the Korean truce to discuss general measures such as limitation of armaments and the banning of foreign military bases; and since Asia was concerned with these questions the participation of the Chinese Communist Government was "essential." Point 1 on the Soviet agenda, therefore, was "measures to decrease tension in international relations." Point 2 was Germany. And seemingly as an afterthought, though we may be sure it was not that, the Soviet note added that a solution of the German problem would help solve the Austrian problem. This boxed the propaganda compass, full circle.

A speech by Malenkov three days later enlarged the play on French fears of Germany and called for French and Soviet cooperation to prevent German rearmament. But still Moscow did not consider the job complete. Anti-German sentiment had been given a fillip in France, but the German friends of Russia were handicapped by the fact that Moscow had made German unification secondary to other objectives. A new Soviet note, delivered August 16, attempted to hold the gain in France while rectifying the error in Germany. The Western position is that the logical and only safe procedure is to hold free all-German elections to choose an all-German government which would then participate in the negotiation of a peace treaty. Moscow now countered with the suggestion that a provisional all-German government be formed by the East and West German Parliaments, and that this weak body, split from the start on every important issue, undertake to prepare and hold elections. The pattern is recognizable. It is the one which brought about the amalgamation of Premier Mikolazczyk's Polish Government-in-Exile with the Provisional Polish Government set up at Lublin under Communist auspices—the re-

sult of which was that Poland was soon delivered to the Soviets. And it is the pattern of the Tito-Shubashich agreement, ratified at Yalta, by which the royalist Yugoslav Government was merged with Tito's, to be in turn submerged in it. Further, since the Soviet proposal would forbid the provisional all-German government from taking part in "coalitions and military alliances," EDC would have been smashed for good.

The supposed attractions of the program for all Germans were further built up in the Soviet-East German communiqué of August 23, offering economic concessions in the East zone and promising West Germany the return of war prisoners. And the alternative was underscored by the announcement that Soviet scientists had exploded the hydrogen bomb.

Will the Kremlin now go on to suggest a pause in Indo-China, like the one in Korea? Would the prospect of ending an enormous drain on French resources be attractive enough to make France consider adopting a Tito policy in reverse, following the advice of the ex-Premier mentioned above? If the Soviets offer this payment in Asia in the hope of sealing the success of their aims in Europe, we shall not exorcise the temptations that will beset France by criticizing her as weak and fickle. We can only point out to the logical French mind that to accept the Soviet solution would mean withdrawal from the Western community. The first step toward a solution which we could accept is for both the French and ourselves to comprehend the full consequences—for both of us—of any such catastrophe.

If some of the tendencies now visible in Europe continue, a radical revision of policies may be in the making—our own included, whether we are ready for it or not. We may have to fall back on NATO, shorn of the plan for a European Army. To make NATO succeed we shall have to put more vigor and imagination than we have done lately into explaining its function here and abroad—here, that it is an organization which exists for our protection as well as Europe's—abroad, that it is something we believe in and support to the limit. The British may have to think again whether they can really expect to hold a balance on the Continent without committing themselves there more specifically. The French may have to face the fact that the alternative to German contingents in a European Army will be an independent German Army, and decide whether in that case Germany will not be a safer neighbor in NATO than outside it.

VI

We are not opposed in principle to negotiation with the Russians; and we have no reason to fear it in fact provided the terms of reference are precise. The lesson of every past negotiation with Communists is that the agenda is of decisive importance. We want to deal with specific problems in the hope of settling them. Our experience has been that they want to discuss general problems which give opportunities for scoring propaganda points.

Reduction of armaments, on which Soviet propaganda always harps, is a case of point. We speak about disarmament too. But we hold that it will become possible—and is therefore worth discussing—only as a result of previous political decisions which have created an atmosphere of international security. This is not contradictory with our efforts since 1945 to persuade the Soviets to accept any workable and efficient method whatsoever for eliminating the danger of surprise atomic attacks. If ever they would accept an effective system of inspection and control, that would be the best introduction imaginable to the settlement of specific issues which we desire and to the general disarmament which they profess to desire. For several years we discussed the general limitation of armaments with other nations at Geneva. We tried to weigh and equate elements that were completely different in function and that varied in value for different nations in different areas at different times. It was no wonder we got nowhere. In any case, the cart was before the horse; the renewal of Franco-German rivalry and the excesses of Fascism had created the fear of war, and there was no framework of general security. The lesson from those days is that the over-all reduction and limitation of armaments represents one of the last political decisions which governments should be asked to take; it is a final step on the road to peace which has already, in essentials, been won. Before we even approach that stage we must traverse Korea, Indo-China, Germany, Austria, the Soviet-occupied states and the many other areas where national and ideological interests clash and create the threat of war.

In spite of our bafflement, we must go on trying to pin down the Soviets to a discussion of the concrete issues that are creating the risk of war. "It is the policy of His Majesty's Government," said Prime Minister Churchill on May 11, "to avoid by every means in their power doing anything or saying anything which could check any favorable reaction which may be taking place

and to welcome every sign of improvement in our relations with Russia." The United States Government has echoed and confirmed that view. This does not mean that we need accept the Prime Minister's idea of a free-for-all discussion with the Soviet leaders. We are not wrong in trying to make them talk to the point. Our error is that our answer to their notes is "No, because . . ." when it should be "Yes, but . . ." The world does not read notes. It is interested in the result, not the reasoning that leads to it. The simple fact of who says no and who leaves the door open for a further try is of immense psychological importance. This is not a "Mr. and Mrs." quarrel; we should be bright enough to leave the last word in every case to them.

The period just before a negotiation with the Soviets would be one of heart-searching and mind-reading. What shall we require? What can we concede? What are the essentials that we must never sacrifice, regardless of risks? When the conference actually comes, if it does, how is the Grand Alliance to be held together, through the vicissitudes of long negotiation, in amity and strength? There are obvious dangers that a conference might establish a false peace or that, in avoiding this, the Grand Alliance might break. There is also the reverse danger. A conference with the Soviet Union will be the occasion for vast numbers of men and women in the West—and, we may believe, in the Soviet East also—to open their hearts to hope. A failure then to reach an agreement would be followed by universal disillusionment which might precipitate desperate actions.

There is no new magic which can be introduced into American policy to alter the present situation abruptly; nor, one might add, is there any new presentation of attitudes in psychological terms which can be devised to take its place. The only argument which will be convincing in Europe is if we ourselves stand by our convictions and continue to give them effect regardless of effort and cost. If one service is more important than another in the attempt to keep the Grand Alliance for peace intact it is to explain again and again to the American people why it is impossible to accept the untested assumption that our adversary has become soft. For the key to the unity and strength of the alliance is American unity and strength.

GERMAN REARMAMENT: HOPES AND FEARS

By Axel von dem Bussche

GERMAN political life today revolves about three main questions: 1, the reunification of Germany; 2, absolute versus relative German sovereignty; 3, German rearmament. To gain any clear picture of the whole it is necessary to understand each of the three components separately as well as their interaction in the framework of tension between East and West.

This is not the place to discuss the problem of German sovereignty in detail. At first glance it seems essentially psychological, for every large nation with a history of its own would like to be master of its future. On close inspection, however, we see that the problem lies in certain rulings under international law, going back to the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam, which must not be violated if only for the sake of Germany herself. Yet they are the reason why, for instance, West Germany cannot for the time being establish unrestricted diplomatic relations with the countries of the Soviet bloc. Yalta and Potsdam provide no legal basis for the absolute sovereignty of West Germany so long as the four signatory Powers fail to agree.

Politically-minded Germans have resigned themselves to the status quo most unwillingly, as is understandable enough considering their natural desire for equality of rights. The German people as a whole have an increasing understanding of the practical limitations of the situation. Thus the idea of relative sovereignty is, in principle, accepted. It is opposed only by politicians who tend to wishful thinking, whose consciousness of history dates only from the day of the German capitulation, and who forget to take account of causes and effects of the Hitler period. On the whole, however, this school of thought has its roots in nothing worse than provincialism, which although narrow and often misinterpreted abroad is not disreputable. Its advocates simply do not realize that Germany is not an island and that the German people cannot face the future by themselves. That was one of Hitler's early and fatal errors.

The facts of the situation should thus rule out any discussion of Soviet offers for the "national and military sovereignty of a united Germany," however tempting they sound. National "sov-

ereignty" might perhaps be bought from the Soviets at the price of an agreement prohibiting a coalition with the West. But military "sovereignty" would involve the creation of an independent Wehrmacht, and here it is enough to ask the question: How would it be financed? The Third Reich Wehrmacht of 1939, with about 36 standing divisions and appropriate reserves, a sizeable air force and a navy, just exceeded the military force now considered necessary to carry on defensive warfare successfully in the heart of Europe. Even if the progress of European unity should rule out the possibility of war against the West, Germany would still need considerable forces in the coming years to guarantee her own unilateral defense against the East. She could not manage without foreign financial and military aid. The costs of creating and maintaining a modern army have grown greatly since 1939, due to increased mechanization. Since the men in the Kremlin who made these offers must be aware of this fact, it hardly seems that they were serious. Were they playing with the German weakness for feeling bigger and stronger than the rest of the world?

In settling Germany's future status, German and Allied politicians will need to use all their wisdom and tact to avoid inflicting psychological injuries which might in the long run produce fatal frustrations. Since 1950 Germany has been building up her international relations from scratch; and the sovereignty which she achieves in the end may be of the relative type which will probably determine the style of continental politics in the next generation. That might be easier for her to accept than for her neighbors, since they will be summoned to step down from absolute sovereignty.

We must examine whether the alternative one often hears mentioned, "Germany: bridge or battlefield," really exhausts the possibilities.

First, is a bridge between the West and the Soviet East morally and politically feasible under the given circumstances?

One day, certainly, it will be part of Germany's historical and geographical task to help reestablish spiritual and cultural ties between the West and a free East. This day will come when the Kremlin ceases to play its present tactical game, changes its principles and puts new ones into action. We could consider that a change of this sort had been made if, for instance, Soviet leaders were to issue a Declaration of Intentions regarding a top-to-

bottom reform and reorganization of the Soviet state and then went on to remove border restrictions, reduce the giant standing army, liberalize Soviet centralization and democratize public life. Those would be some of the basic changes which the West would expect.

Until that day comes we shall have to postpone the construction of a cultural bridge—and when it does come, the best German intellectual forces will be just good enough to carry out their task. Meanwhile they should be made ready. This ought to include enlarging the facilities in German universities for learning about Russia, her peoples, her languages and traditions.

Meanwhile there can be no change in the basic principles of Western strategy, whatever doubts may be entertained about the practicability of particular proposals for integrating German forces in the Western partnership. To spare Germany, if possible, the tragedy of becoming a battlefield, she must enter the partnership. It should be a principle of Western strategy to defend the European peninsula from a joint base as far east as possible. The base can be pushed east of the ancient valley of the Rhine only with the help of German soldiers. This must be done—for the sake of the West, of Europe and of Germany. Here, and here only, lies the moral justification for the formation of German contingents.

Soviet Russia's concept of a standing army is somewhat old-fashioned—more of the nineteenth century than the twentieth. There are 175 Soviet combat divisions, including 80 mechanized and tank divisions as well as 50 artillery and anti-aircraft divisions; there also are 300 submarines and 20,000 combat planes. The combat divisions can be doubled in strength at short notice. Thirty of these combat divisions, among them more than 20 modern mechanized and tank units, are held ready in the Soviet occupied zone of Germany to act as the first wave in any action in Western Europe. They are supported by 3,000 planes. Finally, there are 60 to 70 divisions of satellite troops. Their combat value is somewhat problematic at the moment, but it would be unwise to suppose that, in case of war, they would not be efficient for at least occupation purposes.

"All right then—if we must." Such has been the hesitant and almost desperate attitude taken by responsible German politicians and intellectuals toward rearmament. Americans have often interpreted this as showing a lack of determination among the Germans to defend themselves. The real basis of many Ger-

man hesitations, however, lies elsewhere—in anxiety about the political and psychological structure of the German people. There is concern whether rearmament might not lead back into the dangers of recent German history, only just overcome, and whether such a relapse might not open the way for temptations from the East. These fears by themselves would be enough to explain why some quarters cling to the hope for a Germany that would be reunited but unarmed.

What does “united Germany” mean? What would be the political and strategic implications if it were actually achieved?

We must resign ourselves to the fact that under present conditions a united Germany can reach only to the Oder-Neisse line. All hopes for Silesia, Pomerania and East Prussia must be postponed to the day when a free and democratic Germany can enter into conversations with a free and democratic Poland. Then it will be possible to find a basis for peaceful coexistence. The negotiation is likely to be most difficult, considering the history of injustice over the last 15 years and the national, geographical, religious and cultural background. But to say today that it is impossible would be to despair of the power of Christian forgiveness in the great Polish people and of understanding in the German people.

What are the strategic advantages to be gained from the peaceful unification of the Soviet zone with Western Germany?

A glance at the map of the Baltic shows that this semi-inland body of water is actually a Soviet sea so long as Sweden and Finland stick to their neutrality—as they understandably enough do in present circumstances. For Denmark controls only the gate to the Baltic, in spite of owning the island of Bornholm further east. The gate could be smashed in by a single assault from the Soviet-occupied island of Ruegen and the Soviet-occupied Mecklenburg coast. Even a layman can easily picture a combined airborne and amphibious landing operation from those bases. Furthermore, without running any great risk, a fleet of small cutters and fishing vessels could seize the innumerable East Danish islands during the night. This would leave the United Kingdom, Norway and the coast of Western Europe open to operations by the Soviet Baltic fleet; for which purpose more than 100 modern Soviet submarines are held ready in the Baltic. The consequences for the whole Atlantic area and the United States can easily be imagined.

If this coastal strip, including Ruegen, went to the West, as would certainly happen if there were free elections, the picture would be drastically changed: 1, the permanent threat to Denmark would be considerably, perhaps decisively, reduced; 2, the West would improve its position in the Baltic. A second question would be whether this would be achieved by an agreement demilitarizing the island of Ruegen and the coast of Mecklenburg or by advancing naval and air bases into this part of the Baltic.

In any negotiations about the unification of Germany it will be interesting to use this question to measure the influence which purely strategic factors exert over the politicians in the Kremlin. For the fear of a Western preventive war which supposedly prevails among the Soviet military may induce them to advise against abandoning this part of the Baltic. Their concern about the soft neck of the Soviet bloc between the Oder at Stettin and the southwest corner of Finland may make them object even to a partial westernization of the Baltic. As for the West, its increase in security would be so outstanding that it should be enough in itself to persuade the military chiefs in the Pentagon, Fontainebleau, Oslo and the various European defense departments to become ardent sponsors of German reunification.

However, the Baltic is only part of the strategic problem of unification. The West would have to insist that Soviet land and air forces withdraw within the Soviet-Polish border area. The minimum demand must be that they withdraw east of where the wide-gauge Soviet railroad meets the narrow-gauge European system. Since any movement of troops and supplies would be delayed at this point by the necessary reloading operation, a surprise Soviet drive into Western Europe would become impossible; for large-scale military reloading would involve loss of time and the organizing and massing of transport would (in the event of an armed dispute) provide bomber targets. The line in question runs roughly north and south from Brest-Litovsk along the western edge of the Pripet marshes. Apart from its military importance this line has a cultural significance, since it is the historical division between Europe and Russia.

Nothing would be more dangerous in these decisive years than to become fixed in rigid formulas, such as that the only solution is German rearmament *or* unification of the four zones. It should be revised and called unification of the four zones *and* German rearmament. Actually this is realistic, though admittedly hard to

put into practice. In the event that it fails to be achieved, it is essential, for the sake of Germany's reliability as a partner in the Western community, that the fault be marked down to Moscow. This is one reason why German observers should be admitted to future Four-Power talks on Germany. The German people should be freed from any sort of suspicion by being given first-hand knowledge through their own representatives.

It should be kept in mind that emotions are only one part of the desire for unification. Another is economic, and the importance of this has been steadily increasing in recent months. The German economy is looking for new, non-Communist markets. Unification would provide them, since the reconstruction of the present Soviet zone would absorb German energies for a considerable time. This fact should be remembered by businessmen abroad who worry about German competition in the Near East, South America and Africa; it should turn them—as the gain in security should turn Western military leaders—into advocates of German reunification.

II

Technical and politico-military questions of this sort form only one part of what is talked about when German diplomats, journalists and officers meet Western and neutral colleagues. Any conversation about Germany's projected armed forces usually includes questions about Germany's long-range reliability as a partner of the West. For example:

(1) The Germans live in the heart of Europe. It is conceivable that the Western system of collective security might be disrupted or at least shaken in the near future. Is the German element in a Western army going to be loyal enough and morally strong enough to resist the temptation of trying to become a third force in its own right? Will it be able at a given moment to withstand the enticement of playing a decisive rôle, rifle at hand?

(2) The policy of coöperation with the East as a means of reinsurance—invented by Bismarck and followed by General von Seeckt with the Reichswehr in the twenties—is historically and geographically understandable in the sense of power politics. Is this school really dead, or does it still form the basis of thinking for German diplomats, politicians and soldiers? May they not be saying: "Let us first build up our army; Dr. Adenauer is taking care of that. Then our Great Game will begin." Will there be a

repetition of the year 1812, when the Prussian contingent withdrew from Napoleon's army? Or have four years of experience by German soldiers in and with the Soviet Union, the atrocities of the early Soviet occupation in Germany and the hopelessness of the continuing Soviet occupation, to which may be added the sufferings of hundreds of thousands of German prisoners-of-war in Russia and now most recently the riots in East Germany—have these things really made Germans immune to such temptation?

(3) The German armed forces might become an instrument of militant irridentism, with a view to regaining the lost German territories in the East. Is there any risk of Germany trying to provoke a war? Are Germany's military and political leaders capable of building up a contingent that will be educated and trained for defense only? Some Frenchmen have expressed their doubts in the classic phrase, *Nous ne voulons pas mourir pour Königsberg* (We don't want to die for Königsberg). Does not the phrase about "liberating" the satellites, which for some time has figured in the vocabulary of Western politics, come close to arousing and justifying such aims?

(4) The road to dictatorship in the past was laid on military foundations. What plans have been worked out by responsible German politicians and soldiers to meet the danger that German public life might become militarized again as a result of universal military training?

(5) The attitude of most Western soldiers and politicians toward universal military training is that it is a "necessary evil." In the past, the German attitude has often been that the Wehrmacht was the school of the nation. But the armed forces should at best be *one* school of the nation. There are also the family, private and public institutions for education and the churches. How are Germans going to work all into a healthy combination with the right proportion of each?

(6) How is the German officers' corps going to be selected? How will the board that is to select it be set up? How will Germans check dangerous relics (often unconscious) of recent German history in such a board?

(7) How is Germany going to achieve the psychological integration of the, say, 300 leading German officers of the new armed forces with their West European and American comrades-in-arms? A multi-national army consists of human beings, and it

must not be believed that they can be amalgamated like coal and steel plants by conferences and agreements.

(8) When plans for German rearmament began to be drawn in 1950 there was talk of 250,000 German soldiers to be called up within four years. Now nearly twice as many are envisaged within only half that time. Can a country—even allowing for the breathtaking speed of its recovery—digest this number? Remember that the German Army numbered only 100,000 between 1923 and 1933, but that its political influence over the years nevertheless proved fatal to the tender flower of German democracy. Moreover, the governmental and social structure was much stronger at that time than it is today.

(9) How can the civilian influence over the German armed forces be guaranteed? How can the legal and factual position of the top military leaders be limited by law and custom?

(10) We all know the power of symbols over soldiers. How does Germany plan to handle the former German war decorations? What has been done to prevent tension between former opponents in the Second World War, in view of the fact that almost all German decorations carry the swastika? Will German public opinion accept the elimination of this symbol?

(11) What can be done, as early as possible, to build up friendly relations with democratically-minded Poles and Czechs, many of whom live in Western countries? Aside from the Jews, they are the people who have suffered most from Germans.

Most of these questions can be answered from Germany. They already are being discussed privately and publicly in German political institutions and in government offices at Bonn; and some day they will be answered step by step in laws and regulations. Agreement on them will have to be reached by the parties of the present government and the strong Social Democratic opposition. Both groups know about the unsplendid isolation of the Germans during more than 50 years. They also know that by tradition and history the Germans belong to the West. Neither side has anything to hope for from the East and both must look to the West for everything that is essential to them.

For the Social Democrats, however, the idea of German armed forces involves an additional worry. They fear that for the third time in the course of this century social and sociological tension will be spread through the nation by a rightist officers' corps. It will be for the Social Democrats themselves to decide whether or

not the curse of class struggle clings to the new armed forces, whether or not antiquated and misguided alternatives like "privileged officers class" as against "class-conscious troops and non-commissioned officers" will again come into use. But there is every reason to hope that the present opposition will coöperate loyally after it has been outvoted in a legal democratic procedure.

In any case, it is contemplated that when the time comes a board composed of representatives of the large German parties, educational institutions, churches, universities, schools and trade unions will be created and entrusted with the duty of preparing binding regulations for the German armed forces similar to those in the British Army.

Answering these questions is not, however, a German affair entirely. The problem of how to bring about a psychological integration of the German armed forces with those of the West must be solved by a higher authority—a joint board for troop information and education. It should be established in the framework of German and Allied coöperation and it should draw up and put into effect regulations and plans under the guidance and authority of the NATO command at Fontainebleau. In the beginning, these should be directed toward integrating the high-ranking German officers, who will be reemployed *ad hoc*, into the community of other nations and armies.

The German soldier is reliable, loyal and honest. He expects to be equipped in peacetime and led in war in such a way that he has the same chance of survival on the battlefield as his partners in the community of arms. He furthermore expects that during his absence his family will be protected through an adequate system of air defense and food supplies. He and the German people as a whole have often been reproached in the past eight years for not having gone far enough in recognizing and criticizing their own or Nazi aberrations. Be that as it may. It might be admitted here that self-criticism does not belong among the great virtues of the Germans. At the same time, however, it may be said that hardly anybody likes to repent in public and that no nation likes to exhibit its naked shame. Finally, it may be said that there is an awareness of this guilt in an overwhelmingly large section of the thinking German officers' corps. But no self-respecting corps likes to be abused. The difficulty of writing and talking about these things may be left to the sensitive reader's imagination.

What might be one of the first practical measures taken by such a board on the staff of NATO?

There should already be in preparation a detailed plan to take the 300 leading soldiers of the future German armed forces on a three-month trip through the countries of the Western community before and immediately after they have been restored to active duty. Divided into small groups, or even travelling alone for part of the time, they should find an opportunity to meet and talk about past and future problems with the general public in the countries with which they are now to be partners, and especially, of course, with politicians, intellectuals, journalists and soldiers. Six to eight weeks of these three months should be spent with other West European officers in America—at universities, institutions of various sorts, defense academies and in the institutions of the U. S. Troop Information and Education Program. Nowhere do members of different European nations, with all their mutual prejudices, become such good Europeans as in America. The glance back home across the ocean, the liberal and hospitable atmosphere of the United States and the common experiences of the trip will create ties that cannot be undermined later. It might even be considered whether members of the study groups should not be enabled to take their wives with them for part of the trip at least; for the integration desired should be carried home into the social structure of the new German units of the German army.

How much will this cost? For 300 Germans and 100 West European officers to travel for three months would require about \$5,000 apiece. Thus a total of \$2,000,000, or 10,000,000 German marks, would put the plan into practice. That is, certainly, a large sum. Is it too much? If the figures which one occasionally hears are correct, three to four modern jet fighters cost about the same.

It will take time. The delay that would be involved in actually forming the German contingents—say three months—would be justified, however, considering the time already lost in negotiations. It may be hard to convince the technical organizers of general staffs that such a plan is urgently necessary. In America, where the question of morale of troops at home and abroad is treated with great wisdom, the project is likely to find open doors. An additional advantage would be that it might, on the side, take care of part of the problem of linguistic training.

III

Some day, if reason prevails, the same attitude taken in Germany toward the creation of new German armed forces—"All right then—if we must"—will have to become the attitude of the other West European countries also. This attitude, plus an alertness in Germany herself against any relapse into past dangers, will prevent anyone from proceeding with German rearmament on any other premise than that of a "necessary evil."

But the planning should be contemplated from still one more angle. A careful check should again be made whether or not Germany can really produce half a million soldiers in as short a period as is provided by the Lisbon agreement, namely two and a half years. In this connection, the physical aspect of the problem is secondary compared to the psychological and political aspects. It should be ascertained whether Germany's democratic capacities will not be overstrained by such a figure. Nobody, of course, can give a firm answer on this; but it would seem justified to take the figure 500,000 as the absolute maximum. Below this figure, the problem is reduced to the classic argument between quality and quantity.

There is another question which can be answered only in the United States. As in all the other European nations, the German people and the German general staff lack late information as to the strength, capabilities and costs of atom and hydrogen bombs and the outlook for their future development for use on the battlefield. The layman wonders whether, due to a lack of knowledge of precisely those basic facts, European military advisers may not occasionally base their suggestions on incorrect calculations. In other words, it is possible that even high European staff officers, working from antiquated concepts of pre-atomic warfare, may actually have arrived at quite unrealistic conclusions. It does not help much that those officers are themselves aware of this risk. They must base their planning upon their knowledge and opinions. Military planning is composed of the elements of Strength, Space and Time. Nobody can assign correct quantities in the equations so long as essential principles of the element Strength remain unknown. It is important to make sure that in the future nobody is able to base reproaches on the fact that this gap in knowledge existed.

For anybody familiar with European relationships and the national feelings involved there can be no doubt that the Euro-

pean Defense Community offers the best possibility for achieving centralized armed forces on a continental basis. No better way exists to integrate a German contingent in these centralized forces since the idea of solving the problem by forming a temporary German police force was rejected in 1950. That method might have been slower but certainly it was more organic.

The EDC agreement deserves to be called the "gospel" of Western defense policy. The technical military disadvantages it involves in comparison with the technical advantages of a German national army are unimportant in view of the possibilities of integrated staff operations, the training of mixed units and the organization of mixed supplies—all of which may be practised in time of peace. Moreover, the fact that each of the partners shares in the comprehensive view of the activities of all of them should eliminate any suspicion of unilateral controls. And perhaps coöperation between the European and North Atlantic defense ministries and staffs may help end the fear that one or the other might secretly prepare a preventive war or that meanwhile one or the other might be an idle partner. This slow poison, spread constantly by the propaganda of the leftist press, is probably the most powerful explosive which can split the Western nations.

Only a sense of security, derived from the knowledge of superiority in morale and matériel, can banish the fears which increase the blind tendency toward self-destruction in human nature. We Germans know this. The formula, "If you wish peace, prepare for war," has been abused and perverted too often by cynics, demagogues and the merely simple-minded. As long as responsible Western politicians keep from believing in the inevitability of a Third World War they will be able to form the wise resolutions needed to maintain peace and freedom.

KENYA, THE LAND AND MAU MAU

By Derwent Whittlesey

AFRICA was the continent least known to the American public until World War II took many Americans there. Soon after the war Americans began to hear of political crises at the south and north of the continent; and later the curtain lifted dramatically upon tropical Africa, west and east. Now there are stories of political trouble in no less than seven areas of Africa, to say nothing of developments in the other countries and colonies of the continent that have risen to prominence as sources of raw materials urgently needed by the North Atlantic world. At each center of political crisis violence has occurred, but nowhere has it broken out so abruptly and continued with such virulence as in Kenya, one of four British East African dependencies.

Kenya belongs to a world that has no counterpart anywhere in the United States, Canada or Europe. It bestrides the Equator, and except for a narrow strip of coastland, stands high above sea level. Its low latitude and its high altitude cancel each other, to produce a climate neither hot nor cold, but comfortably temperate. To reinforce its climatic superiority, much of its soil is the productive residue of volcanic flows, in contrast to the characteristically infertile soils of the tropics. As a further amenity, the land has rare beauty, with magnificent volcanic peaks, inviting lakes, forested slopes and expanses of grassland where big game roves.

Not all of Kenya is equally desirable. The barren desert of the north is scantily peopled by nomads. The coastal strip is hot and humid. The most populous parts are low highlands, 3,500 to 5,000 feet above sea level, where African farmers have tilled the soil for several centuries. Europeans make careers there, but only in the towns, and on retirement they return to their homeland or move to higher elevations in Kenya. Those high highlands were rather scantily occupied by Africans when Europeans appeared and found the country inviting to permanent settlement. At altitudes above 5,000 feet white people need make no concessions to climate.

Except for Abyssinia, a country not open to European immigration, the high highland centered in Kenya is the largest area

of the kind in tropical Africa. It has become the home of European farmers and ranchers, as well as of African cultivators and nomads, like smaller spots of similar elevation in eastern Africa. Kenya's recent rise to notice as a place of massacre can be understood only by tracing the shifts in control, utilization, and condition of the land since 1885, when a conference at Berlin, representing interested European states, marked out interior Africa for occupation and partition.¹

II. EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT IN KENYA


The Conference of Berlin set off a scramble for territory that stamped tropical Africa in the short span of 15 years with the political pattern that has been little altered during the ensuing half century. A few European dependencies have changed hands and one independent state has been confirmed, but few boundaries have been affected. The political occupation of territory was based on coastal footholds and aimed at navigable lakes and streams of the interior—all such waterways being cut off from the coast by physical barriers.

In East Africa the British started from Mombasa, the best harbor they controlled on that side of the continent, and pushed toward Lake Victoria. To reach the lake, they had to traverse the high highland; and as an aid in holding the route they encouraged immigration. Political motives may have dominated the venture at the outset, but the British Government had also long been determined to stop the Arab slave trade, and was moved by an ardent missionary spirit which enlisted vigorous support from Christian churches. Then in the 1890's British authorities became eager to forestall French moves up to the Nile toward the great African lakes, and to rival a German push inland to Lake Victoria from the Indian Ocean coast immediately south of the British foothold.

Private incentives were even more varied. Sports attracted some individuals—big-game shooting, mountain climbing and other adventure, although few who came to Africa for such reasons remained in the country. Trade was always an enticement—the most valuable African products of the late nineteenth century being ivory and precious metals. Africans of Kenya had

¹ The most informative book on the tribal background of these disturbances is "Mau Mau and the Kikuyu," by L. S. B. Leakey. London: Methuen, 1952. The author is a Kenyan of European parentage who grew up among the Kikuyu and was made a member of the tribe.

nothing to export from their patches of subsistence crops, and from their scrawny herds only a few hides badly cured and punctured by tickbites. But before 1900 the highland was recognized both in Britain and in South Africa as suitable for settlement. As the railway thrusting inland reached the high highland, immi-



grants from both countries began taking up land for livestock ranches, grain farms, and plantations of coffee, tea, sisal, wattle and other tropical crops. The products were intended for export, and have long since become the mainstay of the country's economy. As rural settlement grew and prospered, towns and cities kept pace. For many years the Europeans have not only paid

their own way, but have in addition provided the government with funds for improvements in African parts of the colony. This has been possible through the cheap African labor available for private and public undertakings.

Nearly all the settlers on the land in Kenya, as well as the majority of the commercial and professional people in the towns, live on the high highland. It has the most attractive climate and the most productive soil; and when Europeans came much acreage lay unoccupied, unused, and, as the newcomers at first supposed, unclaimed. From the outset, the British Government frowned upon the taking of land which Africans were using, although official exceptions were made where administrative or trading centers were needed, and the government took a swath two miles wide for the right-of-way of the railroad. Private holdings were acquired by various methods: some by purchase from communal or individual African owners, many by grant from the British Government of lands that had been declared Crown property. Title was transferred to the Crown by treaty in at least one major case. Essentially all the land in European hands today was alienated before 1915, the bulk of it between 1902 and 1907. Immigrant farmers since that time have moved into subdivisions of earlier European holdings, many of which were too large to be used effectively.

Time has proved that Europeans can live in good health on the high highland, and children born and brought up there appear to suffer no disabilities from their equatorial habitat. But after a generation of hardships, inherent in pioneering in any novel environment, the Kenyans, as they liked to be called, find themselves in perennial disagreement with the British Colonial Office as to policy in dealing with Africans, and increasingly at odds with the Africans themselves. The issues appear at first glance to be varied, but without exception they are based on the question of use and ownership of land.

When the British entered the high highland, several tribes shared it. The nomadic Masai tribe roamed the extensive grassland of the less rainy areas—some sparsely dotted with trees, much of it treeless. These people are believed to have appeared there early in the nineteenth century with the cattle on which they depended and still depend for subsistence. Since the herbage and the waterholes were also used by wild game, they herded their cattle in tight bunches, leaving most of the land temporarily

vacant. Their tribal organization featured a warrior class, organized in bands that perennially raided neighboring tribes for livestock and killed any men who resisted them. By this system they made themselves undisputed masters of the region and forced other tribes to take refuge in wooded areas, generally more rainy and more rugged than the pasture lands. The Masai occupied only spots within the vast territory over which they roamed and from which they excluded other tribes. If evenly spread, they would have averaged less than three persons per square mile, in the best of times.

In 1901-02, when the first wave of land-hungry Europeans arrived, times were hard. The tribe had recently been decimated by a concurrence of natural catastrophes rare even in Africa, where disasters singly or in pairs are almost commonplace. Severe drought had been accompanied by an invasion of locusts that consumed the vegetation over wide tracts of land. Rinderpest (distemper) had killed off large numbers of cattle, weakened as they were by hunger. Cattle losses resulted in general famine. To cap the climax, smallpox raged.

Since the Masai never tilled any of their soil, held more land by force of arms than they needed at any time, and were then reduced in numbers, they made treaties with the British Government surrendering thousands of square miles of humid land suitable for European types of farming. In the end they were relegated to the drier although larger part of their Reserve that lies south of the railway. Their cessions form a preponderant part of the 17,000 square miles of the "White Highlands," so named because settled by white families from Britain and South Africa, and subsequently reserved for Europeans.

A small amount of land now in European hands had never been used by an African. On margins of the Rift Valley, which cuts the high highland into two parts, there were tracts covered with coarse tuft-grass on which cattle languished. Left aside by the Masai, such land was likewise useless to African cultivators, whose primitive tools could not cope with the tough grassroots or whose crops did not thrive. Europeans have broken the land with tractors, fertilized it, added cobalt and other trace minerals needed to make it productive, and are now harvesting bumper crops of wheat every year.

The remainder of the farm and range land of the Europeans was alienated from several of the tribes whom the Masai had

relegated to the woodlands. There they lived mainly by typical African tillage, a system generally called "shifting cultivation." This method produces only two or three crops, after which the tilled patches are abandoned to nature until the lapse of 15 years or so has regenerated the soil. Hence only a small part of the total holding is used at any one time. Many shifting cultivators graze cattle or sheep on a part of the untilled acreage, but to the European newcomers, most fallow land looked unoccupied.

In 1901-2 the tribesmen who lived nearest the Masai had likewise suffered from the catastrophes that afflicted their enemies. One such tribe, the Kikuyu, who inhabited the wooded lands northeast of the Masai, had lost from 20 to 50 percent of their population, the heaviest toll being along the Masai frontier. Many survivors had taken refuge among relatives in other parts of the tribal domain. The consequent reduction in cultivation and livestock made the woodland margin in which the frontier lay seem utterly disused.

This zone had long been a forest defense against the grassland Masai. It was not a no-man's-land, but the territory of a weak local tribe. Shortly before the famine, Kikuyu had been buying parcels of land there, not communally as is usual among Africans, but for individual holdings. This is uncommon procedure, but recognized as valid when the transfer strictly observes native practice. When European individuals in turn paid money to the Kikuyu owners, they assumed they were buying the land for keeps, but because they neglected the forms for a sale required by native custom, the Kikuyu assumed that the Europeans were renting the land for a period of time, until they themselves, as owners, chose to reclaim it.

III. NEW AND OLD WAYS OF USING LAND

So long as the African population remained small, trouble resulting from constriction of the tribal lands was only a sporadic aftermath of mutual misunderstanding. To minimize disagreements, each tribe was assigned to land reserved for it by the British Government. Enough land was available at the time to permit extensive areas, both within and outside tribal reservations, to be declared game preserves, and slopes high and moist enough to support commercial timber to be set aside as forest preserves. The pattern of land tenure created by these allocations, including transfers to private ownership, corresponds only here and there

with nature's landscape design. Viewed from the air, European holdings form neat geometric patterns, within which the fields are terraced or plowed along the contours as a means of preventing erosion. The ground is kept under a cover of vegetation except when freshly plowed. In contrast, African farmlands look much like natural bush and grassland, except that exposed red or yellow soil betrays depleted fertility, and fresh gullies and streams running red prove that the soil is being eroded. Through contrasting land use, the borders between native reserves and European areas, originally arbitrary, have become arresting features of the landscape, even in this highland country where sharp natural contrasts are the rule.

While the design has been ever more deeply etched, the pattern has been little altered since World War I. Europeans have increased threefold, but the total number today is little more than 30,000, and the only additions to the farmer-planter group who have fitted into subdivisions of earlier and larger holdings are veterans of the two wars. Asians, all townsfolk, have increased a little faster, to 122,000. Between 1925 and 1950 the African population has risen from 2,500,000 to 5,250,000.

The sharp rise in Kenya's African population is a consequence of the amelioration of African life by the European government, and the increased opportunities afforded by European initiative. The death rate has been sharply reduced, at first by the abolition of tribal warfare and raiding for slaves, then by medical and sanitary services which have eliminated or minimized epidemics. Diseases that reduce vitality, however, are still widespread, and keep the level of achievement lower than it otherwise could be. The death rate of livestock has also been sharply cut by reducing epidemics, and the resulting surplus of cattle has intensified destructive use of grazing land. Some of the additional people have found work on European farms, and a larger number in the European towns. In Kenya, Africans perform all unskilled manual labor and household service, some semi-skilled labor, and a few clerical jobs. But the number entering European employment has not offset increase in population of the native reserves and consequent drain on the soil.

The material improvements in African life take on new meaning when viewed against a background of persisting and unaltered African attitudes that profoundly affect use of the land. In the face of a declining death rate, the birth rate has remained at

its former level, and in a single generation has brought several tribes to and beyond the limit of their local food supply. In spite of shortages of food, and of land on which to grow it, farming methods of most tribesmen remain those of shifting cultivation—a valid system where land is plentiful, but destructive to the soil if periods during which the soil is rested are too short to permit regeneration. For the Africans, cattle are the mark of wealth, and this favors the rise in numbers of livestock and the consequent pressure on the land, with no corresponding increase in produce except low-grade hides from ill-nourished animals that happen to die.

The government tries to pass on to Africans the lessons of land-use learned on European farms and agricultural experiment stations. Farm experts are resident on the reserves. “Schools” which teach how to improve the soil by resting, manuring, contouring and terracing are actually farmlands where young Africans work the land for a year under supervision by the Agricultural Department of the Colony. Crop trees are started in nurseries and given to promising farmers. At best, however, it takes time for Africans to adopt practices so unlike their traditional ways. At worst, rumor raises doubts of the sincerity of the European tutors, and at least one well-planned project, which was in active operation, has been nullified by fear of further alienation of land to Europeans.

Meanwhile, the rising population increases the load the land must bear. Already the soil on African farms in several reserves has decreased in fertility. The structure of soils in a low latitude is easily broken down, and severe erosion follows quickly. To alleviate destruction of the soil on one hard-pressed reserve, the government has undertaken to prepare a large nearby area for resettling many families on land hitherto unoccupied because of predatory wild animals, tsetse fly, and bushy natural vegetation difficult to clear. On old lands and new, the authorities dig wells and dam streams to provide water for people and livestock after the seasonal rains are over.

Such are the moves that have transformed the land pattern of Kenya in 65 years. Europeans and Asians have implanted a new social structure. Africans are incorporated in it; but at the same time it upsets the balance and demolishes the base of their former existence.

IV. THE KIKUYU AND MAU MAU

In the face of change, a large part of the Africans still occupy their tribal lands and look upon their place in the life of Kenya from the viewpoint of tribal customs and conditions. Most of them are quiet and friendly, and a few individuals are interested in improving their economic and social lot. Some tribes have adequate land, but most of them are pressing hard upon the capacity of their soil to provide subsistence.

The engulfing increase of African population is not confined to the high highland. The most heavily-peopled areas are on the lower highland, where density approaches 400 persons to the square mile in some places. The largest tribe on the high highland is the Kikuyu, numbering 1,000,000. A large percentage of them live on their Reserve, where density is estimated to average 285 per square mile. By any measure, they are one of the tribes short of land.

The Kikuyu tribal territory is the only Reserve that is intermeshed with the flourishing and sparsely settled White Highlands. Originally the same kind of ground, intensified shifting cultivation on the Reserve has resulted in decreasing productivity, washing of soil and gulleying. The European lands present the demonstration of a higher level of living. The contrast is always evident, not only to the Kikuyu cultivating their own land, but also to the many who live as squatter employees on European farms, and to the large number who go to Nairobi to work. No other Kenya tribe has been in such close touch with Europeans, nor for so long a time.

The issues and conflicts are sharpest in and near Nairobi, Kenya's capital and largest city. The Kikuyu Reserve begins at the city limits, and includes the land held by individuals. Here European farms are even more closely intermixed with the Reserve than elsewhere—holdings purchased long ago from individual tribesmen, whose descendants consider the properties their own, as explained above. The European settlers have carefully managed the productive soil, and nearness to the capital and largest market of the colony has enhanced land values. They refuse to relinquish the land at the demand of the Kikuyu claimants, and the 110 square miles at issue have become the epitome of the tribal land grievances. Already, members of the tribe have demanded transfer of European-held lands which they never owned. It may be noted that no other tribe has requested the

return of land, even that land which it has formerly controlled.

Besides being in closer touch with European life than other tribes, the Kikuyu appear to be more interested in political affairs than the rest. They have, as unofficial leaders, men trained in British universities as well as in the local schools. Half a dozen members of the tribe have recently been convicted in court of crimes associated with a secret society known as Mau Mau. Secret societies are common in African tribes, and ritual murder following ancient custom comes to light from time to time. Until now only Africans had been thought to be victims. When, rarely, a European has been assassinated, a personal grudge or religious fanaticism is usually found to be the cause.

Mau Mau made itself known toward the end of 1952 in gruesome massacres of many Africans and several Europeans. It is confined to the Kikuyu tribe. Its instigators are dedicated to ridding Kenya of Europeans, and many Kikuyu whose feeling toward Europeans is neutral or loyal have been terrorized into taking an oath to exterminate them. The 200 or more African victims have come from all walks of life, but they shared the reputation of being loyal to their European employers or to European officials. The much smaller number of European victims have been noted for exceptional services to the Africans. Wives or husbands and children of these individuals, black and white, have been included in the massacres. Personal grudge appears not to be a motive.

The leaders of Mau Mau may hope to dominate the country, if they can wrest control from the present authorities. It is no secret that many Kikuyu covet the Europeans' lands. It is doubtful if the few who have received more than minimum schooling possess the training and experience to take over the complex operation of a White Highlands farm, to say nothing of the segment of the interdependent world which the Europeans have made of Kenya. It is certain that transfer of the European farmlands to Africans would sharply reduce export crops, the basis of the country's economy.

The small gold mines started two decades ago in Kenya are already declining, and land is the sole foundation of human life. Whether there is enough land to support suitably the present population may be questioned. If there is, it will all have to be managed in the most efficient way known to agricultural science. Only a few scattered African cultivators now try to increase the

output of their lands and check the destruction of their soil. Concerted efforts of Europeans and Africans are called for, and also enough time to modify age-old traditions and practices. The present generation of Kikuyu is rejecting body marks and deformations formerly considered essential; succeeding generations can presumably learn to improve their farming methods and to abandon practices outmoded by European innovations. The most destructive aspects of Mau Mau are its repudiation of coöperation with Europeans and its refusal to grant time for a solution acceptable to all groups in the colony.

“TERRITORIAL WAR”

THE NEW CONCEPT OF RESISTANCE

By Lieutenant-General Dushan Kveder

THE last war taught military leaders an important lesson about the nature and scope of resistance movements in occupied countries. Up to that time, countries threatened by aggression had prepared to defend their territories by offering frontal resistance along their national borders. Taking advantage of superior strength, the aggressor smashed this kind of resistance in one country after another. Motorized columns quickly penetrated the frontiers, drove wedges deep into the interior, cut off whole regions and encircled parts of the defending forces. Thereupon isolated commanders surrendered and whole units threw down their arms or were annihilated. When the army had fallen to pieces, the enemy completed the occupation of the country with relative ease, often aided by an official policy of surrender brought about by fifth columns, treachery in government circles, defeatism among military leaders and personal and political antagonisms of various kinds. Thus it was that Poland, Denmark and Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands and France, Yugoslavia and Greece, were taken over one after another. Only a few units succeeded in withdrawing behind the Allied lines, to continue the struggle outside the national territories. Most of the occupied nations, depressed and demoralized, accepted conquest as inescapable.

As the war continued on a world-wide scale, however, the occupied nations emerged from their bewilderment. Gradually they became aware that defeat at their frontiers had not ended the war; slowly they resumed active resistance. In many countries, however, this movement did not gather momentum until the very end of the war, and was restricted mainly to economic sabotage. Since these resistance movements avoided open clashes with the enemy's armed forces and did not utilize their large reserves of manpower, they had little strategic significance.

The political reasons noted above which made resistance ineffective were compounded by an almost inconceivable lack of understanding by Allied military leaders of the military value of continued combat in the enemy-occupied nations. The initial mistake was the voluntary surrender of the trained armies, with

their commanders, weapons and equipment. No attempt had been made before the war to lay the foundations for a continuing war of liberation against the invader, and new armed forces had to be improvised within the occupied countries at the cost of great suffering.

There is no doubt that the possibilities of a liberation movement were more fully developed in Yugoslavia than in any other country during the Second World War. Yugoslav resistance was not limited to economic sabotage and small-scale guerrilla activities. And it showed that an occupied nation can wage a real "territorial war" with large-size regular units and achieve the country's final liberation with its own forces.

Is this lesson of World War II understood today, when again there is danger of war? At present, several European countries have realistic programs for frontal defense in case they are attacked.¹ And, of course, it would be senseless for countries whose frontiers coincide with the NATO defense line—and especially those which have strong armies of their own—to plan to abandon frontal resistance and to hand over their territory and their administrative and industrial centers without fighting. Such nations have every reason for attempting to repel aggression at their border areas and planning a counter-offensive that will crush the enemy on his own soil.

The fact is, however, that most European countries do not as yet possess the material resources required to make this the *only* possible concept of defense. And in many cases the concept of a frontal defense at all costs could have fatal results, leading only to the situations of 1939, 1940 and 1941. Such suicidal undertakings would undoubtedly provoke world-wide admiration; but they would do a disservice both to the countries attempting them and to the system of world defense against aggression. The nations thus defying one of the major lessons of the Second World War would lose their armies, their military organization, their weapons and their morale. To admit that some West European countries might be occupied does not imply pessimism or defeatism. We know too much about the ratio of forces which the two hostile blocs could put in the field to preclude the possibility of occupation for any country. Facing that possibility realistically and courageously, each threatened country must decide

¹ Thus Yugoslavia's capacity for defending her basic strategic approaches is daily increasing, thanks to the growth of her own resources, her alliance with Greece and Turkey, and American aid in war materials.

what concept of defense it should adopt, and what kind of war it should prepare to wage in order to avoid surrender if a superior enemy penetrates the country.

In the first place, each country should provide for a planned withdrawal to prepared lines or zones, where frontal resistance can be continued. In the final analysis, this objective might also be attained by withdrawal to the territory of one or several allied countries. World War II has shown, however, that often this cannot be done. Only a powerful army can execute a successful frontal withdrawal before a superior enemy. Moreover, it is not proper to leave unarmed people at the mercy of the invader. This means that a country unable to withdraw its forces to allied territory will be faced by two alternatives—either to surrender, or to wage the war in a new form suited to the changed military situation and the new relationship of forces.

Surrender is an act of national disgrace, which demoralizes the people and paves the way to collaboration with the enemy and to various forms of treason. The nation loses something even more important than territory—it loses its army and thereby the means for regaining its liberty and its territory. And most important of all—given the ultimate perspective of victory by a coalition in the war—surrender by an allied country (or indeed even of a neutral overrun by the same aggressor) harms not only the country itself but the general allied cause as well, for it unnecessarily postpones the hour of victory. The Liberation War in Yugoslavia showed unequivocally that manpower is fundamental to victory and should be valued above territory. No territory can be maintained if the army is lost; any territory can be regained if the army remains.

The collapse of the front need not, therefore, be followed by surrender, but only by a change from classical frontal war to mobile territorial war. Present-day European armies must envisage waging both types of warfare. Only thus can each country prevent the rout of its army in the event that frontal warfare on its own territory becomes hopeless.

II

Since history has thus far provided no example of a transition from frontal to territorial warfare, many military leaders and theorists may view these ideas skeptically. But there cannot be a precedent for every event that takes place. And history has

shown us examples of territorial wars, even though these developed on a different basis than by a direct transition from frontal war. In its final years the Liberation War in Yugoslavia became a genuine, territorial war on a large scale. Since it demonstrated the usefulness of this type of war both for the people of the nation attacked and for the strategy of the coalition in general, let us examine its characteristics in rough outline.

(1) In the first place, the Yugoslav experience shows that under present conditions territorial war is no longer merely a "little war" (though it includes the typical activities of a little war), but is a genuine "great war." It cannot be referred to simply as a "partisan war," because this name designates the actions of small units, usually carried out in support of a regular national or allied front. By territorial war in the modern sense we mean an *independent* war or, at least, a war which is an integral part of the general coalition war.

A modern territorial war is a *regular* war. All Yugoslav units, from the smallest to the largest, were directed from one center and conducted their operations in accordance with the principles of regular warfare. The operations of the larger regular units are the dominating element, and will be so from the very beginning for armies which switch from frontal to territorial warfare. In armies formed after the occupation has taken place, as was the case with the Yugoslav Liberation Army, they appear only in the later stages, but at last they become the dominating element. Part of this process took place in our army in 1942; it was completed in 1943.

To enable the larger regular units in Yugoslavia to survive and operate it was essential to coördinate their actions with those of the small—also regular—local partisan detachments and sabotage groups throughout the countryside, along lines of communication and in the towns. An army waging a territorial war therefore consists of two parts: large regular units to carry out the bigger operations, and many partisan and diversionary groups for auxiliary actions. While the larger units engage the main mobile forces of the enemy, the small partisan groups scatter the enemy and pin him down over the whole territory. Even at the end of 1944, when our army had switched from territorial to frontal warfare and had 51 divisions at its disposal, we still had 107 large partisan detachments and countless small diversionary groups. They proved very useful.

Modern territorial warfare is characterized by the fact that it is waged by large regular units. These units—regiments, brigades, divisions and army corps—may be formed in the course of the war itself, as in Yugoslavia; or, if an army switched directly from frontal to territorial warfare, would be the same units that existed previously, though lighter and more mobile. The operations carried out by these units are no less important than those of frontal warfare. They are not merely skirmishes between partisan groups and enemy patrols or police. A large number of divisions may participate on both sides. In Yugoslavia, both sides used artillery, tanks and planes.

That experience proved beyond question that even when most of a country's populated centers and communication are in enemy hands, units as large as divisions and corps cannot only exist and operate but also fight and win more easily than smaller ones can in such warfare. Nor is this experience contradicted by the fact that our wartime divisions were somewhat smaller than normal (3,000 to 5,000 men, or less; in the last year of the war from 8,000 to 10,000 men). Had we had more supplies the units could have been larger and their victories greater.

The term territorial war is appropriate for this special form of regular war, since it implies that the warfare is waged over the *whole* territory of the country, and not merely along a more or less unbroken line. This, of course, determines only the basic strategical and tactical conceptions of the military operations. Their political substance represents a liberation war; though a liberation war is not necessarily “territorial.” It can also be a “little” war—guerrilla warfare. A liberation war will be a regular territorial war only if it is waged mainly by large regular units.

Rigid and clearly-defined fronts are not typical of territorial war, although they may appear in the course of it in flexible, modified forms. This is especially so during the final phase, when the enemy is being expelled from the country. Along with the use of the whole national territory, free manœuvring is characteristic of territorial warfare. The larger units operate now in one area, now in another, while the smaller detachments cover the whole territory with their guerrilla activities. Wherever large regular units appear, liberated territories are formed; these may often be abandoned, to be formed again somewhere else. At times all the forces on both sides are in movement and in action. Then the liberated areas practically disappear: but almost all the

“occupied” areas disappear likewise. The two armies find themselves enmeshed in a huge no-man’s land, but with all movements on both sides more or less centralized and directed according to plan. Such, approximately, was the way the fighting looked during the sixth enemy offensive in Yugoslavia.

(2) A territorial war in a civilized country is an organized war directed according to plan. In its general outline the command is expressly centralized, although in detail it leaves much more independence and initiative to the subordinate commanders than is the case in frontal warfare. This single and centralized command gives regular territorial warfare its strength and advantage over the non-regular “little” war.

In territorial war discipline must be as firm as it is in frontal war—or, if anything, firmer. It is based less on formal regulations and coercion than on a profound consciousness of duty on the part of officers and soldiers, attained only by tireless indoctrination. The more disciplined the unit and the better organized its activities, the greater its effectiveness and the smaller its hardships and losses. All tendencies toward disorganization, anarchy, plundering and arbitrary action must be firmly checked since they weaken the resistance, lower the prestige of the army in the eyes of the people, and reduce the prospects of success in battle. In this respect, we in Yugoslavia were not sentimental.

Territorial war is not, and must not be, a disorganized affair on the principle of “every man on his own and a shot at the enemy when possible.” That form of resistance requires sacrifices out of all proportion to enemy losses. Naturally, if no organized insurgent army exists the people themselves may spontaneously take up arms to protect themselves and their homes, thus beginning an insurrection. Under such conditions, this is useful. But we learned that spontaneous uprisings are doomed to failure unless a military organization is set up in time and large military units formed.

(3) Even during the Second World War territorial wars were more political and ideological in character than the frontal war conducted by the Great Powers. They will be even more so if there is another conflict. This political emphasis finds expression not only in the fact that the outbreak of war is closely linked with political events in individual countries and in the world, but also because in a liberation war the smallest tactical actions are bound up with the specific political problems of an area at a given mo-

ment. All battalion and even company commanders, and especially the leaders of partisan detachments, must independently solve many political problems; their military actions cannot otherwise be intelligent or efficient. This is a necessity which cannot be avoided in such a war, regardless of the desire of many officers in European armies to refrain from politics in the exercise of their military profession.

The decisive rôle of morale in wartime is nowhere so obvious as in a liberation war. How otherwise explain the victory of the Yugoslav Liberation Army, which fought under exceptionally trying circumstances against an enemy enjoying great material superiority? In the world as it is today, only a country which has solved its basic social and national problems to the satisfaction of the people—or, at least, shows that it is in process of solving these problems—can find within itself sufficient moral strength to fight in this way. A liberation movement must mobilize the people; its army must win the day-by-day support of the civilian population, especially of the peasants, for without them neither a large territorial war nor a small partisan war can be fought successfully. A territorial war is a people’s war. In such a war it is very difficult to use coercive measures. Further, women and young people play very important rôles, and increase its mass character.

In his work “On War” (Volume 6, Chapter 26), Clausewitz called liberation wars against invaders “people’s wars” and referred to those who opposed such wars because they allegedly offer as great a threat to the domestic régime as to the foreign enemy. Such views are shared even today by some persons in the ruling circles of various European countries. But the liberation movements in the last war showed that no social class or political group has reason to fear for its position if it is resolute in the struggle against an invader. The masses of the people will rally against the occupation and, indeed, nothing can prevent them from doing so. In every nation those who lose their influence and position are those who remain aloof; and those who are destroyed with the enemy are those who have struck bargains with him.

The struggle against the fifth column is of exceptional military importance in a liberation war. Without a fifth column, the invader is blind and powerless. The problem cannot be solved merely by dealing a heavy blow at enemy agents at the outset. The logic of the occupation itself creates new forms of fifth col-

umns. Even people who seemed to be perfectly reliable in peacetime can turn out to be fainthearted and opportunistic. There are always speculators and egoists who put their private interests above the interests of the nation, working for the enemy at first, perhaps, as neutrals, then as petty collaborationists, and, finally, as traitors and spies. It is not a long road from the weakling's first tacit acceptance of the inevitability of the occupation to the moment when the invader puts a rifle into his hands to use against his own people. The fifth column cannot be defeated merely by military action which seeks to annihilate it physically; that action must be backed by a persevering and intelligent political struggle which aims to destroy it ideologically and morally. Even in a prewar period, such political action is a most important part of the preparation for territorial war.

(4) A territorial war is always characterized by violence, terror and reprisals on the part of the invader. It claims its victims not only in the fighting ranks but also among the civilian population. In this respect it does not differ from a classical frontal war, with its atom and other bombs, guided missiles and chemical and biological weapons. Civilian losses are today an inevitable accompaniment to every type of war.

There are no guaranteed methods of preventing casualties at the front or in the rear in any type of contemporary warfare. The Yugoslav experience showed, however, that in territorial war there are reliable ways of reducing the number of casualties. The best way to protect the adult male population from reprisals is to draft these men into military units or, at least, to arm them as Home Guards for local self-defense. Reprisals then become much less likely. The active participation of women and, especially, young people actually guards them from danger rather than exposes them. We learned that the surest method of preventing the unlawful shooting of prisoners-of-war is to hold enemy prisoners. And the most efficient method for preventing reprisals against women, children and old people is to increase the activity of armed units and to spread the uprising. When the enemy realizes that the slaughter of hostages only increases the resistance of the population and spreads the insurrection to other areas, he begins to question its usefulness. This experience carries an international lesson. If the resistance is intensive in all occupied countries of Europe, each nation will pay a proportionately smaller price for the common victory.

(5) In preparing for territorial resistance it is necessary to assess realistically the ability of the invader to control “occupied” territories. Our experience in Yugoslavia demonstrated that wherever we maintained large units, the invader required at least a reinforced battalion to man one garrison. Smaller garrisons, and especially small gendarmerie stations, were marked out for certain annihilation. The density of the occupation forces in a given area was always in proportion to the strength of our army. Where only small partisan detachments were operating the enemy kept many small garrisons, making it easier for him to control the area. Where larger units of our army were operating (especially when they were armed with heavy weapons), the enemy reduced the number of garrisons but increased their size. This allowed our units greater freedom of manœuvre, liberated territory and increased the security of the population.

This rough yardstick that the enemy requires one battalion for every garrison provides an illustration of what might take place in such a country as Switzerland, for instance, if an invader had to fight a territorial war there. Nine enemy garrisons would require an enemy division. And how many cities and industrial centers, towns and large villages are there in Switzerland? Hundreds. Would the enemy be able to devote so many divisions to the occupation of this one country? Obviously not, for there would still be the regular front of the great allies; and in all the other European countries he would be faced with the same problem. Besides, the enemy would need divisions and even armies to keep down the Russian and satellite peoples. The result would be that in Switzerland, and in every other country that was fighting a modern territorial war, there would be large free territories, free towns and even cities. The resistance could carry out all kinds of operations, large and small, organize its intelligence and communications, and supply its army.

On the other hand, a nation which surrenders can be held with the aid of a few gendarmes and domestic agents, perhaps with a few mobile police regiments in reserve, especially if its government administration enters the service of the aggressor. Under modern conditions of territorial resistance, then, occupation is a relative matter. Actually, a whole national territory can never be occupied. The greater part of the population and large parts of the national territory will always remain free if the people and their army will it so.

(6) The operational basis of a territorial war is not in the towns but in the countryside, that is, in open areas which no occupation, no matter how heavy, can control. The existence of such areas made it possible for Yugoslavia to transform the original partisan army, consisting of 92 detachments with a total of 80,000 fighting men in 1941, into a large regular army totalling 53 divisions with 800,000 fighting men in 1945. But this countryside is only a kind of rear for the units, whose operations are in the main directed against towns with large enemy garrisons. This should not, however, reduce the importance of creating armed groups within the towns themselves. These groups are also a significant force in territorial warfare.

(7) Yugoslavia's relatively large area (approximately 257,000 square kilometers) gave our units great possibilities for concentration and dispersal, permitting the transfer of troops from one area to another for surprise offensives and flexible withdrawals. Would territorial war be impracticable in countries of smaller size? A more detailed study of our experience indicates that similar manoeuvre is entirely possible even in small areas. The Yugoslav province of Slovenia covers approximately 20,000 square kilometers, or about half the area of Switzerland. This province was in a special position since parts of it had been annexed directly to the Third Reich and other parts to Italy. The enemy was very sensitive about what went on there. Moreover, the main lines of enemy communications crossed the province, and the Slovene units had specific tasks to carry out. In view of this, Slovenia had more autonomy in waging the war than did the other provinces and Slovene units seldom operated in other provinces. Throughout the war, in spite of hard-hitting enemy offensives using large numbers of troops (almost 100,000 Italians, for example, took part in the third enemy offensive in Slovenia), the Slovene units never were compelled to abandon their operational territory and withdraw to other parts of the country. When sometimes they crossed over into neighboring Croatia it was to help the Croat units execute certain large-scale operations, after which they again returned to Slovenia. The Slovene commanders never felt that the narrow limits of their province did not provide sufficient manoeuvring space for fighting and means of subsistence.

In another war, almost all the European nations which have the misfortune to be occupied will, as a result of the experiences of the last war, conduct at least a small territorial war, if not a

large one. In these conditions, each insurgent will find support in neighboring countries, permitting some military units of one country to find shelter for a time on the territory of another. Often during the last war the Italian Garibaldi-Nattisone partisan division, which operated in Friuli in northeastern Italy, was given shelter by our Slovene units, and in the same way Bulgarian partisan units often sought refuge in eastern Serbia.

(8) In Western Europe one often hears that mountainous terrain is essential for success in territorial war. The facts do not bear out the thesis. In the first place, Yugoslavia is not predominantly mountainous, since 54.8 percent of her area is less than 1,600 feet above sea level and a further 27.4 percent lies at an elevation of between 1,600 and 3,300 feet—a total of 82.2 percent of rolling terrain suitable for manœuvre. There is another 14 percent of moderately mountainous land (3,300 to 4,900 feet in altitude), which from the military point of view is not essentially different. Steep mountains (4,900 to 6,500 feet) cover only 3.3 percent of the area, with really high mountains (above 6,500 feet) accounting for the remaining .5 percent. Partisans thus fought on a terrain all but a fraction of which is suitable not only for operations by infantry units armed with modern weapons but also for actions by motorized troops, tanks and all sorts of artillery, as well as for the establishment of air bases. And indeed, our experience never gave us reason to believe that it is easier to wage partisan or territorial war in the mountains than on intermediate terrain. On the contrary, our fighting men always considered high mountains an uncomfortable and difficult battlefield and avoided them whenever possible. Furthermore, in the mountains, where there was no enemy, the partisans had nothing to do and no one to fight. Their function was to fight and they could do that only where the enemy could be found: on the plains and at lower altitudes.

(9) There is also a belief in Western Europe that it would be very difficult to conduct a territorial war there on account of the density of population, the proximity of settlements to one another and the well-developed network of roads. Extreme density of population on almost absolutely flat areas certainly hampers large-scale operations. However, most European countries do not belong in this category, or at least not entirely. Yugoslavia has 63 inhabitants per square kilometer, with one part less densely and another more heavily populated. Operations were carried out in

both, but especially in the more densely populated areas. Again the experience in Slovenia is instructive. In Slovenia there are 70.5 inhabitants per square kilometer, which makes it not different essentially from the military point of view from, for instance, Switzerland with approximately 112 inhabitants per square kilometer. In Slovenia all sorts of operations were carried out by units which by 1943 had grown to two army corps consisting of six divisions, three independent brigades and approximately 15 partisan detachments of several hundred fighters each—a total of from 35,000 to 40,000 fighters. The density of the population never was an obstacle to these operations. On the contrary, our units always strove to penetrate the richest areas, where the enemy usually put up the strongest defense but where living and fighting conditions were better: food more plentiful, equipment easier to get, recruits more numerous, care of the wounded easier, and organization of communications and intelligence simpler.

In Slovenia it is difficult to find a point more than 10 to 15 kilometers, as the crow flies, from an automobile road. The roads were useful to the enemy but they were useful to us, too. When we wanted to prevent the enemy from using them, we had means at our disposal to do so. A concrete example: six parallel automobile roads lead from Ljubljana to Celje, through a gap of 20 to 30 kilometers wide between the Sava River and the Kamnik Mountains—that is, one road to each three to five kilometers. No point on this terrain is more than three or four kilometers from the nearest road. The whole terrain is heavily populated. The Kamnik-Zasavje Detachment, numbering 100 to 200 fighters, fought in this area from 1942 until the end of the war, operating as a whole and never breaking up into smaller units. It constantly attacked lines of communication and convoys. It withstood at least two enemy drives per month. Yet the enemy never succeeded in driving it out of this region. These and many other similar examples taken from actual practice should be convincing evidence that territorial war can be waged in any country with a similar network of roads.

(10) Was the relative backwardness of prewar Yugoslavia responsible for success in this new form of war? In the first place, it might be noted that a relatively low standard of living does not in itself cause a liberation movement to develop. If this were so, it would be hard to understand why the Bulgarians or Rumanians—whose living standards did not differ much from those in many

Jugoslav provinces—did not develop any important resistance movements against the Germans, although they had as many reasons for it as we did. Besides, in the last war troops of many highly-civilized nations fought under conditions which were no easier than those under which Jugoslavs were fighting—for example, the British soldiers in the African deserts or the Americans in the jungles of the Pacific. The men of the French resistance fought bravely; if they were not as effective as they might have been, this was not due to the degree of their civilization but to their general conception of the struggle and the tasks they had set themselves. In Jugoslavia before the war, all the provinces had not reached the same level of development. But there was no essential difference between the standard of living in Slovenia and the other countries of Western Europe. And yet the Slovenes fought no less well than the other nationalities of Jugoslavia. Explanations of the will to fight in men must be sought elsewhere than in criteria of “civilization” or “backwardness.” In my opinion, any nation could fight a territorial war in the future, regardless of its state of development, provided it possessed a high degree of national consciousness and devotion to freedom and independence.

(11) What kinds of weapons are needed for territorial operations? The three basic requirements are suitability for manoeuvring and extreme mobility, for hard and rapid blows, and for fighting at close range. What are needed, therefore, are: first, light weapons, easy to carry; second, weapons of high destructive power, capable of strong and sudden concentration of fire; and third, weapons of somewhat less than ordinary range. It is quite incorrect that forces in a territorial war, including partisan units carrying out auxiliary activities in the enemy rear, should be armed merely with light infantry weapons. Certain new armaments developed during and after the last war will greatly facilitate the waging of territorial war in the future—among them anti-tank rocket launchers, recoilless guns and infrared sights for firing at night. They will help solve three important problems which have to be faced in territorial actions, namely anti-tank fighting, destruction of fortified points and effective firing during night operations.

(12) Special attention must be drawn to the extremely important rôle of the air force in this type of war. In essence, modern airborne troops employ simply the typical methods of territorial

war. In the last war, with a few exceptions, the possibilities of using airborne troops were not fully utilized. One reason was that they were overburdened by various requirements arising from the principles upon which frontal warfare is waged, and hence were not flexible enough for use in territorial operations. The opportunities for using them—especially in one's own occupied country, or in a friendly country—are much more extensive than is usually believed. If they adopt appropriate tactics, the length of their survival in the enemy rear need not be limited. This was proved by Yugoslav divisions which operated for years in the thick of enemy forces. Even smaller airborne units such as battalions and regiments can accomplish a great deal if they use clever tactics and are armed with good weapons.

Transport aviation adds greatly to the mobility of land units in territorial warfare. Besides performing marches and infiltration, such units will in future be able to make use of air transport in their manoeuvres. The possibilities of surprise through the rapid transfer of the main effort from one area to another will thereby be greatly increased. Transport also plays an important rôle in evacuating the wounded and sick who are a particular burden on the field forces in territorial warfare. In the course of the fourth enemy offensive against our main forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instance, Yugoslav units were compelled to carry with them 4,000 wounded and sick (mainly typhus cases), which greatly hampered the operations against 11 German and Italian divisions. On the other hand, when the Allied air forces evacuated several thousand wounded to southern Italy at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, the burden on our units was greatly relieved and their fighting morale was heightened.

Combat aviation is very important for carrying out more difficult tasks, such as attacking fortified positions and defending one's own forces from attack by superior enemy concentrations. Difficulties in using artillery and tanks—ever-existent due to the very nature of territorial war—can be lessened through the close coöperation of air forces. Aviation is useful for liaison work between various commands, and renders possible more frequent personal contact between commanders. It also can be an important source of supply, especially as regards materials which are difficult to capture from the enemy.

For these reasons every country which seriously considers the possibility of engaging in territorial war must build up its avia-

tion, and especially its transport aviation. In this connection, the great usefulness of helicopters must be emphasized. They open up new prospects, especially with regard to supplies and evacuation. The problem of airfields for transport aviation should not cause too much concern. If the transport aviation cannot temporarily be based on one's own territory, it can be based on neighboring allied territory. Units on “occupied” territory will always be able, with a little resourcefulness, to set up makeshift airfields as we used to do (although disappointingly few planes came to land on them).

(13) Foreign armies which are considering the possibility of territorial war on home ground always have misgivings about being able to supply their units, especially with ammunition. This is certainly a difficult problem, but our experience has shown that there is a remedy for this also.

There was no continuity of organization between the old Yugoslav Army and the new Liberation Army. The latter was formed on a completely new basis. At the very beginning, the weapons and ammunition which had been hidden both by our underground organizations and by individuals acting on their own initiative when the old army disintegrated proved to be extremely valuable. The quantity was small, but enough to start with. The weapons and ammunition already in the possession of a regular army at the time of transition from frontal to territorial warfare are likely to be sufficient at the beginning—and if a territorial war is planned in advance, there will have been ample opportunity to prepare reserves of material and to store them away in hiding places for months and even years of war. In this connection it must be kept in mind that less ammunition is used, and less should be used, in a territorial war than in a frontal war; troops should think twice before firing a round or a shell.

In Yugoslavia we built up an army of 300,000 armed men before receiving from the Allies a single rifle or a single round of ammunition. We armed them exclusively with weapons captured from the enemy. Only in the second half of the war did we begin to receive aid from abroad, but this was never sufficient to cover our needs. War booty was our main source of materials until the end of the war. It is to be hoped that in a possible future war, the liberation armies will receive more aid than in the last war. It would, however, be erroneous to count on this source alone, since it cannot be sufficient. The major Allies will have the problem of

supplying their own armies. Moreover, let us hope that the number of people carrying on large-scale resistance will be larger. And there are bound to be shortages of transport planes and pilots, as well as interference by enemy planes. Liberation movements in a future war must be prepared to rely at least partially upon their own resources.

If the war lasts a long time, it may become necessary to rearm the fighting forces in part. To the extent that there is a shortage of ammunition for their own weapons and calibres, resistance forces will have to adopt enemy weapons and calibres. "Standardizing" armaments will occur in a new form—in accordance with enemy calibres. This would be unthinkable in a frontal war, but is quite natural in a territorial war.

III

A soldier who received his training during the last war in the school of partisan warfare cannot help regarding present Western defense conceptions with certain misgivings. He must, of course, admit the great value of large divisions equipped with modern arms, powerful weapons for fire support, strategic aviation, atom bombs and atomic artillery, guided missiles and other up-to-date armaments for resisting the aggressor frontally and disorganizing his rear. Along a conventional front in a possible future war similar armaments will no doubt be basic for defense and counter-offensive. But the tendency to underestimate the military importance of resistance by nations which have fallen under enemy occupation, and to think of it only as insignificant auxiliary action by guerrillas and saboteurs, seems shortsighted. The strategic value of liberation wars seems to have been underestimated in Western military planning; not enough is being done to prepare for organized resistance by nations which, owing to their exposed position, might be occupied, at least temporarily. In estimating the relative strength of the Eastern bloc and NATO, the supposition appears to be that all the enemy divisions will be used on the conventional front. But the number the enemy will put there can be considerably reduced by compelling him to fight a territorial war in any nation he overruns. If the assessment of the situation overlooks these huge reserve forces it may weaken Europe's defensive power.

A widespread liberation war has immense strategic importance. In the last war, Yugoslavia prevented the dispatch

of any of her own quisling units to other fronts, reduced to a minimum the enemy's ability to draw on the country's production for his own needs, and pinned down over 30 enemy divisions, with more than half a million men. At the end of 1944, for instance, the enemy was compelled to put 40 of his divisions with 580,000 men into the field against 51 Yugoslav divisions and 500,000 men. At the same time, on the Italian front there were only 27 to 28 Axis divisions, consisting of 350,000 men, fighting against 24 Allied divisions.²

The prospects of *final* victory in an eventual new world war are on the side of the forces united against aggression. This perspective is based not merely on their greater economic resources which may have a decisive influence, but also on their moral advantages in a war which they have done nothing to provoke. Confidence in final victory will give tremendous moral support to all nations which are attacked, including those which might be temporarily occupied. But it cannot by itself maintain the morale of European nations threatened by occupation. They cannot nourish their fighting qualities solely on the hope that, if occupied, they will be freed from the outside. Indeed, that attitude tends to lull a nation's fighting spirit rather than stimulate it. A threatened nation must be made aware that it can defend itself successfully with its own forces and that it should not expect to be rescued by someone else. It must find strength for the struggle within itself; must develop reliance on its own possibilities. Only such a nation can withstand aggression, occupation, terror and reprisals, and win back freedom and independence. If it does, it thereby makes a vital contribution to the joint victory over the aggressor.

A liberation war can be improvised, as Norway, France, Italy and other occupied countries showed in the last war. Even in Yugoslavia the military organization had to be set up, by and large, during the war itself. But it was a difficult, long and painful road, exacting many victims. If the former Yugoslav Army had made any real preparations for prolonging the war against the invader, our Liberation Movement would have developed under much easier circumstances. Victories could have been won more quickly had we started with a situation similar to the one we had

² In his memoirs, Churchill quoted from a memorandum he had prepared in late 1943: "These guerrilla forces [Yugoslavian and Albanian] are containing as many [German] divisions as are the British and American armies put together." "The Second World War," by Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951, Vol. V, p. 330.

created by 1943, for instance, instead of starting under the conditions of 1941.

A new solution of the problem of organizing in advance for territorial warfare should not be sought in the formation of units of a special type, however. The whole army to be used in frontal operations should be trained both for frontal and territorial war, since it is difficult to determine in advance which units will be left behind the enemy lines. Formation of special partisan detachments and groups of saboteurs, detailed to specific areas, is justified, however.

Psychological preparation also plays a very important rôle. Before the last war, one often heard naïve views to the effect that any preparation for occupation, or even talk about the possibility of failure in the frontal resistance, would spread defeatism in the army and among the people. The unrealistic appraisal of the relative forces and the underestimation of the need of preparing for a territorial war were concealed behind talk of the absolute invincibility of this or that nation and the certainty of smashing the enemy by offensive action. And this, in fact, was a tacit admission that the failure of frontal resistance would mean the end of the struggle and the beginning of capitulation and slavery. But a breakthrough by the enemy need not mean the end of all fighting, and least of all does it mean the end of the war; it simply means a transition from one form of warfare to another. True, this is a much more difficult and sanguinary form, but the better and more complete the preparations for it, the less bloody and difficult it will be. Preparations for territorial war in peacetime do not, therefore, spread defeatism in the army and among the people, but open new vistas for saving national honor and independence. Further, they act as a curb on a would-be aggressor and thereby serve the cause of peace. For if an aggressor is sure that by liquidating the frontal resistance of a country, especially a small one, he can destroy all further resistance and compel surrender, he will not hesitate to commit aggression at the convenient time. But if, on the contrary, he is convinced that after occupying the country he will have to fight a terrible, exhausting and prolonged territorial war, over its whole area, he will seriously reconsider the advisability of attacking. Territorial war thus represents a tangible and convincing inducement for a would-be aggressor to respect peace and shun war.

SELF-HELP AND "HELPLESSNESS" IN BRITISH-AMERICAN TRADE

By Roy Harrod

ANGLO-AMERICAN economic relations are passing through a period of uncertainty; and where there is uncertainty, there is inevitably some danger. The new British Government entered office in 1951 in a phase of acute crisis; rather drastic first-aid measures had to be taken to restore solvency. When the measures began to show signs of having been effective, and after an intensive study of more basic factors in the international situation, the Government focused its thoughts on how a decisive move might be made towards that ideal of a "one-world" system, with convertible currencies and no discriminations, which has been the declared objective and abiding aim of the United States and the United Kingdom alike. A movement away from the paths of control and of interference with the natural flow of trade was quite in line with the philosophy of the new Government.

These matters were discussed at the great Commonwealth meeting in the autumn of 1952 in a spirit of hope and purposefulness. While the communiqué was necessarily expressed in somewhat general language, there is little doubt that the discussions covered a number of specific problems. These were, however, treated with realism and with no desire to embark on experiments that might involve excessive risk. It was accordingly felt necessary to predicate that the bolder measures envisaged would be dependent on what are commonly called "helpful" policies on the part of the United States. "Helpfulness" here did not mean "aid."

Unfortunately, hopes were soon dashed by a development that need not be regarded as surprising. The new Administration in the United States required a fairly extensive period for study before committing itself to new developments. The simplicities of election speeches were confronted by the woefully complex, obdurate and tiresome facts of the present economic situation. No blame at all can be attached to the Administration for requiring time to consolidate its thoughts, but the result has been a sort of waiting period. Furthermore, during this period fears have arisen that political conditions in the United States are such as to preclude large departures of policy in a "helpful" direction. That is, of course, a matter on which judgments formed abroad are nearly

worthless; but the mere delay, quite inevitable though it may be, is highly favorable for the advocates of an altogether different point of view in Britain, namely of what is sometimes called the "two-world" system (both being, of course, within the free world). That idea is to weld together the British Commonwealth and Empire, and the countries of Europe, into a system supported by strengthened preferences, and currencies that are mutually convertible but inconvertible to outsiders. Economic relations with the United States would be limited to a minimum.

This point of view has rather noisy supporters, but it must be emphasized, first that its British adherents consist of no more than a minority in either of the great political parties; the majority in each adheres faithfully to the one-world idea; secondly, that this school of thought has hardly got beyond verbal phrases which, when analyzed, prove no more coherent than they were when Lord Keynes castigated them in his speech recommending the U.S. Loan Agreement to the House of Lords in 1945. Furthermore, they contain much wishful thinking in regard to the degree of coöperation likely to be forthcoming for such a scheme, both from other members of the sterling area and from the other countries of Europe. Thus there is no need to fear that a policy of this kind will take the place of the one the British authorities are pursuing—sincerely, if, in American eyes, somewhat slowly.

However, one trouble at the moment is that there is a lack of clarity about the relation between the ultimate aim of a "one-world" system and the immediate necessities. Clearer definitions are needed. These require not only constant attention to the ultimate aim, but also frankness in recognizing the nature of the difficulties. Many obstacles have been overcome since 1945. It is important to be clear about the nature of the obstacles that remain, and of course it would be very advantageous if the authorities responsible for policy on both sides of the Atlantic should take the same view of them. After all, the facts are what they are, and it should not be impossible for highly intelligent administrators to achieve a unity of vision and assessment.

It cannot be denied that most Americans feel rather strong discontent with British behavior in recent years. Between the Atlantic meeting and the end of the war, a common point of view about international economic policy seemed to emerge, and it was hoped that the two countries would work together, not only in implementing a liberal policy but also in influencing other countries in

the same direction. Meanwhile, the United States was conscious of making large concessions to the British—wiping out the Lend-Lease obligation and granting a large loan on easy terms. These acts were not regarded by most people as a sort of bribe for securing British adhesion, but rather as a token of the fact that the British had expressed sympathy for the broad American line of policy, and had reached agreement on many matters of detail, such as those involved in the Bretton Woods plans. Meanwhile, it was recognized that Britain could not come the whole way towards liberalization while coping with the “transitional” difficulties of postwar readjustment.

In the eight years that have passed, Britain has had the advantage of much American money. Yet little progress seems to have been made towards removing discriminations against American exports. Outside the sterling area, sterling remains inconvertible, and this also may militate against American sales. There has been no joint leadership toward a clean sweep of restrictions and inconvertibilities. The United States has been generous and patient. Britain cannot still plead that she has been hurried, and Americans feel that she has failed to carry out her undertakings. The British feeling that the United States still has to do something more “helpful” in its external economic policies is intensely irritating to Americans.

The British, on the other hand, concentrate on the fact that, much to their own disappointment, a fundamental equilibrium has not yet been achieved. Britain just cannot abolish discriminations, as this would mean stark bankruptcy. While the British are willing to admit that mistakes have been made, and while their successive governments have had sharp critics at home, they plead that the situation since the war has been perplexed and confusing. They feel that they have made very great efforts indeed. They may point to their austerity, for which they have received some admiration but also a good deal of sarcastic comment of a not very friendly kind. British production has soared. Exports have soared. And yet British citizens have so far reaped practically no advantage from all this; they tighten their belts; and then they are scolded for not having implemented a liberalizing policy which to them seems manifestly impossible. The very fact that so much time has passed with no fundamental equilibrium reached despite all their hard work and austerity seems to point to the conclusion that there is something in the world-wide state

of affairs that precludes the attainment of such an equilibrium, however hard they may work for it.

It cannot reasonably be argued that shortcomings in the nationalized sectors of the British economy are responsible for the external trade deficit; and the increase of social services, also criticized in America, cannot possibly have had any effect on the external situation. They have been fully paid for by the British citizens themselves. Since 1947, the British budget has had a surplus, and in this respect Britain can claim that her record is much better than that of the United States. Indeed, if less had been spent on health and education in Britain, and more on automobiles or other luxuries, the balance of trade would probably have been worse. While British people in the lower income brackets have probably had some moderate improvement in their standard of living, when all is averaged out it appears that the general level of consumption in the country has barely risen compared with the prewar period. Outside the poverty-stricken regions of the world's surface, this is probably a unique record. And so, since the international balance continues to be in disequilibrium, the British are inclined to argue that the next move is up to the Americans. They ask them to adopt more "helpful" policies. It is a paradoxical situation. The two countries have, or claim to have, the same ideals; neither side wishes to be unreasonable in its demands. And yet there is friction.

This must arise from a failure at some point to appreciate the facts. But the trouble is that there are so many facts, and each party may choose those that suit his point of view. If my facts are presented with a view to justifying the British point of view, I hope it may at least be considered that they are relevant and that they are facts that both parties should bear in mind if they are to succeed in contriving harmonious policies conducive to their common aim.

II

I concentrate upon the external aspect. It is not necessary to bring into the picture the familiar facts about war damage in Britain and the need for internal rehabilitation. The external task has been twofold. Foremost and greatest has been Britain's need to reestablish her over-all external balance, which had been gravely damaged during the war period. The additional task was related to the specific "dollar shortage." Besides greatly en-

larging her exports, Britain has had to reorient them somewhat, owing to a shift in the pattern of world trade. She has had to make a huge increase of exports, but she has also been concerned to see that a larger proportion of those exports earned dollars.

The mere enlargement of exports was bound to be the prior task. If Britain did not enlarge them enough to pay her way, then the country would be insolvent. If she did not enlarge her dollar exports sufficiently, she would have to maintain discriminations against dollar imports, and this would be contrary to the long-run commitments which she had undertaken, and to her own long-run policy. But it is clear that the question of over-all solvency had priority; a country lapsing from bankruptcy to bankruptcy would accomplish nothing by coöperating in establishing a brave new world of multilateral trade.

To see where we are and what the United States may reasonably expect of Britain in the next round, it may not be unfair to look first at the situation as it was in 1951 and 1952. The two great factors that have militated against Britain in her over-all balance are, first, the loss of value of her "invisible" receipts on foreign account, of which the investment-income item is much the largest component; and, secondly, the worsening in her terms of trade. The loss of net investment income was due partly to Britain's forced sale of foreign assets in order to fight the war against Hitler, especially when fighting it alone, and partly to the reduction in the value of fixed-interest receipts owing to world-wide currency inflation. The loss of net invisible income may be fairly and squarely attributed to the war. It could be argued that the terms of trade might have moved against Britain even had there been no war, though it may also be said that, had Britain not been engaged in the terrific economic strain of the war, she would have been able to adapt herself gradually to the worsening situation. However that may be, what we are interested in here is the size and nature of the burden which she has had to take on.

In 1938 Britain exported sufficient to buy imports worth £533,000,000; on top of this she had an invisible net income by which she could buy £248,000,000 worth of imports. Thus her net invisibles enabled her to buy 47 percent more imports than she could otherwise pay for. In 1951 her net invisibles were £346,000,000. These paid for as many imports as £79,000,000 worth of invisibles would have paid for in 1938. Thus the amount of extra goods that she could buy with her invisibles in 1951 rep-

resented only 15 percent of what she could buy with her exports in 1938. If we may take exports and invisibles together, we can say that exports as they were in 1938, plus invisibles as they were in 1938, would buy 147 units of imports (exports 100 and invisibles 47). If, in 1938, she had had only the net invisibles she had in 1951, she could have bought in 1938 only 115 units of imports. Therefore if, in 1951, she was to offset her loss on invisibles, she had to raise her 1938 exports by 32 percent to fill the gap. That is one heading of loss.

Moreover, owing to the worsened terms of trade, a given quantity of exports in 1951 would not buy as many imports as in 1938. The terms of trade had moved against Britain by 42 percent. Thus if she was to pay for as many imports out of earnings in 1951 as she paid for in 1938, she would have to increase her exports by 74 percent—of which 32 percent allowed for the loss of buying power of her net invisibles, and 42 percent allowed for her worsened terms of trade. If she exported 74 percent more in 1951 than she exported in 1938, she would be able to pay for as many imports, and no more, as she paid for in 1938. Let us consider this burden, leaving out of account for the moment the fact that in 1951 Britain might want more imports because she had a larger population and because her manufacturing population was producing nearly 50 percent more and needed correspondingly increased amounts of imported raw materials; and let us also leave out of account any possible increase in her standard of living. To get that same amount of imported goods that she paid for in 1938, she had to increase the amount of her exports by 74 percent. This is a large amount. It meant that Britain had to export extra goods worth about \$3,423,000,000 merely to be where she was in 1938.

The figures for 1952 are slightly more favorable owing to an improvement in the terms of trade. On account of invisibles she would have to export 36 percent more, and on account of the worsened terms of trade she would have to export 31 percent more, making a total of 67 percent on both accounts. This was worth about \$3,091,000,000.

We may hope for some improvement on this in coming years, but we cannot bank on it owing to the slackening in world markets for British exports and keener competition. It looks as if Britain would have to continue to export some \$3,000,000,000 worth of extra goods merely to be where she was in 1938. In the end she will have an imperative need to import somewhat more

than in 1938, but let us waive this for the moment. It must be remembered that Britain is holding her imports down to (or below) the level of 1938 only by stringent import restriction—one of the very points at issue between herself and Americans, who claim that, in accordance with jointly-declared aims, she ought to give a lead in liberalizing her commercial policy.

But let us concentrate upon the burden. This need to continue, year by year, to export some \$3,000,000,000 more of goods merely to be where she was in 1938 may be conceived to be a sort of perpetual tribute levied upon Britain by the war—perpetual, anyhow, for the period relevant to immediate policy decisions. This is a large sum of money. Americans might claim that they had increased exports by considerably more than this sum a year; but then they are exporting from a larger economy. It would represent only some 1 percent of the American national income; it is about 8 percent of the British national income—all going out for no return whatever, in the sense that Britain must do it merely to keep from sliding backward. And, of course, these extra exports use much more than 8 percent of her manufacturing output.

Americans rightly feel that they have been patient in waiting for an adjustment in British external policy, and generous in giving her aid during the awkward transition. Of the generosity of the aid there can be no doubt; and Britain remains appreciative of it—and aware that it was not without cost to the harassed American taxpayer. But, of course, it does not follow that because aid is very generous it can solve the problem of the beneficiary country. In order to get a balanced view, it is desirable to compare the aid with this extra tribute that Britain now has to pay (remembering that this burden has nothing to do with the specifically “dollar” problem, which requires a reorientation of her exports).

The great U.S. loan to Britain consisted of \$3,750,000,000. The terms were generous, but it is now being repaid at a low rate of interest. In one way and another Britain has repaid the dollar area governments \$764,000,000 since the war; of this the major part was to the United States. So we may think of the great loan as being somewhat over \$3,000,000,000 net, which must be repaid. Receipts under Marshall Aid and under Defense Aid to the end of 1952 amounted to \$3,043,000,000. That sum need not be repaid. All this is certainly great generosity; but, in effect, what

it means is that the United States has lent Britain enough to pay her "tribute" for a little more than one year, and given her enough to pay it for another year. To put it thus is not to register a note of complaint. The comparison is brought with a view to diagnosis. It is to be hoped that Britain will progressively reduce her import restrictions; but it must be borne in mind that the amount given was small in relation to the burden that Britain has to be sure of being able to shoulder before she can reduce her import restrictions.

Broadly we may say that this heavy task was achieved two years ago. In 1950 the volume of British exports stood at 176, taking the volume for 1938 as 100; manufactured exports had been roughly doubled. But exports had to be expanded further to make possible the purchase of a greater volume of imports in line with growing needs, and thereby to enable restrictions to be removed. Yet another heave was necessary. In 1951 exports were further increased. But since then, the situation has not been favorable for this further objective. World markets have been declining and British exports have somewhat declined in volume; this problem gives rise to anxiety.

III

The second problem is the balance with the United States. Not only has an increase in the total quantity of British exports been required, but there has had to be some change in their direction, so that a higher proportion of dollars would be earned. Britain must accomplish this at a time when the dollar shortage is world-wide, owing to changes in the direction of demand and supply of various commodities. These changes, however, have not had much direct effect on the bilateral balance of trade between the United Kingdom and the United States, which has improved somewhat since before the war, no doubt partly owing to discriminatory restrictions.

Other factors have hit Britain. There has been a substantial decline in her bilateral balance with the United States on invisible account, owing to loss of investments and to a shift in shipping. But the main cause of British embarrassment is the altered position of gold. Before the war Britain was easily able to finance her bilateral deficit with the United States on trade account—a perfectly natural one—by the remission to the United States of newly-mined gold, which it could purchase out of its

surpluses in the sterling area. Indeed, the value of newly-mined gold substantially exceeded what was required for this purpose, and a much larger amount was dispatched to the United States to cover capital movements; but we need not be concerned with these here. At the present time, although the trading deficit is smaller, the newly-mined gold is insufficient. This is the crux of the British problem; it is also the crux of the European problem. The countries of continental Europe had a persistent and natural trading deficit with the United States, and the whole of this could comfortably be financed by newly-mined gold, in a way that—again apart from capital movements—did not mean the allocation of an exorbitantly large share of the gold to the United States.

If this old relation is not to be restored, Europe will have to find a new method of securing a balance with the United States. Since the war the situation has been adjusted partly by aid, and partly by restrictions on imports from the United States. But great efforts have been made to increase exports to America. In the British case, the quantity of finished manufactures exported to the United States stood, in 1951, 83 percent above the level of 1935-39.¹ Exports of materials had not risen so much, but this was partly due to a change of accountancy by which the United Kingdom ceased to be credited with some materials that passed through it by way of entrepot trade. The total dollar value of its exports to the United States stood at 318, compared with 100 in 1935-9. This was a handsome increase, and the figure would have been higher but for the statistical confusion about entrepot trade. In 1952, the figure appears to have been 341, and in the first quarter of 1953, 357 (annual rate).² This effort is not to be belittled. Nonetheless, Britain's exports still paid for less than half of her greatly restricted imports from the United States. No one seriously thinks that the bilateral trade between these two countries could or ought to be made to balance. What is needed is for Britain to secure a dollar balance multilaterally, that is by earning dollars in third-party markets.

The changed position may, no doubt, with some oversimplification, be stated as follows. In the old days Britain had no diffi-

¹ "Pattern of the U.S. Import Trade Since 1923." Federal Reserve Bank of New York, p. 136.

² These last figures are deduced from the data supplied in the *Monthly Digest of Statistics*. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, June 1953.

culty in maintaining surpluses with the sterling area, wherewith she earned gold to make good her deficit with the United States. By those surpluses, she can now earn some dollars, but not nearly enough to balance what would be her deficit if discriminatory import restrictions were removed. Her main task now, therefore, is, while striving to sell as much as possible in the United States, to achieve surpluses, not where she can earn gold, but where she can earn dollars. And that means achieving surpluses in the Western Hemisphere, for the rest of the world has not many U.S. dollars available. Thus Britain has not only had to devote a much larger proportion of her productive capacity to additional exports (for which she gets no additional return), but if the discriminatory system is to be modified she must also enter into hot competition with the United States in this area, thus earning extra U.S. dollars to balance her direct deficit with the United States.

To put the point strongly, Britain has to push a fairly large quantity of United States exports out of markets where United States goodwill is strong. This is formulating the matter in a way that seems almost to give it an anti-American twist. But it is vitally important that Americans should understand the position. If they wish Britain to abandon her discriminatory system—a reasonable wish—it will be necessary for Britain to capture some of the U.S. dollars available in the countries of the Western Hemisphere by squeezing out American exports. If she cannot do this, it is fairly certain that she will have to maintain her discriminatory system. This is a mere matter of arithmetic. Americans are too apt to think of Britain's dollar imbalance in merely general terms and not to figure out what a rectification would mean concretely. It must mean the capture by Britain (and other European countries) of Western Hemisphere markets for which the United States now caters; there are no two ways about it.

There are grave difficulties confronting such a development. European exports to Latin America are hampered by fears in that region of a third world war and a desire not to be dependent on supplies of manufactures that might again be cut off. During the postwar period, when Europe was heavily engaged in restoring its productive system and expanding its over-all volume of exports, Americans came in strength into the markets of the Western Hemisphere and established connections. If Europe had

been in a position to compete very effectively there in the years immediately after the war, her position might be much easier now. But that was not possible at the time.

If Britain and Europe are to achieve balance in this way they will have to quote competitive prices and underbid American traders. But their prices must not be too low for, if they were, that would turn the terms of trade against them and gain no dollars. We need not despair of this development eventually taking place. But the task is by no means an easy one. It calls for another big effort, and at the present time markets are not favorable. What I would put forward is that Britain and the countries of continental Europe have made a remarkable achievement in the over-all expansion of their exports, which may be judged a creditable performance and a justification of the aid so generously accorded.

IV

What might constitute the so-called "helpful" policy on the part of the United States in these circumstances? By far and away the most helpful thing that could be done would be a restoration of the position of gold. This is a delicate topic, and it is not for foreigners to prescribe to the United States what its gold policy should be. If it chose to proceed exactly as at present, no one could complain. But the most helpful thing that the United States could do would be to raise the dollar price of gold by a substantial amount. Subject to the strong proviso that there must be no claim to interfere in what is essentially America's own business, some remarks may be made about this.

First, it may be noted that the present position is utterly unlike that which confronted President Roosevelt in 1933, and that no American who has strongly condemned Roosevelt's policy need think he is being inconsistent in favoring a change in the price of gold now. Some Americans hold that it would set up an internal inflationary pressure. The outside observer is bound to feel skeptical about this, since the Federal Reserve System has plenty of ammunition for preventing the increased value of gold from enlarging the total money supply in the United States. It is indeed possible that an inflow of gold at an increased value might raise difficult problems relating to the Federal Reserve support for the U.S. bond market. The agreement on this topic reached two years ago between the Federal Reserve System and

the United States Treasury was certainly a matter of great satisfaction outside, as well as inside, the United States. It would be regrettable if that harmony were disturbed; but that set of problems, interesting and important as it is, is bound to seem rather minor compared with the momentous question of the equilibrium of world trade and the choice between a "one-world" and a "two-world" system.

Some Americans argue that to raise the price of gold would merely be to give "aid" (which we all now seek to work away from) in a new form. Outsiders cannot see it quite that way. This would not be giving something for nothing. Gold is produced only by toil and sweat. Both from the point of view of the countries that mine gold, and of the European countries which would have to produce goods for export in order to buy it, requital for this labor at a fair price can by no means be regarded as "aid." Americans might argue that, even if the gold cannot be provided without hard productive labor, its purchase at a higher price would indeed constitute "aid" if they do not happen to require more gold at a higher price. It has often been said—much too often, I think—that there is already plenty of gold in Fort Knox.

It is certainly most imprudent for an outsider to challenge this view, yet even on this ultra-delicate subject a few words may be said for the sake of frankness. In the two great war efforts which the United States has undertaken in this century, the course of events developed in such a way that the United States did not require great external reserves, as Britain did. But another war might be different. In the Second World War, Britain, a smaller country, and able to operate only on a much smaller scale than would the United States in another world war, overspent externally far more than \$22,000,000,000, and dollars were then worth more. Anyone who sits down to do a little figuring can see at once that the approximately \$22,000,000,000 of gold in Fort Knox is a miserably inadequate external reserve, and quite out of line with the defense preparations that the United States is making in all other fields. It could be argued that the United States would find itself able to purchase goods from neutrals and to finance overseas operations on credit, since its credit is excellent. Britain did that in the last war. Blocked dollar accounts could be set up in various parts of the world. But it must be said that this would not be a point of strength; it is often

embarrassing to depend on being given credit to finance operations or purchases that may be of vital importance in the war effort. If by a stroke of the pen the United States told the world that its present stock of gold was worth not \$22,000,000,000, but \$44,000,000,000, the whole world would accept that *now*; but after a war had broken out, it would be too late.

It is not necessary for me to dilate upon various helpful lines of policy in the field of tariff and customs procedures, since these are already very well known. But I should repeat that it would be useful for the American authorities always to bear in mind that the way in which the true equilibrium of world trade can be established and discrimination dispensed with is for Europe to sell more goods, at the expense of American exports, in Western Hemisphere countries. And there is a further point in connection with this. Some Latin American countries have recently been overspending, and are unable to pay all their debts either to American or European exporters. In consequence, European exporters have become discouraged and relaxed their efforts to sell in those regions. If the United States authorities make advances enabling American commercial creditors to be paid off, these American traders will naturally go at their task of selling in those countries with renewed zest. Thus American exporters will be encouraged, and European exporters further discouraged in these markets. Such action by the American authorities may be regarded therefore as decidedly unhelpful. To take another point, where the Americans have a generous conception of aiding underdeveloped countries by productive investment, whether directly or through international agencies, it would be helpful if they encouraged the employment of a fair share of European technicians, since orders on capital account tend to go to the countries from which the technical experts have come, rather than to the countries where the required equipment is available on the most economical terms.

There is one final point to be made beyond all this. It is "helpful" for Americans to show sympathetic understanding of the European problem. The figures I have given may suggest that the efforts made by Britain have not been unworthy, and that the period that has been required for them not unduly long. If discriminations have to be maintained, for the reasons already stated, this should not be attributed to backsliding. If at a time when Britain feels she has done a good job of work and is deter-

mined to go ahead to reach the "one-world" ideal, Americans attribute her failure to remove discriminations here and now to mere slackness and backsliding, the resulting exasperation gives fine ammunition to the minority in Britain which seeks a "two-world" system.

The situation is particularly delicate at the moment, because the tailing off of American aid may require even stronger discriminations against American goods. Also, if the United Kingdom is to make sterling convertible in the fairly near future, that may also require an intensification of discrimination. It must be remembered that an increase of discrimination undertaken in order to buttress a convertibility experiment would represent the thinking of those whose final aim is the "one-world" system. The "two-world" party is not interested in convertibility. It can be argued that it will be difficult for Britain to earn dollars in triangular trade—and that is an absolutely essential prerequisite for eventually getting rid of discrimination—so long as sterling is a soft currency, for debtors will seldom surrender hard currency to pay a soft-currency debt. Thus it may be desirable to introduce convertibility prior to the establishment of final equilibrium, even at the expense of temporarily increasing discrimination against U.S. imports. It is important that Americans should understand the true meaning of such a move and not raise obstacles in its way.

The "two-world" party is most unlikely to gain power in Britain. The greater the sympathy and patience shown by the American authorities at all stages on the difficult journey to the restoration of a fully "one-world" system, the sooner it will come.

THE REBIRTH OF NORTH NORWAY

By John J. Teal, Jr.

IT IS interesting to speculate upon the reasons for the sustained attention which Norway is giving to her long-neglected northern provinces. Is it due to the international crisis and the dangers of the new common border with Russia? Crisis is not new to the north and the border has often in the past been shared with Russia. Is it an expression of greater Norwegian nationalism? As early as the fourteenth century, Norwegian kings jealously guarded their Lapland-marches and built a fortress to assert their domain. Is it due to economic factors? The northern fisheries and other industries are ancient and have always been linked with the south. Have the opportunities for settlement in Nordland, Troms and Finnmark been the vital factor? For centuries large colonies have migrated from the south in times of famine or misfortune. Can it have stemmed from sympathy in the wake of the German "scorched earth" policy? The Russians have raided and burned along the coasts in times past. Is it the threat of radicalism and disaffection? This threat exists, but has been greater in earlier centuries.

The explanation for the Norwegian Government's postwar concern probably includes all of these reasons, but there is a new and overriding explanation—the budding awareness everywhere of the North, and the world-wide push into the Big Frontier. The push is stimulated by scientific developments which enable men to deal with the problems of the North with new effectiveness, especially the development of rapid means of communication. And, not least, it is stimulated by the new political importance of all the world's northern regions.

During World War II the German occupation of northern Norway was rapacious and cruel. But among its by-products were the construction of airfields (from which the Allied convoys to Russia were bombed) and of continuous highway links in the extreme northeast and in Finland. In 1944 the Germans were driven back by the Soviet Army and burned the province of Finnmark with a senseless thoroughness. Since thousands of people were rendered homeless, the Norwegian Government gave Finnmark the highest priority for reconstruction. Two years ago, when the emergency had been relieved, the North Norway Plan was in-

stituted to encourage the fullest economic development of this region—once treated merely as a colony—and its integration into the economic and political life of Norway.


A symptom of the long era of neglect of North Norway is the surprising fact that until recently it was less explored, in scientific terms, than Norway's Arctic archipelago, Svalbard. And while the latter lured expeditions from many nations, research in North Norway emanated chiefly from the Tromsø Museum. It is a region of almost incredible beauty with sharp diversity among its land forms, populations, economies, languages and customs. The chief unifying feature is its lighting: long days of summer sunlight, "the land of the midnight sun;" then the short days, darkness, and aurora borealis of winter. The contrast is felt throughout the whole region, and challenges civilization to create harmony.

II

North Norway, which covers 41,840 square miles—about one-third of Norway—begins with the southern boundary of Nordland province, about 90 miles south of the Arctic Circle, and extends through the provinces of Troms and Finnmark to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. Thence it extends eastward to Russia. In ages past Nordland and Troms formed the mighty province of Halogaland, which clung to the western slopes of the "Keel," the mountain range which divides Norway from Sweden. On the western side the land is deeply indented by fjords, and some of the mountains, partly submerged, form chains of rugged islands, such as Lofoten and Vesteraalen. Although these mountains never attain more than 6,000 feet, their jagged contours and bare tops give the impression of enormous height. Except along the coast, travellers going any distance by land inevitably find themselves crossing the tree-line. The tides race in and out of the long fjords and between the islands, and, in doing so, often create a "strøm," or whirlpool, such as the Saltstrøm, the Moskenesstrøm, or Poe's "Maelstrøm."

In recent times several broad river valleys—for example, Målselv—have been opened up to agriculture; and mining or forestry have been developed in particular districts. But for the most part, the patterns of settlement have followed a tradition built about the sea. The economy has been based chiefly upon the great wealth of fish, particularly the cod, and the *Nordlendinger*

have divided their labors between their boats and nets and small farms nestled at the mountainous side of a fjord. But since sufficient grain for bread cannot be grown on these farms, trade has been necessary with southern Norway, or with the Russians in the east. The available land is so limited that the location of settlements has changed little; in many places the modern inhabitant has his farm where before him the Viking had his *vin* and before him the stone-age hunters had their village. What is surprising is that since proximity to the fishing grounds has been



the chief consideration for settlers, remote islands or headlands, with no overland communications, often bear the largest towns. But there is an honored Norwegian saying: "The land divides us; the sea unites us."

The climate of these western districts takes its character from the sea, and is controlled by the North Atlantic Drift of the Gulf Stream which breasts the coasts of all northern Norway and keeps the harbors ice-free throughout the year. The winters are relatively warm with heavy snowfalls, the summers cool. All the Arctic is growing warmer, and the glaciers are in retreat.

East of the "Keel" lies Finnmark, divided into coastal districts whose five immense fjords and their raised beaches give the impression of a land just emerging from the sea, and the inland tundra plateau, or Vidda, the home of the nomadic Lapps. In the far east lies Grense Jakobselv and the Pasvik Valley, since Paleolithic times a central artery to Finland but now a closed border. The population of Finnmark traces its origins to Norwegians, Finns and Lapps (the first two predominant on the coast), and there has been extensive intermixture. The names used to describe Finnmark and its populations are rather confusing. In early days the Lapps, who call themselves Samer, were known as Finns. Thus Finnmark was the "land of the Lapps." Within the province the Lapps are still called "Finns." A man from Finland is a Finlander, but the Finlanders who live permanently in North Norway are called Kvaener, derived from an ancient name for their homeland.

Within historical times the Arctic sea-ice descended to the coasts of Finnmark in winter, and sealing and walrus-hunting balanced spring and summer fishing. On the inner parts of the fjords lived the so-called Sea Lapps, while on the islands and headlands near the best fishing grounds the Norwegians and Kvaener held sway. The sea-ice has long since disappeared, however, and the coastal climate does not greatly differ from that of Nordland and Troms. Inland, the winters can be bitterly cold, the summers hot. On the Vidda the Lapps pastured their herds of reindeer and in summer followed them to the coast. Along the rivers impoverished Reindeer Lapps lived in permanent settlements catching fish, milking a few poor cows, and snaring ptarmigan in winter. This basic economic pattern still continues, but to it has been added a mixture of occupations, including mining; and agriculture has been improved. In general, it might be said that along the coast and in the farming valleys the Norwegian culture predominates; inland the culture of the Reindeer Lapps has the most vitality—though the reindeer-drawn sled is being efficiently challenged by the snowmobile.

Scattered towns and small cities, often established by royal proclamation, have augmented the settlement of northern Norway. Some of these trace their origins to the *fiskevaer* or fishing stations where a convenient harbor and storage facilities near the fishing grounds were of great seasonal value; and many of these became permanent towns such as Svolvær, in the Lofotens.

Other towns sprang up about the headquarters of a *nessekong*, literally "king of the point." These men were traders whose harbors and supplies—and credit—were strategically located on coastal routes dominating a certain district. Other towns were formed in different ways: Mo i Rana and Kirkenes are mining centers; Bodø with its harbor, proposed railhead, and airfield is to be a great Arctic communications center; Narvik is the shipping port for Swedish iron ore; Tromsø, the cultural center of North Norway, is a focal point for sealing and whaling, and for traffic along the coast and to Svalbard. On the Vidda the towns of Kautokeino and Karasjok have grown about missions and have become Lapp centers. Throughout the whole of North Norway settlement and economic development are advancing rapidly.

But the energy being devoted to the region is not due to fresh discovery, for northern Norway has been settled for ages. The first known human occupants of Scandinavia were stone-age hunters who crept westward around the fringes of the great ice sheets covering the land and settled upon the coasts of North Norway 8,000 or 10,000 years ago. They established the so-called Komsa culture. As the ice melted and new lands further south were cleared, other tribes moved in from the southeast, and were in turn pushed northward by the invading Finns. Possibly they were the Reindeer Lapps, if these people did not arrive by a separate route from northern Asia. At any rate, when Tacitus sat down to write his description of northern Europe, he had before him incongruous tales of a primitive people living in the far north whom he called Finns. As the years went by and reports from the north increased, writers were able to describe *Skridfinnia*, in northernmost Norway, and *Biarmia*, near the Kola peninsula. Both lands were inhabited by Lapps, described by Saxo Grammaticus as "the farthest people to the north, in a clime almost uninhabitable, good archers and hunters, and of uncertain habitations, wheresoever they kill a beast making that their mansion, and they slide upon the snow in broad wooden shoes."

Toward the end of the ninth century a Norwegian Viking, named Ottar, strode into the halls of King Alfred the Great of England and told of a voyage he had made around the top of Norway to the White Sea. Since the English king was literate, he recorded Ottar's remarkably accurate descriptions, and the first clear impressions of North Norway began to emerge from the mists of fable.

Thereupon the Sagas, corroborated by archeology, take up the story. We find northern Norway an important part of the realm. We read of the strongholds at Bjarkø and Andenes and the chieftains whose mighty influence was felt not only in the north but throughout the land. We read of the Halogalanders' skill at building boats, the importance of their fisheries, the revenues from taxing the Lapps, the laws which they framed, and their warfare. We also read of border disputes with the Russians after 1217. Sometimes the disputes were concerned with ownership of the land, at other times with the privilege of tax-collecting. Often, with Sweden joining in, the benighted Lapps found themselves taxed by three nations at once. From St. Olav's time the Norwegians taxed east on the Kola to Valijoki, the coast being known even today as the Murmansk (Northman's) Coast. The Norwegians last collected taxes in Kola in 1613, but the Norwegian claims continued until 1813. Some years the Vikings raided the Russian coasts, in others the Russians plundered and burned as far south as the *Vesteraalen*, notably in 1302, 1316 and 1323. The present border was more or less foreordained by the construction of the Vardøhus fortress by the Norwegians in 1307, to protect Finnmark, and by the gradual establishment of the Greek Catholic church on Kola.

III

How could northern Norway—rich in resources, well organized, influential in the affairs of the country and jealously guarded by the king—suddenly have declined at the end of the fourteenth century to a position which brought it neglect and the abuses of colonialism for 400 years? Various explanations have been advanced, ranging from climatic change to the supposition that Norwegian seamen forgot how to sail past the rough sea-coast above Sør-Trondelag called Folla.

The real explanation is simple. From the time Norway was unified until 1380, the capitol of the nation and seat of the Church had been Trondhjem, the logical center of the country. As long as the capitol remained in Trondhjem the powerful chieftains of Halogaland were able to exert an influence proportional to their position in the realm. Nordland is still Norway's second most populous province. However, in 1380 Olav V, who was already King of Denmark, moved the capitol south to Oslo, and ruled chiefly from across the Skaggerak. Upon his death in 1387 the

old line of Norwegian kings died out and Norway was ruled from Denmark. In those days of slow communications the political influence of the Halogalanders was no longer felt.

Two economic factors contributed to the decline of the north. In the fourteenth century, the Hanseatic League of merchants, particularly those established in Bergen, gained virtual monopoly over trade in Norway, and because of their vital grain supplies were able to control trade with the Halogalanders. The League exploited the northerners; and at the same time the Danish kings, under the pretext of the Russian threat, outlawed all other trade outlets and instituted a system of absentee landlordism. A few bad fishing years in North Norway, or a crop failure, plunged the inhabitants into debt.

The Hanseatic monopoly was not only instrumental in the decline of Norway, but impoverished the whole country, and Greenland as well. Indeed, Greenland suffered the most, for it was furthest away, and the Hanseatic merchants, who were not noted for benevolence, found the trip too arduous in comparison with the more lucrative markets. The Greenlanders were helped by the intermittent trade with English merchants, forbidden by the Danish king. In like manner, North Norway survived by illegally trading fish and furs with the Russians for grain.

Although the Hanseatic League finally lost its grip in 1560, its place was taken by other Bergen merchants. Periodic famines continued, and only bread made from bark prevented much of the population from starving. The Danish crown tightened its hold upon all of Norway and taxed the people remorselessly. North Norway paid heavily for resisting the Lutheran Reformation. Although many of the most distinguished Norwegians came from this region, the majority of northerners were treated with condescension. The result, of course, was disaffection, and in time this might have disrupted the country, had not the Russians provided a counterirritant with frequent plundering and burning. In 1811, Bishop Mathias Krogh of Nordland, in an effort to induce more men to become full-time farmers, remarked that while farmers were secure and loyal, the fishermen—who relied on Bergen—had little patriotism. The continued allegiance of the northerners to Danish sovereignty was becoming doubtful, and Russian and Swedish tax-collectors were already at work in Troms and Finnmark.

At the end of the eighteenth century a program of reform was

instituted under which traders were permitted to deal with whom they chose, to settle without permits, and to be free from taxation for 20 years. Outside capital was courted for investment in Finnmark, and widespread land reform was undertaken. The effort paralleled the modern scheme of development just adopted, and for a few years showed promising results until the wars following the French Revolution depressed the markets and brought renewed adversity.

But the lesson of the whole experience was not lost on the northerners. If appeals to humanity and justice had failed to move the Bergen merchants or the Norwegian Government, the threat of shifting allegiance had brought action. Norway regained her independence in 1905; but eastward in Russia political radicalism was growing swiftly, and northern Norway watched with interest and sympathy. Presently the extreme left came to power in the Tsar's realm. The upshot was great prestige for Communism in North Norway—and, today, a stronger Communist Party there than elsewhere in Norway. One meets prosperous fishermen in Finnmark, owners of their own boats and in every sense capitalists, who consider themselves staunch Communists, remembering the days when their season's catches were purchased at a fraction of their value, and reasoning that Communism is an effective method of drawing attention to the needs of the north. Indeed, they point to the new North Norway Plan to prove their argument.

IV

The genesis of the North Norway Plan, however, lay in a humane response to the need of postwar reconstruction. The German campaigns in the north, followed by the scorched-earth treatment of Finnmark, focussed the attention of the nation on the plight of the region. During the war the north had been the center of military activity. Most people in Finnmark lost their homes and livelihood, and privations were also severe in Troms and Nordland. When the war ended many thought that essential food and clothing, even machinery, might be had from abandoned German depots. But the liberating English destroyed most of these supplies and, in doing so, incurred considerable bad feeling. After the Finnmark relief commission had provided the essentials of life—food, clothes and housing—the Norwegian Labor Government sought to rebuild the economy of the region.

There was some conflict between Socialist theory and ingrained tradition—with tradition winning. Regional planners, for example, wished to rebuild destroyed fishing villages further up the fjords, where the prospects for agriculture were better and fishing could be supplemented by farming. The former villages had been placed on headlands near the fishing banks for the convenience of oarsmen and sailors, but modern motor vessels could take fishermen to the banks further away in no more time; but the people insisted that the towns be rebuilt on their former sites. Regional planning was successfully applied in some areas, however, and new farm lands were opened to take advantage of soil fertility, and availability of timber and transport. The iron mine at Kirkenes was rebuilt, among other industries. A boom spirit prevailed and there was large-scale immigration from the south.

At the same time, the Norwegian Government was faced with many new problems. For example, timber from north Finland and Finnmark used to be floated to the sea on the waters of the Pasvik River. But the peace treaty between Russia and Finland lopped off the north of Finland, and the Russians will not permit the floating of logs; the logging industry has consequently come to a halt in that region. Moreover, the Russians have taken to releasing the pent-up waters of Lake Inari at irregular intervals and flooding the farmlands on the Norwegian side of the Pasvik. Another example of new problems is the curious transformation in progress among the Reindeer Lapps. Success with a reindeer herd depends upon nomadism—in other words, the constant search for good pasture. But now Lapp women have learned of one of the amenities enjoyed by their sex in less rugged climates—in a word, houses. They demand a house. If the husband is to provide one, he usually has to sell a large part of his herd to pay for it; and moreover, if the family lives in it, he is no longer a nomad, and instead of being an effective herder of reindeer, he finds that he is a poor farmer. Of the 20,000 or so Norwegian Lapps (two-thirds of the world's total), only 2,000 are still reindeer herders. It is estimated that a family of five needs a minimum of 200 reindeer to earn a living, and at present about 60 percent of the Lapp families have herds that cannot support this mode of life. Sealing and whaling, which have long constituted one of the chief enterprises for the people of the north, likewise offer new frustrations. The hunting grounds extend from the Arctic to the Antarctic, but the sealing in the White Sea and in

the waters about Franz Josef Land have been of major importance. Now the Russians have barred the Norwegians from these areas, despite earlier agreements.

When the relief commission terminated its work in 1951, social conditions were unsatisfactory. The influx of workers had created unusual housing shortages and seasonal unemployment. The old-style Communists were entrenched in a number of districts, and to them were added numbers of malcontents. The nearness of the Russian border and rash statements about abandoning the north above a certain line led many non-Communists to adopt an attitude of fatalism. There was widespread skepticism about the effectiveness of NATO. Recognizing that the situation in the North was too precarious to be ignored, the Norwegian Government in 1951 proposed a ten-year plan for development. It drew strong support from all segments of Norwegian life. The unique feature of the plan is that, though the government is Socialist, it sought to achieve its objective by encouraging private enterprise and guaranteeing loans. The plan is ambitious and provides for the expanded use of natural resources through mining, fishing and agriculture, improvement of communications, building of hydroelectric plants for industry, clearing new lands for farms, reforestation, improving methods of fishing and preparing fish for the market, reorganizing banking and credit facilities, and (as in the eighteenth century) offering tax relief to investors.

The North Norway Plan went into operation in March 1952, signalized by a lavish and successful national trade fair held in Tromsø during July of that year. It was attended by the King and members of the Storting, and gave many northerners their first glimpse of the possibilities of the future. So far the progress shown is encouraging, though only a small part of the initial appropriation of 225,000,000 Kroner has been spent. Surveys of resources have been made, with a view to laying the bases for new industry, and educational programs outlined in the various crafts and trades. The Sør-Varanger iron mines have been brought back into production, with Marshall Aid, and exported 205,000 tons of ore in the first four months of this year. New housing units are being constructed, money has been allocated for the purchase of reindeer for the Lapps, for fencing, and for slaughtering and freezing plants. Many new plants for processing fish are being built. In Bodø a huge airfield is nearing completion. In the cultural field plans are being made to expand the fine

Tromsø Museum, with the hope that it may some day become a university for North Norway—a source of great satisfaction to the northerners.

All is not smooth sailing, however. During the spring, severe storms ruined the Lofoten fisheries, making the catch the poorest in 50 years and severely diminishing one of Norway's important sources of revenue. It was necessary to appropriate large relief funds for the destitute fishermen, and many processing plants were forced to close. But, as compensation, the Finnmark fisheries have been highly successful. And as a reward for the regional planners in their battle with tradition, 81 families from the outer fishing stations have now asked to be resettled elsewhere.

In reviewing the progress of its North Norway Plan the government found reason for encouragement, but also made some sobering discoveries. Reidar Carlsen, Director of the North Norway Development Fund, recently stated: "We must be prepared for disappointments and miscalculations. That cannot be avoided. But we shall learn from our mistakes and do a better job in drafting plans for the larger projects which will have to await completion of defense installations in the northern provinces." The major problem is that the funds for development are limited; indeed, much of the money is supposed to come from the surpluses of the National Unemployment Insurance Fund. If Norway should meet with a slump in foreign trade, the program might be halted as abruptly as was its forerunner in the Napoleonic era. To give stability to the program foreign investment is needed. Yet the Labor Government places so many obstacles in the way that this is unlikely on any significant scale.

The fears entertained by private business in Norway were intensified this spring when the Storting passed a price-regulation law whose innocuous name belies its power. Presumably, the government can now determine the prices of all goods, choose the markets, decide the type and extent of production, in short, regulate industry in detail. Rationalization, not competition, is apparently to be the yardstick of business. This law presents an odd contrast to the avowed purpose of the North Norway Plan of encouraging private enterprise, and if the two can be harmonized they will offer a strange economic paradox.

One other urgent problem of a different kind is linked with these efforts to help North Norway achieve a balanced economy. North Norway's common border with Russia presents a military

threat found only in one other part of the NATO community, Turkey. The frontier, once the area of friendly commerce with the Finns, is now closed; and the Russians reputedly have established advanced military installations on the other side. Accidental border crossings by Norwegians lead to detention by Russian border patrols; and the Russians take every opportunity to protest against defense preparations on the Western side.

The attitude toward this border has undergone considerable change in North Norway in recent years. Immediately after the war the Russians were considered as "liberators," and were popular in Finnmark. Communism made many converts. Today, as the north becomes more closely knit with the south, many northerners have left the Party. But a third of all conscientious objectors in Norway come from the north, there are many Communist soldiers in the home guard, and the idea that this territory is fated to be taken over by the U.S.S.R. persists.

In an effort to correct this fatalism the Norwegian Government has been sending teams of political speakers north to explain the purpose of NATO, and is also constructing defense installations to make plain that the northerners are not to be abandoned. More than a quarter of the national budget this year is destined for defense projects—37,400,000 kroner of it for a military airfield on Andøy in Troms. Throughout the region male citizens have their assigned defense tasks, and determination grows with the confidence that successful defense is possible.

North Norway is one of the most important areas within the NATO community, yet the most vulnerable—a flank that might be easily turned by large, modern forces unless real strength is developed there. Its loss would mean the loss of Norway. Yet its usefulness is also great. In terms of over-all Arctic strategy, its rôle is that of guardian of the sea lanes to and from northern Russia—a task to which its great fjords are suited and have been used before. Its air bases are situated on the Arctic perimeter, and are within effective striking range of the Soviet Union. If present plans mature, the defenses of the region will add formidably to Western strength. Norway has every reason to speed the rebirth of her long-neglected northern lands, and Norway's friends have every reason for seeking to forward the effort.

SOVIET COLONIALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

By Sir Olaf Caroe

ALMOST in the center of Asia, and far removed from the oceans, are two great basins of continental land, once the home of a civilization rivalling that of Cairo or Cordova, and even today an extension of the Moslem East. They were known until recent times as Russian and Chinese Turkestan. Both are ringed round by some of the world's highest mountains, and where the mountains stop the plains fade into desert or inland sea; both are traversed by rivers which do not reach the ocean; both are inhabited in the main by people in whom a Turkish strain may be said to predominate. To distinguish these Transcaspian peoples from the Turks of Turkey and the Caucasus it is convenient to speak of them in general as the Eastern, or Central Asian, Turks.¹

More specifically, those of Turkish stock living in the U.S.S.R. are divided into Kazaks, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kirghiz and Karakalpaks; the Kazaks and Kirghiz overlap into China, where there are also Turkis or Taranchis. There are also the Tajiks, of Iranian stock and language. Turkmens, Uzbeks and Tajiks all overlap into Afghanistan, and the first into Iran also. All except the Tajiks speak one or other form of Turkic language, the Tajiks a form of Persian. A confused history has led to much crossing of stocks, and it may be said that the people in the settled area south of the steppe—the old Transoxiana—represent a mingled Turco-Iranian heritage, of which bilingualism in Turkic and Persian—common among Uzbeks and Tajiks—is one indication. The Iranian strain predominates in the towns and the settled oases along the rivers, while the Turkish strain, often infused with Mongol blood, is more common upon the steppe and in the mountains.

The two parts of Turkestan are divided by the great mountain transept culminating on the Pamirs, from which spring several of the biggest ranges of the world. In a general way this water-shed, linking the Tianshan with the Hindu Kush and Karakoram mountains, is also the political frontier between Russian Turkestan and the Chinese Turki dominion known as Sinkiang.

The curtain fell on Central Asia long before the days of Soviet rule, even before the Tsars. The fanatical exclusiveness of the Bukhara Emirs and *ulema* (priesthood) made of that city a legend remote from ordinary life. The seclusion of Samarkand was even more striking. According to the American Consul Schuyler, from the time of Clavijo who went there in 1404 on an embassy to Tamerlane from the King of Spain, until the journey of Khanikov in 1841, Samarkand saw no Europeans but two chance Russians—two visits in more than 400 years. No wonder that it had a halo of romance and piqued the curiosity of the Western World.

It was therefore not surprising that the Russian capture of Tashkent in

¹ It would be convenient to refer to them as *Turkis*. But Turcologists tend to confine this name to those living in China.

1865, of Samarkand three years later, and of Khiva in 1873 should have caused a stir. Now at last, it was thought, the mysteries of these magic cities would be unveiled. But no; the Tsar's Government consistently looked with irritation upon intrusions into its Asiatic territories and kept a strict hand on all the controls. There was always something to conceal, a rebellion, a massacre, an advance not to be avowed. One aspect of the Tsarist conquest calls for particular remark. It was achieved by methods of pitiless violence. The darling of the army, a political idol whom it was blasphemy to criticize, was Skobelev, a leader in the capture of Khiva and Farghana, and later the general who overcame the gallant Turkmen resistance at Gök Tepe.

I hold it a principle [he said] that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. Strike hard and keep on striking till resistance ends, then form ranks, cease slaughter and be kind to the prostrate enemy.

In a prophetic passage Curzon claims Skobelev as typical of the Russian nation, poised with one foot in the past of Chingiz Khan and another advancing into a new world of ideas and action. Indeed, he was not a meteor only; he was the lodestar of a creed destined to sway many worshippers.

For concentrated historical or contemporary thought on Russian Central Asia in English it is necessary to go back at least 50 years, and it is not easy to uncover modern sources of real value. The gap must be filled from Russia and Turkey. In respect of one period—the uneasy interlude of 1917–24 between the Revolutions and the consolidation of Soviet power—there is interesting material from the pens of leaders of Turkish stock with a Russian education superimposed on their Moslem upbringing, men who for a short time themselves figured as founders of independent national states. These have left memorials in writing, suggestive of what their peoples may yet achieve if history turns in their favor. In Russian there is a large body of real scholarship, often tendentious but always painstaking, as well as the usual statistics backed by much panegyric in Soviet publications and press. Soviet publicity, so sedulous to replace the old with new, is apt to give prominence unwittingly to the old things it would uproot. The stream of exhortation, coupled with vituperation directed at the “deviationists,” is itself evidence of a fear that there is yet life in peoples who for hundreds of years had their own pride, their own distinctive civilization, and their own foundations of belief. Sometimes, too, an even brighter illumination proceeds from the statements and admissions of the Kremlin, and particularly of Stalin himself.

In the thirteenth century this Turkestan was the near-center of Chingiz Khan's Empire. Chingiz with his four sons, in an age of horse transport, established across Asia and Europe the vastest continental empire ever known until it was rivaled by the empire of the Russians and their satellites seven centuries later. Like Russia, the Mongol power stretched from China to beyond the Black Sea; the Mongol threat, like Russia today, overhung both Western Europe and the Indian peninsula. To us, and viewed in the perspective of time, the Mongols seem to have come and gone in a fleeting moment, so that historians are accustomed to speak of their rule as a passing phenomenon. But in their passing they threw on the screen a shadow premonitory of a dominion which was to be as extensive in bounds and as lacking

in mercy as their own. So too the new Eurasian empire, as dependent as that of the Mongols on singleness of aim within a small and jealous palace clique, may prove to be as ephemeral as theirs.

II

The October Revolution was scarcely over when there appeared over the names of Lenin and (even so early) of Stalin the famous Declaration of Rights, with its special appeal to the peoples of Colonial Russia:

The Council of Peoples' Commissars has decided to base its work in relation to the nationalities of Russia on the following principles:

1. The equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia;
2. The right of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states. . . .

Three weeks later a manifesto was issued addressed to "all toiling Moslems in Russia and the East," adjuring "all those whose mosques and prayer-houses were destroyed, and religion and customs trampled upon, to build up their faith and customs and to enter on a national life freely and unhindered." This would read oddly in *Pravda* today. It was not surprising that the autonomists of Asia believed a Golden Age had dawned.

The same doctrine of liberty, with right of secession, is proclaimed as the Soviet gospel for export today. The phrase "freedom for colonial peoples" remains on Communist lips as an open sesame, promising access to a new world where the lion and the lamb lie down together. But in fact, at least until Stalin's death, the very word nationalism has been one of the unholy things, and every conceivable pressure has been applied to overcome separatism in the colonial territories of the Soviet Empire. How, then, can the practice be reconciled with the platitude of the theory?

The answer begins to appear if we examine certain particulars distinguishing Soviet Central Asia from other parts of the world which from time to time have been regarded as dependencies. The first distinction is that the peoples of what may be called the metropolitan race in the U.S.S.R.—the Great Russians—have an absolute majority over all other races in the Union, and at the last census constituted 58 percent of the total population. Great Russians and Ukrainians made up exactly three-quarters of the total, while the two most important Asian stocks, the Uzbeks and Kazaks, together amounted to less than 5 percent of the population. There is thus an enormous preponderance of European over Asian population in the Union, and it follows that in areas suitable for European colonization there are no such problems as beset the Commonwealth in Africa, and France south of the Mediterranean.

The next point is this. Central Asia is a part of the same continent with European Russia; one passes into the other with easy gradations of climate, soil and population. Indeed the Russians are only doing today in Central Asia what they did from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries on the Volga steppe and in the Urals; just as they then flooded over and mingled with the Turco-Tatar population in Europe, so now they gradually pervade and submerge the Turkish population of the Kazak steppe and Transoxiana. The process is the same, the interaction further to the east—that is all. The

process is the easier in that, broadly speaking, the whole of inhabited Central Asia is possible terrain for European colonization. Indeed much of it has a more clement climate than any part of Russia proper, the Crimea perhaps excepted. This process, started by the Tsars, has continued in Soviet times, with the result that in many parts Russians have now completely displaced the indigenous peasantry.

An even more important distinction is to be found in the fact that until the "proletarianization" of the nomads under the First and Second Five-Year Plans (1928-37), there was in Central Asia no organized indigenous urban proletariat. There was, of course, a city population of merchants, traders, craftsmen and *religieux*, but it was the usual medley, following the guild system to be found in the bazaar quarters of all eastern towns. Such factories as existed in early days were staffed by Russians, and Russians alone were to be found on railways and telegraphs. Industry and communications were in Russian hands. As Stalin himself said: "The fact of the matter is that a number of peoples, mainly Turkic—about 30,000,000 in all—have not had time to pass through the period of industrial capitalism and consequently have no industrial proletariat." And two years later he added:

The conditions now exist enabling those republics which possess no proletariat to establish *with the aid of the Russian proletariat* their own centers of industry in order to create in these centers groups of local proletarians who will serve as a bridge between the Russian proletarians and the toilers of these republics.²

This interpenetration of the Central Asian peoples by a Russian peasantry in the countryside, and by a Russian proletariat in the towns and along lines of communication, supplies the most important clue to an understanding of the realities of the colonial policy of Soviet Russia. It is seldom mentioned; indeed Stalin's reference to the bridge-building task of the Russian proletariat is the nearest we get to an admission of the facts. But from the beginning its existence made nonsense of the high-sounding phrases of the 1917 Declaration and ensured for Russians a dominating position, not as sojourners like the English in India, but as permanent settlers.

During the interregnum of 1918 to 1924, at least three autonomous states were set up within Turkestan—Kokand (in Farghana), Bukhara, and Alash Orda (on the Kazak steppe). After a short period all were shattered by the Red Army and there was no hesitation in the use of Skobelev's methods where resistance was met. When the dust settled, the movements for local autonomy were dispersed, and the way was open for the abolition of the old principalities of Bukhara and Khiva—maintained as vassals under the Tsars—and the rationalization of the colonial provinces over the whole field. This took place in several stages; here there is room only to record that the boundaries of the five constituent Republics finally emerging in 1936 were ostensibly fixed in accord with national principle modified by economic considerations. These five are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizia and Turkmenia, with Karakalpakistan an "Autonomous" S.S.R. within Uzbekis-

² Speeches to the 10th and 12th Congress of the Communist Party, March 10, 1921, and April 23, 1923, "Marxism and the National and Colonial Question." London: 1942, p. 104 and 156.

tan. Their total population in 1939—the last Soviet census—was nearly 17,000,000, of whom at that date there remained only some 11,000,000 of indigenous stock. The total area is larger than India before partition, and more than half the size of the United States. Stalin claimed that this delimitation of frontiers offered an excellent example of how the Soviets can be brought into closer touch with the masses. The time had come, he said, when scattered fragments could be reunited into independent states.

The map belies him. The territories are inextricably tangled. The boundaries do not even divide language-groups, and they cut across irrigation systems. The natural unit of the Farghana Valley is gerrymandered into three parts, distributed among Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizia. Pretty



enough on a map, these convolutions are evidence of a policy of cantonization, conceived with the object of confusing ideas of local unity, and bringing the *disjecta membra* under the influence of stronger forces of assimilation from without. The impression is strengthened by the development of a language policy which first in the twenties substituted a Roman for an Arabic alphabet, and ten years later a Cyrillic for a Roman, in both cases differing slightly for each language-group. These changes emphasized the differences of the various Turkic languages and facilitated the adoption of Russian words and phrases. And there was a motive of a more subtle kind—the realization that change upon change in the medium of education must tend to sever the generations one from another and help to usher in a new age.

III

So much for fact set against fancy. But it remains to see in what way the directors of policy were able even in their own minds to reconcile their 1917 professions of "freedom for all" with the developments which actually took place. In examining this question it is necessary to look first for some statement of doctrine conceived as regulating policy. The particular task will be easier if we bear in mind Stalin's own saying that at the outset *the indigenous peoples of Asia possessed no proletariat*. And it is safest to go for the answer to the Soviet sacred books themselves.

The general principle of the right of secession is not only to be found in the 1917 Declaration, but is enshrined in Article 17 of the 1936 Constitution. Let it pass, outside the U.S.S.R., for a liberal aspiration: it has never been suggested that any Republic in the Union really possesses the sovereign power entitling it, for instance, to be neutral in a war, much less to secede, and local nationalisms have been crushed by force. But this gets us no nearer to understanding how the actual outcome can be seen by any mind as harmonizing with the principle. Two citations³ from Stalin's own speeches (to which others could be added) point the way within the shrine:

Nations have the right to preserve any of their national institutions but that does not mean that the Party will not combat and agitate against the pernicious institutions of nations. On the contrary it is the Party's duty to conduct such agitation.

There are instances when the right of self-determination comes into conflict with the other, the higher right. In such cases, this must be said bluntly, the right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the exercise by the working class of its right to dictatorship. The former must give way to the latter.

Here then is the Doctrine of the Proletariat, overriding the right to secede, and applied to "native nationalists" (who have no proletariat of their own) by a Russian proletariat working through the Party. In more recent years this doctrine has been reinforced by another, known to Soviet writers as the Doctrine of the Lesser Evil. (The sacerdotal flavor of Stalinist thought is always interesting.) This dogma runs as follows. Oppressive though the Tsarist régime may have been, it was less evil than the alternative then open to non-Russian nationalities, namely, annexation by a rival empire. And oppressive though Tsarist capitalism may have been, it led the annexed Moslem peoples away from feudalism through capitalism along the only road to Socialism, and was therefore a lesser evil than a continued independence. It is an extension backwards into history of the sort of reasoning from first principles which earlier enabled Stalin to justify to his own satisfaction the crushing of any separatist nationalism by means of the Doctrine of the Proletariat. Both dogmas are shafts aimed at one target—the native nationalists, who, if they believed in historical dialectics at all, wished to develop them within the framework of a national and not a Great Russian consciousness. The difference is that the newer doctrine makes it no longer even respectable to take pride in national resistance to the Tsarist conqueror. Great Russia in all her incarnations is declared unassailable.

For an understanding of the pressures which the execution of these theories

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 53, 163.

brought to bear upon the men and women of Central Asia, it is necessary to look to the objectives of the Five-Year Plans. If a short definition may be attempted, it would be that these aimed at the rapid industrialization of the country by means of the redeployment of labor. The human fodder for mines and factories was to be found by the collectivization of agriculture and the suppression of nomadism, so hard to reach and so obnoxious to all centralized control. Later, the period of World War II saw a large increase in Central Asian production of coal, oil and heavy industry under the spur of war needs and the evacuation of industry from Europe. And all the time, in pursuance of policies inaugurated by the Tsars, a steady increase took place in the numbers of European settlers in the land, synchronizing with an even larger reduction in the indigenous population, more particularly upon the steppe. The dry facts of Soviet statistics themselves establish that between the census of 1926 and that of 1939 the Kazak population on the steppe was reduced by 21.9 percent, when on normal expectations for the U.S.S.R. as a whole it should have increased by 15.9 percent. In short, one Kazak out of three perished during this period, a process which is only to be described by the new term genocide.

To grasp the situation facing the Soviet planners on the steppe and in the more remote glens, it is necessary to have some insight into the meaning of Central Asian nomadism. It takes two forms, that of the spreading open steppe, and that of moving with the season to the mountains. The first form is not unlike the nomadism of the Bedouin in the Arabian desert, where the owners of flocks and herds have to move many miles in pursuit of the grass that follows a precarious snow or rainfall. The second form is common to countries where high mountains stand over deep valleys, and climate changes in a journey of a few hours, or at most a day or two. In Farghana and the Tajik valleys, for instance, heat in summer is fierce and the lower lands burnt brown. But a short journey leads the herdsman to flowery alps, where his flocks can pasture at their ease. In the same country in winter, when the alps are under snow, the outskirts of the hills afford a clement refuge and good pastures. Some part of an accustomed range suffices for the animals throughout the year.

In this way the tribes of the steppe and the tribes of the mountains had roamed for centuries, free-born and untrammelled, meeting with rivalry only from their own kind if they overstepped their limits. The way of their life implied that they were here today and gone tomorrow, and it was not easy for authority to control or tax them. Up to the first Five-Year Plan (1929) the old loyalties to chief and elder, the old observances of tribal formula and prohibition, the old laws of hospitality were still in force. It was this system the Soviets determined to break up.

The job was done not by redistribution of land, as in cultivated areas, but by indiscriminate rounding up of the nomads with their animals. It was this that led to the death of one in three of the herdsmen and of nearly three-quarters of the herds. Nor is the story yet complete. The current Soviet press is full of complaints of the failure of stock-breeding programs. All note that plans are not being fulfilled, and a search for scapegoats is continual. Every reason is given except the true one, namely, failure to learn the art of animal management. In these regions, whether in the semi-desert of the steppe or in

the sharp contrast of mountain and glen, with all the variations of season and altitude, there exists a stage where it is hard, if not impossible, for men and animals to survive, unless they adapt themselves to a migratory life. These pastures do not produce long grass suitable for winter feed, and the irrigated fields, on which it could be grown, are needed for grain and cash crops. In other words, the right economic system for stockraising in this climate is a form of nomadism. And there is another and more subtle reason for the failure. The bond between herdsman and herd is close, for all animals have their idiosyncracies. The world of animals cannot be regulated simply according to theories of heredity and environment. It is hard for a mechanized system to grasp the thought of the shepherd who leaves the ninety-and-nine sheep in the wilderness to search for the one that is lost and, when he has found it, brings it home on his shoulders, rejoicing. But that is the secret of success with livestock; the animal is an individualist, and gives of its best in response to gentleness and care.

Behind all doctrine in Central Asia, and enforcing each pressure against any form of individualism, stood always the Party (to paraphrase Stalin), unitary in content, federal only in form, a solid structure bound in the strictest discipline to a central command and controlled from the apex at Moscow. It has often been described as a monolith; it is more like a banyan tree whose branches spread from the central trunk and return to earth, sending up fresh trunks all of the same species as the central trunk, killing all other growth in the lands which they reach. Party missionaries went forth from this center to spread the gospel and fight nationalism as Stalin had decreed. In such a conflict the local nationalists had no chance. Every force that can be thought of was applied to overcome any centrifugal impulse in this colonial Empire. The power derived from the presence of a large Russian resident population, a universal ideology, a regimented education, collectivization, centralized industrialization, mass transfer and slaughter of populations, the mechanization of the inner springs of life, all these forces are to hand and have all been used.

IV

What, then, is left of an old civilization, of a pride which more than once inspired movements carrying the ancestors of these men to the banks of the Danube and the Ganges? Is all submerged beneath a flood, turgid like the Oxus, unpredictable in its attack but bearing down the landmarks till all is flat and even and the last resistance overcome? Surely, apart from the break-up of tyranny itself, the only factor which can upset material pressures of this order is the existence, in the face of all power and indoctrination, of an inner spirit which refuses the idea of the mechanization of man.

We have already observed that the exhortations of the Soviet press and platform make plain that "deviations" exist. Whenever "ideological-creative" work slackens—so the jargon runs—there emerge insubordination, "bourgeois-nationalistic tendencies" and, worst of all, "religious survivalism" among the youth. And, indeed, there is a certain afflatus of the Turkish spirit which seems to make the Turk, Western or Eastern, conscious of impulses moving him apart from other men. He proudly preserves his identity. That pride is lasting, and the Turk whose spirit has breathed over Persian and

Mongol, Anatolian and Byzantine, remains simply and invincibly himself, curiously unsullied by more complex influences around him. He is a prince of deviationists.

But there is more than that. In the emigrations from Russia after the Revolution there were many groups of exiles from Central Asia. They formed organizations, dreamed dreams, and wrote books and articles, putting forward programs for a free and united Turkestan. Before 1941, it might have been said that, like other exiles, they were old and nostalgic, out of touch with actuality in the land of their birth, and apt to contend so violently with one another that they were unable to command the attention of the outer world. But with the war hard facts broke in, in the shape of many thousands of deserters and prisoners from the Soviet armies who fell into German hands in the first months after the German attack on Russia. Many came from Central Asia and the Caucasus; from Turkestan alone some half-million men either deserted or were taken prisoner in the first year after June 1941. They were placed in prison camps under appalling conditions, and treated as brutally as the Nazis treated all prisoners from Russia. Thousands died. But of the remainder as many as 180,000 entered as volunteers into one or another formation of the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS, believing they fought for the liberation of their country from Soviet rule.

Fortunately for the Allied cause the Germans proved heavy-handed. And to the end of the war they were undecided about the treatment of the "minorities" from Russia who had fallen into their hands, wavering between a declaration of support for movements in seeking the establishment of independent states, or a policy aiming at incorporating these people in a new German colonial empire. Almost all officers in these formations of Turkestan troops were German, and language difficulties were great. No distinction was drawn between prisoners and deserters; they were equipped with inferior arms. The German Ministries were at odds on almost every question; only the Ost-Ministerium under Rosenberg seems to have shown any political flair for dealing with an important asset.

But in spite of all the German mistakes of principle and practice, in spite of frequent crudity of method and the German inability to give that personal touch to relations with men of another race which alone commands the devotion of Asian troops, it can be said that these Central Asian and Caucasian mercenaries served their new masters not unfaithfully to the end. They proved good soldiers, believing the liberation of their homelands a cause worth fighting for. It was noticed that, Communist or not in upbringing, the youth of Turkestan was always influenced by a national tradition inculcated in family life. This tradition, which often had a religious background and remained alive within the family, had made the youth skeptical of Communist teaching and ready to welcome those who could speak to them of what they could understand.

The Germans did not deserve to have such men to lead. They used them to serve only a German purpose; when totalitarian Germany fell, she dragged down her mercenaries with her. The path was uncharted and there was no clear direction for men who sought anxiously for a goal. In the end, most of the volunteers who did not perish were by Allied agreement handed back to

their old masters and disappeared. Cast to and fro between two tyrannical forces—Russian and German—lacking a home and refused understanding, for them the end was bitterness. Yet what happened shows at least that a strong spirit of independence had survived a quarter-century of Soviet rule and still lived in the hearts of thousands of the youth.

One great reform was introduced by the Soviets—the emancipation of women and the discarding of the veil. Against this no Central Asian nationalist will find it easy to exclaim. But it remains a question how far this measure has really weakened the more vital of the Turkish traditions, though it may have transformed them. On the steppe women were never secluded. A vivid nationalism is not seldom nurtured by women, both within and without the home, more feelingly than by fathers or schoolmen. A greater permeation of society by women may produce a higher feminine velocity, as it were, and in the end recoil on Russians who forced it on urban Moslem populations. The mothers of the volunteers of World War II had not discarded their patriotism and their Turkish ideals with their veils.

Yet if something new is indeed to emerge from the clash between Russian and Turk of Central Asia, it will not be just a resurrection of the unchanging bigotries of Bukhara, or even of the simple tribalism of the steppe. For much that is constructive and life-giving—for instance, this greater enlightenment among women—will have come in under cover of the new forces. Dead wood has been cut, and new growth achieved. Persecution purifies. There will be memories of past inspirations, but the spark that is blown by that breath to flame will not illuminate the faces of a latter-day body of *ulema*, but of men and women who have been through Soviet schools. We need not expect the products of Soviet education superimposed on the Central Asian tradition to be of the stuff of a Gandhi or a Jinnah, for, paradoxically, such men are bred only in an English forcing-house. But they may be persons in their own way no less surprising. While tyranny is in full blast, they will bide their time; when it breaks—as break it will if only under stress of inner conflict—their opportunity will come. When that time arrives, they will be well placed from their peripheral situation to make contact with the outer world. Our successors may then say that the inert mass of stratified ritual and bigotry, which represented Islam as practised in Transoxiana before the Russians came, needed the violent impact of the encounter with Communism to reanimate it and raise it to the heights of a spiritual reaction.

The great movements of history, which are in essence movements of the spirit, tend to have origin in regions such as Turkestan where ideas and civilizations overlap. It was so with Judaism, and again with Christianity and Islam; Central Asia, like India, is a region of this kind from which we may expect new forces to be set in motion in this age. It is clear that the older inspirations of the Central Asian peoples have not yet failed; there is also reason to suppose that the impact of the new has not been wholly destructive, but by a process of catalysis may bring about some renewal of life. From this meeting of old and new some offspring will surely be born. It is for the free world to forecast the delivery and nurse it when it comes.

CLASS STRATIFICATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

By W. W. Kulski

THE Soviet intelligentsia may be roughly divided into three groups: the small nucleus of top professional politicians who form the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party; a much more numerous upper layer of the bureaucracy which is well paid and enjoys substantial privileges; and all other educated people, who occupy the lower posts of the Soviet apparatus. Nothing in the Soviet Union is decided by ballot, and the rank and file of citizens play no political rôle.

The term bureaucracy has a different meaning in the U.S.S.R. than in non-Communist countries. Every educated man in Russia is a bureaucrat. His daily bread depends upon the state, and he must take orders from the professional politicians who are its masters. Secretaries of the Party and of the Trade Unions, industrial and agricultural executives, the technological personnel, men of learning, writers, composers, artists—all are functionaries of the state, the sole employer and the sole source of income. A biologist or a physiologist must follow the theories of Michurin or Pavlov, for such is the will of the professional politicians. A composer must produce melodious music for the same reason. A university professor or a research worker must accept the conclusions suggested by the Party leaders before he even begins his research. Trade Unions are the tools of the Party, and their secretaries are expected to fulfill the orders of the employer—the state, whose voice, again, is that of the top few. The Party machine is of course their instrument. They have effective means of enforcing obedience—the drastic criminal codes, the powers of the Ministry of the Interior which can impose exile or confinement to a forced labor camp without judicial trial, censorship, discharge, demotion or refusal to promote.

Even so, the bureaucrats below the top rung are not completely helpless. They do, to some extent, share the power held by the professional politicians. The ten members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party formulate the external and internal policies of the U.S.S.R., but the bureaucrats advise them and assure the correct implementation of those policies. If the bureaucrats ceased to transform the blueprints of the Presidium into governmental activities, the wheels of the Soviet apparatus would come to a standstill. Prolonged passive resistance by the bureaucrats—if that can be imagined—would bring the régime down.

Although Stalin brought about this situation by building a completely bureaucratized state, he also saw the danger. He once compared the Party to the mythological Antaeus, the son of the goddess Earth, who could be defeated only by being lifted up and severed from contact with his divine mother. Heracles, his antagonist, knew the secret and destroyed him. Stalin said that disaster could befall the Party if it lost contact with its mother—"the toiling masses." But he was using the obsolete Communist verbiage,

meaningless to everyone including himself; for the Party leaders the "toiling masses" are not a mother but a stepchild, or, more accurately, a herd of sheep. Beneath the feet of the rulers at the top there is only one earth—the bureaucracy. It has grown in strength by reason of the very fact that it is indispensable. Hundreds, no doubt thousands, could be demoted, dismissed, "liquidated," but as a class they are the pivot of the régime. If ever they were estranged as a body, Antaeus would be strangled.

II

Stalin did his best to impress upon the bureaucrats that they had personal, vested interests in the régime. He abandoned the teachings of Marx and Lenin in this respect, but he was actually more realistic than they, for the nationalization of all the means of production and the concentration of power in the hands of a small group of leaders of one Party demanded the creation of such a class. In his pamphlet completed before the October Revolution, "The State and Revolution," Lenin had written:

The following measures of the [Paris] Commune emphasized by Marx are particularly noteworthy: the abolition of all representation allowances, and of all monetary privileges in the case of officials, the reduction of the remuneration of *all* servants of the state to the level of "workmen's wages." . . . And it is precisely on this particularly striking point, perhaps the most important as far as the problem of the state is concerned, that the teachings of Marx have been most completely forgotten. In popular commentaries, the number of which is legion, this is not mentioned. It is "good form" to keep silent about it as if it were a piece of old-fashioned "naïveté," just as the Christians, after their religion had been given the status of a state religion, "forgot" the "naïveté" of primitive Christianity with its democratic revolutionary spirit.

Lenin was addressing his sarcastic remarks to the Western Socialists, but his words are prophetic in their application to the state which he helped to found, in which Marxism is now the state religion. Stalin described his own policy clearly in an interview with Emil Ludwig in 1931: "Egalitarianism has for its source the peasant way of thinking, the mentality of sharing everything equally, the mentality of the primitive peasant 'Communism.' Egalitarianism has nothing in common with Marxist Socialism." His policy produced a society with highly-diversified incomes, and with distinct upper and middle classes composed of the Soviet bureaucrats.

The eminent rôle played by the intelligentsia may be gauged by its proportionately high representation on the various soviets and congresses. At the last national congress of trade unions, held in 1949, 71 percent of the delegates had had secondary or higher education; at the previous congress, held in 1932, only 40 percent of the delegates had had an equivalent education. In the present Supreme Soviet, elected in 1950, 69 percent of the deputies have had higher or secondary education. Out of 1,192 delegates to the last Congress of the Party (October 1952) 1,016 had higher or secondary education. Out of some 73 speakers who were allowed to address the Congress, 63 were members and four alternate members of the Central Committee, two were members of the Party Central Auditing Commission, and four occupied high positions in the Party provincial organizations; none of them

worked at a plant or a collective farm. The Soviet toiling masses are not permitted to be represented by genuine proletarians.

In the Soviet Union a citizen belongs to the bureaucratic class by virtue of his education, the precondition of higher income. The disparity of incomes is apparent from the meager Soviet data. The manager of an important factory in heavy industry may have a monthly income of 5,000 or 6,000 rubles or more, including basic salary and bonuses. This differs sharply from the earnings of city people, who had an average income of 500 rubles per month in the period 1946-1951. A recent Soviet handbook on the mechanical-engineering industries lists eight categories of workers whose basic wages vary from 291.20 rubles per month to 757.12. To earn these wages a worker must fulfill his monthly minimum norm of output. Skilled workers may earn more, because they work according to piece rates.

The principal of a trade school (Labor Reserve school) has a monthly salary of 950 to 1,500 rubles, excluding bonuses, while a night-watchman or a cloakroom attendant at the same school gets from 260 to 280 rubles, and the furnace man from 310 to 335. A highly-skilled worker fares much better than his unskilled fellow-proletarian, and this helps in breaking down the solidarity among the Soviet workers. The meaning of an income of 300 or 600 rubles monthly (assuming that the wife of an unskilled worker also earns her living) becomes fairly plain if one recalls the Soviet retail prices of the most essential commodities: for example, rye bread, 1.50 to 1.80 rubles per klg.; beef, 11 to 18 per klg.; sugar, 10.40 to 12.20 per klg.; men's shoes, from 200 to 400; women's shoes, from 150 to 500. Those prices were lowered by an average of 10 percent to 15 percent on March 31, 1953.

The disparity of incomes produces great variations in the standards of living. Housing conditions may serve as an illustration, especially in a country notorious for its housing shortages. The scale is very wide—from one room shared by several strangers or one apartment by several families to the private ownership of a five-room dwelling house and a summer cottage. A well-paid member of the intelligentsia does not need to worry about the inconvenience of sharing his quarters with strangers. Since 1948 Soviet citizens have been permitted to own private dwelling houses of five rooms, while leasing from the state the plot of land on which the house stands. The house is owned in perpetuity and may be inherited by the relatives of the deceased owner. It may be built by its owner, or bought from the local municipal soviet or from the enterprise which employs the buyer. The law forbids one family to own more than one house. But a Soviet housing specialist hurries to comment on this regulation: "The simultaneous personal ownership of a dwelling house in a town and of a cottage in a rural, summer vacation or health resort locality is not contrary to law. . . . The cottage serves by its very nature the purpose of rest or of a medical cure and promotes that type of the creative concentration of mental forces which is ensured by the atmosphere of a forest park or of a rural place far removed from the noise and traffic of the city." These few sentences tell the whole truth about the social stratification in the Soviet Union. A dignitary who can afford to buy a dwelling house and a summer cottage needs relaxation for "the creative concentration of his mental forces;" a worker who shares an apartment with

a few other families supposedly gets all the rest that he is entitled to, however.

If the citizen purchases his dwelling house, 20 percent of the price must be paid in cash and the remainder by monthly instalments within two or three years. The All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions explained on November 13, 1948: ". . . the sale of individual dwelling houses to workers, engineering-technical and other officials, will begin on January 1, 1949, as a rule for cash and in exceptional cases for credits granted by banks with the obligation of repayment within the period of two to three years and at an interest fixed by law." Only a well-paid person can afford to buy a house on such stiff conditions.

The Soviet taxation system relies heavily on indirect taxes on goods and services. More than 50 percent of the total Soviet state revenue is provided by the turnover tax—which we would call a sales tax—charged on every product and included in the retail price of all commodities. This tax, not the cost of production, represents the major portion of the retail prices of consumer goods. This might not make a great difference to a dignitary who earns several thousand rubles monthly, but it creates a vital problem for a manual worker who pays from 48 to 62 percent tax on a pound of potatoes.

Direct taxes produce usually about 9 percent of the total state revenue. The personal income tax begins at the rate of 2 percent on any income above the minimum of 260 rubles per month; the highest rate is 13 percent, on incomes of 1,000 rubles or more. Thus a person with a salary of more than 1,000 rubles is treated more leniently than the people in the corresponding income brackets in capitalist countries. The Socialist state does not intend to cut down the salaries of its favored supporters indirectly by the imposition of a high income tax. Moreover, members of the armed forces including the troops of the Ministry of the Interior, heroes of the Soviet Union and of Socialist Labor, and holders of decorations are totally exempt from income tax payments on their salaries or wages. The Stalin prize-winners do not pay any income tax on the value of the prize, which may be as high as 100,000 rubles. It is worth while noting that the Soviet income-tax regulations include a table of rates applicable to writers and artists which exceed the usual maximum of 13 percent, providing for a 33 percent tax on incomes of 100,000 rubles per year and still higher rates for higher incomes. Evidently the incomes granted to the most successful and conformist writers and artists are high indeed. The Soviet Government reduces the purchasing power of all citizens by annual state loans, to which everyone must subscribe at a rate equal to three or four weeks' earnings. But again, this bears far more heavily on the poor than on the rich.

The differentiation of incomes naturally produces its social effects. One may hardly expect a well-paid dignitary with higher education to invite to his home a manual worker with low wages, poorly dressed and having practically no topic of conversation in common with his host. The Soviet practice duly registers these social divisions. If one glances, for example, at the ticket prices of the Trade Union movie theaters, one finds out that there are six categories of prices ranging from six to two rubles. An unskilled worker earning some 300 rubles per month cannot be expected to buy a six-ruble ticket; even an average wage-earner could hardly spend six rubles to go to the movies.

Thus the upper stratum of the intelligentsia is well protected against unpleasant promiscuity with ordinary proletarians.

III

The disparity of incomes also influences educational opportunities. All Soviet citizens are expected to acquire an elementary education within the program of four grades. Wherever the seven-grade junior high schools are available (mostly in cities), children can continue their education up to and including the seventh grade. Within the limits of these seven grades, education is free. The delegates to the last Party Congress claimed that the seven-grade education had become universal in urban and rural districts. This claim may be accepted with a grain of salt, because previous Soviet data of recent years indicated that education through the seventh grade was generally available only in cities and towns and that education to the fourth grade only was the prevailing rule in the villages. Moreover, a peasant child is compelled to begin work on the collective farm at the age of 12.

Elementary education begins at the age of seven and is supposed to end at the age of 14. One may legitimately wonder whether a peasant youngster who has to work at the age of 12 can simultaneously attend classes of the upper grades of the junior high school. The urban child has no such problem, because the junior high school would probably be available, and his labor duty begins only at the age of 16. Because of the meager earnings of his parents such a child might be compelled to start working for his livelihood at the age of 14, with the permission of the labor inspector; but this should not prevent his graduation from the junior high school which takes place usually at the age of 14. There is in fact discrimination against rural children.

The discrimination against poorer town youngsters begins with the eighth grade of the secondary school, where free education ends. Beginning with the eighth grade of the secondary school, through the ninth and the tenth and through the whole university, students must pay fees unless their scholastic records are high enough to win them a state scholarship. The annual fees for the eighth, ninth and tenth grades range from 150 to 200 rubles. But poorer parents who want their children to rise in the world must find the money, for the secondary school certificate is the precondition of admission to a university, and the university diploma is the key to careers.

The existence of three types of schools—"elementary," "junior high school" and "secondary"—produces further discrimination. Each begins with the first grade, and theoretically the corresponding grades should offer equivalent programs; elementary schools have only four grades, but the fifth, sixth and seventh grades of the "junior high school" should be interchangeable with the corresponding grades of the "secondary" school. But pupils at the secondary schools are the favored ones. These are urban schools, and the teachers of the first four grades are quite certain to be better qualified than the rural teachers of the elementary schools. Moreover, a child lucky enough to be admitted to the first grade of a secondary school has a greater chance of passing through all the grades of the same school. A youngster graduated from the junior high school should be able to transfer to the eighth grade of the secondary school; but Soviet regulations allot only 15

percent of the vacant places at the eighth grades of the secondary schools for the boys and girls who have graduated from the junior high schools; 85 percent of places are reserved for students already enrolled in the secondary school. Moreover, the compulsory draft of boys and girls for the trade schools (Labor Reserve schools) does not extend to students of the upper grades of the secondary schools.

The problem of gaining access to the highest careers and the best incomes begins at the age of seven for a Russian child. Soviet sources do not explain how these lucky children who begin their education at the secondary school are selected, but one may be quite certain that the school authorities do not refuse to admit children of influential parents. Members of the intelligentsia enjoy hereditary opportunities—corrected to some extent, as in other countries, by scholarships granted to outstanding students of poor parents. The fees exacted at the universities or similar schools range from 300 to 500 rubles, depending on the location and type of school, and such schooling involves other expenditures, especially for attendance at a university away from home. Such tuition fees are high in proportion to Soviet incomes, save for those in the upper strata.

IV

The régime does its best to enhance the prestige of its bureaucracy in other ways. Titles of rank are freely bestowed. The process of restoring titles began in the armed forces, where all the traditional Tsarist military ranks have been reestablished, including those of major-general, lieutenant-general, colonel-general, general of the army, and two ranks of marshal. Several branches of the civil administration have been provided with uniforms, emblems of rank and titles. A recent Soviet textbook on administrative law acknowledges frankly the reasons for this return to the imperial tradition: "The introduction of personal titles and uniforms for the aforesaid categories of the state officials aims at a further intensification of service discipline and at increasing the prestige of those officials." The Soviet diplomats not only wear embroidered uniforms but are adorned with all the traditional titles (Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Counselor, etc.). The titles of the state procurators are topped by the terrific accolade of Actual State Counselor of Justice, which is bestowed upon the Procurator General of the U.S.S.R., and descend progressively through the State Counselors of Justice of three classes, the Counselors of Justice (also of three classes), down to the lowest ranks of Jurist (again three classes). The young man who begins his career in the procurators' hierarchy has the title of a Junior Jurist; the Soviet regulations make it clear that his rank is equivalent to that of a second lieutenant in the army. Peter the Great would have been pleased because he was the first in Russia to establish the equivalence between military and civilian ranks.

The Party does not make any secret of its intention to reserve privileged treatment of the intelligentsia. For instance, on September 4, 1946, the Central Committee of the Party severely censored a film called "The Great Life," which tried to depict the reconstruction of the Don basin, heavily damaged during the war. The authors of the film interpreted the events of the recon-

struction in the romantic spirit of the early post-revolutionary years, showing several cases of ordinary manual workers being promoted to the commanding posts because of their unusual intelligence, vigor and initiative. The Central Committee did not like it. Promotion to higher positions nowadays requires a diploma of formal university education. The Central Committee expressed its displeasure in these indignant words:

The film—"The Great Life"—propagates reaction, lack of culture and ignorance. It is completely unfounded and incorrect to show, as the authors of the film have done, the mass promotion to the leading positions of technically illiterate workers with reactionary views and attitudes. The producer and the author of the libretto have not understood that we highly esteem and boldly promote in our country only cultured people who are modern and who know their profession well, that we never promote people who are reactionary and deficient in culture, and that the Soviet authority has produced its own intelligentsia.

In October 1952, G. M. Malenkov, the spokesman of the Central Committee, told the Party Congress: "Cultured people, experts on the problems with which they have to cope, must be placed at the helm in industries and agriculture, in the Party and state apparatus." One of the aspects of this policy is now visible in agriculture. An ordinary peasant can no longer become the chairman of a collective farm; this highest managerial post is reserved for the agricultural specialists with secondary or higher education. The peasants are still conceded the innocent pleasure of "electing" (unanimously, by show of hands) an educated man who has been selected in advance by the Party or the Ministry of Agriculture and whom the peasants may never have seen before.

Soviet industries are run on the principle of one-man command, which simply means that the manager of the factory is the boss who directs operations without interference by the employees and takes the whole responsibility for the fulfillment, or over-fulfillment, of the plan of production. The workers must comply with orders which are contrary to the regulations, when the management insists that they are necessary to achieve greater production. For instance, the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., on April 1, 1943, convicted a worker who had not reported for work on a day of rest when told to do so, although the worker claimed, rightly, that the order was irregular, since it had not been concerted with the factory trade union committee. The Plenary Session of the same Court convicted another worker in similar circumstances on February 10, 1944, declaring that workers must report for work on an official day of rest when ordered to do so, even if the management has failed to substitute another day of rest as required by law. The Court acknowledged that such orders would be incorrect, but said that they were nevertheless binding on the employees, whose disobedience should be punished as wilful absence.

In short, the intelligentsia have developed their own *esprit de corps*. Of course the Soviet Government, like any other, would like to have at its disposal an honest, devoted and scrupulous bureaucracy, but it finds misappropriations, embezzlements and abuses of all sorts, especially in the provinces where control by the central authorities is least effective. The local administrators form cliques. The secretary of the Party, the manager of the

factory, the chairman of the collective farm, the secretary of the district soviet and of the local trade union, the procurator, and so on, now have similar educational backgrounds and comparable incomes. They are friends, and they try to "take care" of each other. This infuriates the Party leaders, who endlessly investigate and denounce. Malenkov told the last Party Congress:

Some leaders recruit the personnel not according to political and professional qualifications, but according to such criteria as family relationship, personal friendship or origins in the same part of the country. Frequently honest and expert employees, who have assumed a severe and impatient attitude toward defects in work and who have caused thereby some uneasiness to their superiors, are squeezed out. . . . In consequence of such distortion of the Party line in regard to the recruitment and the selection of the personnel there are being formed at some institutions small "family" circles of people who support each other and are bound by a kind of mutual protection system; they place the interests of their own group above those of the Party and the state.

The privileged position of the bureaucracy in the Soviet system intensifies the shortcomings of human nature.

V

At the bottom of the social pyramid are the unskilled workers of the cities and the peasants—the forgotten men of the régime. The peasants are at the very bottom. Even an unskilled worker at least has the benefits of state social insurance and firm wages, which do not change according to the profits or losses of the plant or institution which employs him. But the peasants, or collective farmers, lack even these safeguards. They are excluded from the state scheme of social insurance. Each collective farm has its own assistance fund, whose assets are provided by annual contributions, limited by law to 2 percent, from the yearly income of the collective. These incomes vary according to many factors—the acreage of land placed at the disposal of the collective, the fertility of the soil, the kind of products harvested, the weather and all the natural factors affecting agriculture. But if the collective cannot provide for the sick and the aged out of its own fund, they are left to the charity of their families and neighbors. Moreover, the state refuses to underwrite farmers' incomes as it does for industrial or office workers, and they vary as the fortune of each collective farm varies.

Because of the fluctuating and uncertain rewards, peasants could be tempted to abandon the collectives and try their luck at factories, and the state has established a system of passports to prevent this. Every resident of a town must possess a passport, and no man or woman who lacks one can be given employment or lodgings. Heavy penalties are inflicted on persons who attempt to live in a city without such an identifying document, on police officials who tolerate it, and on the house managers and owners who rent lodgings to these unfortunates.

The October Revolution was presumably made for the benefit of the workers and the peasants. The present Soviet Government has a different objective: to use every means to increase the economic power of the state, whatever the consequences. The Communist politicians are as fascinated by the idea of building a highly-industrialized state as the Pharaohs were by the

idea of building pyramids. The cost to the laborers who pile stones on stones to produce the structure means nothing. And in the shadow of this industrial pyramid a comparable stratification has developed in the Communist society. It is crowned at its top by the ruling politicians and the upper layer of the bureaucracy; its middle stratum is the lower layers of the intelligentsia and skilled workers; it stands on a vast base formed by the neglected masses of unskilled workers and peasants. The professional politicians who form the Central Committee with its inner ring of the Presidium (formerly the Political Bureau) cannot come in touch with the lower strata of the pyramid without making their way through the upper layer of the high bureaucracy. They are, in fact, cut off from the masses in whose name they pretend to address the world. They have no choice in the matter. A totalitarian government must be composed of these two elements—the professional politicians who form its brain, and the bureaucrats who are the skeleton of the structure. Industrialization at such a pace requires cutting home consumption to the bone. But the bureaucrat cannot be neglected. He must enjoy better living conditions than the “toiler,” and he must be surrounded with prestige. Those are the conditions of his active support of the régime, and this is the inescapable logic of the régime.

Are there any cracks in this imposing bureaucratic structure? One possible source of dissatisfaction is insecurity, since anyone may be fired out of hand and the whole hierarchy is from time to time wracked by purges. The severity of the intellectual censorship may be another. In the prewar days censorship was mainly political, and did not prevent an educated Soviet man from enjoying atonal music, for example, modern painting, or a Western play or novel. In the postwar years the control of thought and taste of educated men has gone to absurd lengths. But we must not forget the offsetting factors. The bulk of the bureaucracy is composed of Russians whose nationalistic feelings have been greatly flattered by the constant praise of the talents and achievements of the Russian nation, of her pre-revolutionary past and her heroes like Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, General Suvorov and General Kutuzov, and the dominant rôle she enjoys among the Soviet nationalities. Many bureaucrats are, indeed, non-Russian and must avoid showing attachment to their native lands—the Ukraine, the Baltic States, the Central Asian or Caucasian republics; despite their high incomes and honors, the rabid nationalism of their Russian colleagues must affront them. Even so, the bulk of the Soviet bureaucrats, especially in the higher brackets, are Russian or Russianized. They live without freedom of thought, but are otherwise pampered; and they doubtless find a powerful consolation in seeing their country become one of the two greatest World Powers, its frontiers stretched beyond the imagination of Tsarist imperialists, in control of one-third of Europe and with great influence over the policy of one of the largest Asian nations. What would happen if their allegiance were tested by an open struggle among their bosses—the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee—no one knows.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. BY JOHN J. McCLOY. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 81 p. \$2.00.

Drawing on his years of public service, the former Assistant Secretary of War and High Commissioner for Germany presents his views on the leading problems in foreign policy confronting the United States. Delivered originally as the Godkin Lectures at Harvard, the three brief but thoughtful chapters consider in turn the nature of the external threat to the United States, the manner in which our policy has been, and should be, determined, and some of the complexities involved in the execution of policy.

WHO SPEAKS FOR MAN? BY NORMAN COUSINS. New York: Macmillan, 1953, 318 p. \$3.50.

Writing out of personal experiences and travel since the war, the editor of the *Saturday Review* and president of the United World Federalists discusses the present international crisis and the escape therefrom. Fundamentally he finds the present crisis a result of the international system of national sovereignties, with no one nation or ideology exclusively responsible for the difficulties.

FOREIGN POLICY WITHOUT FEAR. BY VERA MICHELES DEAN. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953, 220 p. \$3.75.

Feeling that American policy is excessively fear-ridden, a quality which arouses foreign mistrust and apprehension, Mrs. Dean undertakes with a good deal of persuasiveness to increase American awareness of the "realities of world affairs," and to show that other nations may quite legitimately have differing points of view. Her favorite spokesman, "our non-Communist friends abroad," is, however, a rather synthetic creation, and at times the book gives inadequate weight to the very real occasion for many American fears.

IST FRIEDE NOCH MÖGLICH? BY HERMANN RAUSCHNING. Heidelberg: Vowinkel, 1953, 331 p.

The author of "The Revolution of Nihilism" (1939) probes the prospects for peace. Challenging the possibility of achieving "peace through overwhelming military power" or of realizing collective security through coalitions, he is critical of most Western postwar policy and urges rather a balance of power, the key to which is an independent, neutral zone lying between the U.S.S.R. and the United States.

THE FUTURE OF THE WEST. BY J. G. DE BEUS. New York: Harper, 1953, 178 p. \$2.75.

After examining the views of Danilevsky, Spengler and Toynbee, the author, who is Minister of the Netherlands Embassy in Washington, states his own optimistic thesis: despite all its tribulations Western civilization retains its vitality and is about to enter a new phase, marked by a world-wide civilization and peace.

THE QUEST FOR PEACE. Los Angeles: University of Southern California (for the Institute of World Affairs), 1952, 186 p. \$5.00.

A symposium, at the 28th session of the Institute of World Affairs.

GENERÄLE MACHEN POLITIK. By HELMUT LINDEMANN. Bonn: Auer, 1952, 198 p.

Essays on the rôle of generals in politics from Marius and Wallenstein to Ludendorff and Metaxas.

DIE MODERNE WELT, 1789-1945. PART II: WELTMÄCHTE UND WELTKRIEGE: DIE GESCHICHTE UNSERER EPOCHE 1890-1945. By HANS HERZFELD. Brunswick: Westermann, 1952, 392 p.

Professor Herzfeld's area of special interest—Wilhelminian Germany and diplomacy—provides a good background for this brief general history of the 55 years between Bismarck's fall and Hitler's death.

NEITHER EAST NOR WEST. By MARIE LOUISE BERNERI. London: Freedom Press, 1952, 192 p. 10/6.

A posthumous selection of the political writings, covering the years 1940-1948, by an Italian anarchist who lived many years in England as a political exile.

CARNETS. By VICTOR SERGE. Paris: Julliard, 1952, 218 p. Fr. 600.

These entries from the notebooks of the late anti-Stalinist revolutionary are largely from the year 1944 when Serge was in Mexico, though a number of fragments date from 1936-40.

DER FRIEDENSSCHLUSS. By HANS VON HENTIG. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1952, 319 p.

Comparing the peace treaties of the last century and a half, the author asks why the ability to achieve a tactful and magnanimous peace appears to have become a lost art.

DIE VERANTWORTLICHKEIT DER STAATSORGANE NACH VÖLKERSTRAFRECHT. By HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK. Bonn: Röhrscheid, 1952, 420 p.

A scholarly monograph in international criminal law as it relates to the Nuremberg trials.

LE STATUT INTERNATIONAL DES GOUVERNEMENTS RÉFUGIÉS ET LE CAS DE LA FRANCE LIBRE 1939-1945. By MAURICE FLORY. Paris: Pedone, 1952, 311 p. Fr. 1500.

A monograph on the juridical problems of a government in exile with special reference to the French case in the Second World War.

FREEDOM THROUGH LAW. By ROBERT L. HALE. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952, 591 p. \$7.50.

An extended study of public control, through law and the courts, over the "private governing power" which is inherent in economic possession and ownership.

DE LA DEMOCRACIA (LA IGUALDAD DE LOS DESIGUALES) AL COMUNISMO (LA DICTADURA DE LOS PEORES). By JOAQUÍN DUALDE GÓMEZ. Barcelona: Bosch, 1952, 218 p. Ptas. 30.

Essays developing the theme of the title.

1952 ANNUAL REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS. EDITED BY CLYDE EAGLETON AND RICHARD N. SWIFT. New York: New York University Press, 1953, 226 p. \$4.50.

THE YEAR BOOK OF WORLD AFFAIRS, 1953. EDITED BY GEORGE W. KEETON AND GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1953, 427 p. \$7.50.

The latest volumes of these two annual reviews.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

ECONOMIC PLANNING FOR THE PEACE. BY E. F. PENROSE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953, 384 p. \$7.50.

Mr. Penrose, who was wartime economic advisor to Ambassador Winant, "seeks to determine how it was that, notwithstanding the warnings that might have been taken from the First World War, and the time, the energy, and the resources that were given to postwar planning, economic disaster came early in Germany and was narrowly averted in 1947 and 1948 in the rest of Europe." Briefly, his thesis is that the principal error was a faulty sense of proportion in the planning.

RELIGION AND THE DECLINE OF CAPITALISM. BY V. A. DEMANT. New York: Scribner, 1952, 204 p. \$3.00.

Pursuing R. H. Tawney's well-known theme Dr. Demant, Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology, discusses what he conceives to be the clear decline of capitalism in recent years.

PLANNING FOR FREEDOM. BY LUDWIG VON MISES. South Holland (Ill.): Libertarian Press, 1952, 174 p. \$3.00.

A collection of essays and addresses since 1945, largely in criticism of the followers of Veblen, Marx and Keynes in the United States and abroad.

PLANISME ET PROGRÈS SOCIAL. BY ANGELOS ANGELOPOULOS. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1953, 403 p. Fr. 1200.

A former professor at the University of Athens discusses the need for "democratic planning" in the modern state, with somewhat crude anti-capitalist bias.

INFLATION. BY PAUL EINZIG. London: Chatto and Windus, 1952, 222 p. (New York: Macmillan, \$2.50.)

The prolific British financial journalist provides a clearly-written guide through many of the aspects of a subject that is either very simple or very complicated.

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS. BY CHARLES HENRY ALEXANDROWICZ. New York: Praeger (for the London Institute of World Affairs), 1953, 263 p. \$6.00.

A survey of the principal economic institutions which have been established since the First World War.

RAISING THE WORLD'S STANDARD OF LIVING. BY ROBERT T. MACK, JR. New York: Citadel Press, 1953, 285 p. \$4.00.

A substantial and serious analysis of the problem of coördinating the work of national and international agencies in programs for social and economic development in underdeveloped areas.

THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY. BY ROBERT A. NISBET. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 303 p. \$5.00.

Proceeding from the sense of personal alienation and cultural disintegration which seems to haunt the Western World, Mr. Nisbet, a professor of sociology, seeks the roots of this insecurity and ways of re-creating a feeling of community.

MODERN NATIONALITIES. BY FLORIAN ZNANIECKI. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952, 196 p. \$3.95.

A sociological study in elaboration of the thesis that nationality—meaning the sharing of a common culture—can exist without a common political government.

The Second World War

THE ROMMEL PAPERS. EDITED BY B. H. LIDDELL HART. New York: Harcourt, 1953, 545 p. \$6.00.

Whether Rommel was one of the "great captains" may be debated, but certainly he had the power of capturing the imagination of his opponents as well as of his countrymen. This translation of his papers is an important contribution to his biography and also contains a final chapter, by his son, on his death, and a running commentary by Captain Liddell Hart.

L'AGONIE DE L'ALLEMAGNE, 1944-1945. BY GEORGES BLOND. Paris: Fayard, 1952, 350 p. Fr. 500.

A lively if somewhat journalistic account of the last year of the war in Europe. A sequel to "Le Débarquement" (noted here January 1952).

NEW GUINEA AND THE MARIANAS. BY SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1953, 435 p. \$6.00.

Volume VIII of this projected 14-volume history of United States naval operations in World War II deals with action in the Pacific during the spring and summer months of 1944: the conquest of New Guinea, and Saipan, Tinian and Guam in the Marianas.

THE CAMPAIGN ON NEW BRITAIN. BY LT. COL. FRANK O. HOUGH AND MAJOR JOHN A. CROWN. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, 1952, 220 p. \$3.75.

MARINES IN THE CENTRAL SOLOMONS. BY MAJOR JOHN N. RENTZ. Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, Historical Branch, 1952, 186 p. \$2.75.

The tenth and eleventh in a series of monographs on the operations of U.S. Marine units in the Second World War.

THE CAMPAIGN IN NORWAY. BY T. K. DERRY. London: H.M.S.O., 1952, 289 p. 35/.

The first volume in the military series of the United Kingdom History of the Second World War is a substantial offering based on full access to the official records. The story which emerges is one of fairly consistent blundering, from deficiencies in intelligence to inadequacies in planning and supply.

TRIAL OF ERICH KILLINGER, HEINZ JUNGE, OTTO BOEHRINGER, HEINRICH EBERHARDT, GUSTAV BAUER-SCHLICHTEGROLL (THE DULAG LUFT TRIAL). EDITED BY ERIC CUDDON. London: Hodge, 1952, 255 p. 18/. (New York: British Book Centre, \$4.00.)

This ninth in the British War Crimes Trials Series treats the case of the five German air force officers accused of ill-treating British prisoners of war.

ILLYRIAN VENTURE. BY BRIGADIER "TROTSKY" DAVIES. London: Lane, 1952, 246 p. 18/.

Superficial reminiscences by the chief of a British wartime mission to the Albanian partisans.

SPECIALLY EMPLOYED. BY MAURICE J. BUCKMASTER. London: Batchworth, 1952, 200 p. 12/6. (New York: British Book Centre, 1953, \$2.75.)

An account of the wartime achievements of the British agents working with the French Resistance. Colonel Buckmaster was in command of this activity.

H. M. SUBMARINES. BY LIEUT.-COMDR. P. K. KEMP. London: Jenkins, 1952, 224 p. 16/.

The story of the exploits of British submarines in two world wars.

LA TRAGIQUE DESTINÉE DU SCHARNHORST. BY ALBERT VULLIEZ AND JACQUES MORDAL. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1952, 233 p. Fr. 750.

The story of the dramatic odyssey of the *Scharnhorst*, until its sinking in December 1943.

THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH FIRST ARMY. BY MARSHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY. London: Allen and Unwin, 1952, 532 p. 42/. (New York: Macmillan, 1953, \$9.50.)

A slightly abridged translation of the late Marshal's history. The French edition was noted here in April 1951.

L'ÉPOPÉE FRANÇAISE D'ITALIE 1944. BY RENÉ CHAMBE. Paris: Flammarion, 1952, 442 p. Fr. 980.

An account of the achievements of the French expeditionary corps in Italy in 1944-1945.

TABOR. BY JACQUES AUGARDE. Paris: Éditions France-Empire, 1952, 316 p. Fr. 585.

The wartime experiences of a French officer with the redoubtable *goumiers* in Italy, France and Germany.

The United States

THE STRANGE CASE OF ALGER HISS. BY THE EARL JOWITT. Garden City: Doubleday, 1953, 380 p. \$3.95.

The former Lord Chancellor of Great Britain reviews the famous case, with a perceptible favoring of the defense. While advantages may be gained by distance and a different perspective—the contrasts between American and British court procedure are interesting in themselves—it is doubtful whether the gains in this instance balance a certain lack of surefootedness in treating the evidence in this most controversial trial.

SHAME AND GLORY OF THE INTELLECTUALS. BY PETER VIERECK. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953, 320 p. \$4.00.

An ardent and articulate spokesman for the "new conservatism," Mr. Viereck here dissects "Babbitt Jr."—the American liberal intellectual who failed, in the 1930's and 1940's, to detect in Communism the enemy he had fought in Fascism. A stimulating and intelligent book, though the reader may feel unduly pelted with aphorisms.

YANKEE DIPLOMACY. BY O. EDMUND SMITH, JR. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1953, 196 p. \$3.00.

A criticism of United States policy toward Argentina under the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations, as a case of misconceived and self-defeating intervention.

THE AMAZING MR. DOOLITTLE: A BIOGRAPHY OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES H. DOOLITTLE. BY QUENTIN REYNOLDS. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953, 313 p. \$3.95.

A pleasant biography of one of the best-known figures in American aviation in the last three decades.

THE AMERICAN WAY. BY SHEPARD B. CLOUGH. New York: Crowell, 1953, 246 p. \$4.00.

Designed originally for a French audience, this book undertakes to explore the reasons for the high level of national well-being achieved by the American economy and its relation to the advancement of cultural values.

BIG BUSINESS: A NEW ERA. BY DAVID E. LILIENTHAL. New York: Harper, 1953, 209 p. \$2.75.

The former head of TVA and the Atomic Energy Commission discusses "Big Business as a fresh manifestation of American imagination and vitality." Questioning the "curse of bigness," Mr. Lilienthal urges an unprejudiced examination of this important and much-argued subject.

THE FEDERAL DEBT. BY CHARLES CORTEZ ABBOTT. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1953, 278 p. \$4.00.

A professor of banking and financier examines the Federal debt and its management since the end of the Second World War, and sets forth certain recommendations.

THE WORLD THE DOLLAR BUILT. BY GUNTHER STEIN. London: Dobson, 1952, 288 p. 12/6.

The author's theme is that "America must change her economic order if the world is to live in peace." "Big Business" and economic instability are the villains of the piece, and seem to have fomented the cold war. The Marxist analysis is festooned with selected quotations from American public figures and the press.

EDUCATION AND LIBERTY. BY JAMES BRYANT CONANT. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 168 p. \$3.00.

The former president of Harvard examines secondary education and advances proposals for its improvement—a subject of utmost relevance to the preservation and progress of American society and culture.

RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES. BY GEORGE EATON SIMPSON AND J. MILTON YINGER. New York: Harper, 1953, 773 p. \$6.00.

A scholarly introduction to the subject of prejudice and discrimination in America, primarily in regard to the Negro and the Jewish minorities.

Western Europe

LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER. Paris: Colin, 1953, 338 p. Fr. 1100.

This careful, objective book by a study group of the Institut des Relations Internationales of Brussels will be of great help to anyone making a detailed study of the Schuman Plan. It systematically examines the whole treaty, concentrating on the allocation of functions, interpreting provisions and calling attention to uncertainties. Other chapters discuss the form of organization of the Coal and Steel Community and compare it with other kinds of international bodies.

DER SCHUMAN-PLAN BY CARL HORST HAHN. Munich: Pflaum, 1953, 158 p.

On the basis of a fairly detailed study, which includes a good deal of useful information, Dr. Hahn concludes that the Schuman Plan will not have a marked effect on the cost of producing steel in Western Germany or France in the near future. For the common market to work successfully, he argues, economic integration will have to be extended to other fields. The book also contains a reasoned re-statement of many of the main German criticisms of the coal and steel treaty.

L'EUROPE EN FACE DE SON DESTIN. BY EDOUARD BONNEFOUS. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1952, 386 p. Fr. 900.

The present study is a projection of the author's earlier work on European unity, "L'Idée Européenne et sa réalisation" (1950), but is particularly devoted to recent developments—the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan, and the European Defense Community. Extensive documentary appendix.

MY EUROPE. By SIR ROBERT BRUCE LOCKHART. London: Putnam, 1952, 273 p. 16/. (New York: British Book Centre, 1953, \$3.50.)

Rather nostalgic personal recollections of events in Europe since the eve of the First World War.

BRIAND. VOLUME VI: L'ARTISAN DE LA PAIX 1923-1932. By GEORGES SUAREZ. Paris: Plon, 1952, 380 p. Fr. 990.

The text of the final volume of this important Briand biography was completed in 1940. Based on Briand's diary and numerous unpublished documents, it carries the statesman through his years of greatest international reputation—the years of Locarno, Thoiry and the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

JUSTICE POUR CEUX DE 1940. By GENERAL A. LAFFARGUE. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1952, 237 p. Fr. 490.

A defense of the morale and capabilities of the French army of 1940. In the author's view the fatal error in the defeat was the diversion of six divisions to Holland, which left the Meuse inadequately defended.

COLONISATION, COLONIALISME, DÉCOLONISATION. By HENRI LABOURET. Paris: Larose, 1952, 203 p. Fr. 550.

A study of the problems and achievements of the Union Française—especially in the fields of education and economics—in our period of waning colonialism.

AUX CÔTÉS DU MARÉCHAL PÉTAİN. By VICE-ADMIRAL FERNET. Paris: Plon, 1953, 309 p. Fr. 660.

Admiring and generally uncritical recollections of Pétain by an officer who served as secretary general of the *Conseil national* in Vichy.

LECLERC. By ADRIEN DANSETTE. Paris: Flammarion, 1952, 230 p. Fr. 595.

A sensitive and reverent portrait of the late general.

LA DÉMOCRATIE DIRECTE DANS LES COMMUNES SUISSES. Zurich: Editions Polygraphiques, 1952, 254 p.

A collection of articles exploring the practice of direct democracy in the communes of the various cantons, a practice which has a wide variety of forms.

DER WAHRHEIT EINE GASSE. By FRANZ VON PAPEN. Munich: List, 1952, 677 p.

MEMOIRS. By FRANZ VON PAPEN. New York: Dutton, 1953, 634 p. \$6.50.

Franz von Papen, whose ability to survive perhaps excels that of the Abbé Sieyès, here reviews his lengthy career with a marked sense of righteousness and few twinges. Although the book is one of the more important and readable of the German memoirs to appear since the war, as a historical document it must be checked carefully with the other evidence bearing on the critical episodes of von Papen's career. Some of the material relating to his early years is omitted from the English translation, which, however, contains a criticism of certain passages in the Bullock biography of Hitler.

LE DANGER ALLEMAND 1866-1945. By EUGÈNE CARRIAS. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1952, 259 p. Fr. 780.

An interpretative review, largely in the context of military power and military doctrines, of the successive German threats to France after 1866.

LA NOUVELLE ALLEMAGNE 1949-1951. By HENRI LAPORTE. Paris: Lavauzelle, 1952, 202 p. Fr. 480.

An expression of alarm over Allied postwar policy toward Germany and an appeal for a real Franco-German reconciliation.

AUCH DU WARST DABEL. By PETER KLEIST. Heidelberg: Vowinkel, 1952, 407 p.

A propagandistic discussion of the problems confronting Germany since the beginning of the First World War. The author argues that the Germans need not be particularly repentant of what happened under Hitler, and maintains that the Western democracies are chiefly responsible for the uneasy state of today's world.

DIE DIPLOMATISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN DEUTSCHLANDS ZUR SOWJETUNION 1917-1932. By FRITZ KLEIN. Berlin: Rütten, 1952, 190 p.

A Stalinist interpretation.

DIE TRAGÖDIE SCHLESIENS 1945/46 IN DOKUMENTEN. Edited by JOHANNES KAPS. Munich: Verlag "Christ Unterwegs," 1952-3, 552 p.

Two hundred documents assembled to show the treatment accorded the Germans of Silesia by the Poles and Russians at the end of the war.

KÖNIGSBERG 1945-1948. By HUGO LINCK. Leer: Rautenberg, 1952, 194 p.

A German pastor's report of his experiences in Königsberg and East Prussia in the first three postwar years.

DER KAMPF UM DEN SÜDWESTSTAAT. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1952, 507 p.

A collection of documents on the development of the controversy over the union of Württemberg-Baden, Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern.

ENGLAND-NÜRNBERG-SPANDAU. By ILSE HESS. Leoni am Starnberger See: Druffel, 1952, 175 p.

Letters from Rudolf Hess to his wife during his various incarcerations between 1941 and 1951.

KURT SCHUMACHER. By FRIED WESEMANN. Frankfurt: Herkul Verlagsanstalt, 1952, 260 p.

A brief, appreciative but not exceptional biography; largely completed before the Socialist leader's death.

OPFERGANG DER GENERALE. By JOSEF FOLTSMANN AND HANNS MÖLLER-WITTEN. Berlin: Bernard und Graefe, 1952, 176 p.

A report on the casualties suffered by German generals and admirals—by death in battle, execution or illness—during and after the Second World War.

DEUTSCHE PARTEIPROGRAMME. By WILHELM MOMMSEN. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1952, 198 p.

A most useful collection of German party programs and statements, from the *Vormärz* to the present.

DER BAUER IN DER KULTUR- UND WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE ÖSTERREICHS. By JOSEF BUCHINGER. Vienna: Oesterreichischer Bundesverlag, 1952, 471 p.

A rather erratically organized study of the peasants' rôle in Austrian history and society.

VOM GESTERN INS HEUTE. By FRIEDRICH FUNDER. Vienna: Herold, 1952, 717 p. Schillings 139.

Reminiscences, chiefly of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, by an old journalist who was closely associated with the Christian Social movement.

UNA MANCATA INTESA ITALO-SOVIETICA NEL 1940 E 1941. BY MARIO TOSCANO. Florence: Sansoni, 1953, 144 p. L. 800.

Professor Toscano, editor-in-chief of the Italian Foreign Office documents, has prepared a scholarly study of the hesitant and eventually abortive Italian efforts to seek an improvement of relations with the U.S.S.R. in 1940 and 1941.

IL TRIBUNALE SPECIALE. BY CESARE ROSSI. Milan: Ceschina, 1952, 395 p. L. 1200.

A study of Mussolini's Tribunale Speciale per la Difesa dello Stato and some of its victims, based on the record and on personal experience.

VITA EROICA DI AMEDEO DUCA D'AOSTA. BY AMEDEO TOSTI. Milan: Mondadori, 1952, 172 p. L. 1000.

A brief biography highlighting the military and administrative career of the Duke d'Aosta.

Eastern Europe

THE CAPTIVE MIND. BY CZESLAW MILOSZ. New York: Knopf, 1953, 251 p. \$3.50.

From 1945 to 1951 Mr. Milosz put his literary talents at the service of the Polish Government. Having broken with the régime, he here presents a most sensitive analysis of the plight, and also the lures and moral pitfalls, besetting the intellectual working in the Soviet Imperium. In large measure a perceptive self-examination, this work is unique in its penetration of the reasons—beyond those of brute force—which have brought many fine minds to advancing the Stalinist "New Faith."

SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMUNISM. BY JULES MONNEROT. Boston: Beacon Press, 1953, 339 p. \$6.00.

A stimulating if somewhat chaotic analysis of Soviet Communism—a "twentieth century Islam." Although an extended philosophical "digression" in the French edition has been omitted in the English translation, the book is quite philosophical enough as it stands. The individual insights, however, are more impressive than the argument as a whole.

RUSSIA: WHAT NEXT? BY ISAAC DEUTSCHER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 230 p. \$3.00.

Developing the views contained in his biography of Stalin, Mr. Deutscher attempts to project the likely course of events under the dictator's successors. Essentially his thesis is that Stalinism had a rational function in forcibly overcoming Russia's economic and social backwardness, that with the realization of this function has disappeared the *raison d'être* of the régime, and that there is a reasonable chance for eventual democratic evolution. This sanguine expectation is convincing only if the author's view of Stalinism as pragmatic and self-limiting can be accepted.

MALENKOV: STALIN'S SUCCESSOR. BY MARTIN EBON. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953, 284 p. \$3.75.

A useful and restrained sketch of Malenkov and other leaders of post-Stalinist Russia. About a third of the book comprises a selection of Malenkov's important addresses.

CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES. EDITED BY LEO GRULIOW. New York: Praeger, 1953, 268 p. \$6.00.

A very useful collection of documents, including the record of the 19th Communist Party Congress and the reorganization after Stalin's death. The translations are from the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*.

THE KREMLIN VS. THE PEOPLE. BY ROBERT MAGIDOFF. Garden City: Doubleday, 1953, 288 p. \$3.50.

Mr. Magidoff, for many years a correspondent in Moscow, is here concerned with exploring the multiple tensions within Soviet society. While the strains which the author describes are real enough, Mr. Magidoff cautions against any expectation of an early demise of the régime.

SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH. EDITED BY ABRAM BERGSON. Evanston (Ill.): Row, Peterson, 1953, 376 p. \$6.00.

This important book brings together the results of the research of a score of American scholars on the subject of the Soviet economy. Presented first at a conference held in May 1952, these studies, containing much original material, cover the major sectors of Soviet economic life, their present status and future prospects.

SOVIET NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT IN 1937. BY ABRAM BERGSON. New York: Columbia University Press, 1953, 156 p. \$3.75.

The first application to the Soviet economy of the methodology of "national economic accounting." A significant piece of basic research in the field.

THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM OF THE SOVIET UNION. BY ROMAN SMAL-STOCKI. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1952, 474 p. \$6.00.

A poorly-organized and highly-polemical book by a Ukrainian scholar, now in the United States. Much of the author's time is spent in battling with other writers in this field.

THE END OF A REVOLUTION. BY FRITZ STERNBERG. New York: Day, 1953, 191 p. \$3.00.

A somewhat obvious demonstration that the Soviet Union is a "reactionary" state.

LES COURANTS COMMERCIAUX DE L'EUROPE DANUBIENNE. BY EUGÈNE ZALESKI. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1952, 564 p. Fr. 2000.

A substantial, well-documented, monograph on the development and regressions of commerce in Danubian Europe in the first half of the present century. The last section deals with conditions under Soviet domination of the area.

LES MÉMOIRES DU MARÉCHAL MANNERHEIM, 1882-1946. Paris: Hachette, 1952, 429 p. Fr. 975.

A considerably abridged translation of the late Marshal's memoirs, which have previously appeared in Finnish and Swedish editions.

THE TRAGEDY OF THE BALTIC STATES. BY JOHN ALEXANDER SWETTENHAM. London: Hollis, 1952, 216 p. 15/. (New York: British Book Centre, 1953, \$2.75.)

A report on the vicissitudes of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia since the outbreak of the Second World War, based upon official documents and upon the stories of eyewitnesses. The author was a member of the Displaced Persons Division of the Control Commission for Germany.

DA MINDSZENTY A GRÖSZ. EDITED BY OTTAVIO PASTORE. Rome: Macchia, 1952, 154 p. L. 700.

A Communist account of the trial of Hungarian Archbishop Grösz in 1951.

RUMÄNIENS WEG ZUM SATELLITENSTAAT. BY ION GHEORGHE. Wels (Austria): Verlag Welsermühl, 1952, 444 p. Schillings 88.80.

Rumania's last wartime minister in Berlin reviews, and largely defends, the steps by which Marshal Antonescu assumed power and led his country into war as an ally of Germany. Important for the point of view it represents.

CAROL IL UND MADAME LUPESCU. BY JOACHIM VON KÜRENBERG. Bonn: Athenaeum, 1952, 242 p.

The misadventures of the late King of Rumania; not very substantial.

ALBANIAN EXPOSÉ. BY GLENN A. McLAIN. Quincy (Mass.): Albanian American Literary Society, 1952, 99 p. \$1.00.

Largely about conflicts among the Albanian groups in the United States.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

WINSTON CHURCHILL: THE ERA AND THE MAN. BY VIRGINIA COWLES. New York: Harper, 1953, 378 p. \$5.00.

A sprightly and surprisingly successful biography. The author, quite wisely, largely limits herself to Churchill's career, with its spectacular ups and downs, before the climactic years of the Second World War.

THE FORSAKEN IDEA. BY EDWARD CRANKSHAW. New York: Longmans, 1952, 178 p. \$3.25.

An examination and defense of the imperial ideas of Lord Milner, who, in the author's view, has much of value to say to the British in their present quandaries.

INTO THE DANGEROUS WORLD. BY WOODROW WYATT. London: Weidenfeld, 1952, 238 p. 15/.

Mr. Wyatt, Labor M.P., writes a lively if somewhat self-conscious installment in autobiography, starting with his remote birth in 1918. Of interest in showing the views and mood of the younger generation of the British Labor movement.

UTOPIA LTD. BY HAROLD ORLANS. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953, 313 p. \$4.50.

A critical analysis of one interesting example of social planning: the founding of the New Town of Stevenage by the British Government, as part of a program to move people from the metropolis.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD IN THOUGHT AND ACTION. BY BENJAMIN SACKS. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1952, 591 p. \$8.00.

Although Professor Sacks labors diligently in these carefully prepared essays to present Mr. MacDonald as the "architect for a better world," the impression remains that the late Prime Minister lost his blueprints in the course of his career.

HAIG, MASTER OF THE FIELD. BY MAJOR-GENERAL SIR JOHN DAVIDSON. London: Nevill, 1953, 158 p. 21/. (New York: British Book Centre, \$4.50.)

General Davidson, who was head of the Operations Branch of Haig's General Staff in 1916-18, is in a position to write with much authority about his chief. This study is limited to a consideration of the problems confronting the British and French armies from the spring of 1917 to the end of hostilities.

ALEXANDER OF TUNIS. BY NORMAN HILLSON. London: W. H. Allen, 1952, 252 p. 18/. (New York: British Book Centre, 1953, \$3.50.)

A biography which does not measure up to the subject.

THE BRITISH ECONOMY, 1945-1950. EDITED BY G. D. N. WORSWICK AND P. H. ADY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, 621 p. \$9.00.

A meaty symposium of 25 essays, all by Oxford economists, which should be most valuable as a reference work.

CIVIL INDUSTRY AND TRADE. BY E. L. HARGREAVES AND M. M. GOWING. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1952, 678 p. 37/6.

WORKS AND BUILDINGS. BY C. M. KOHAN. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1952, 540 p. 32/6.

BRITISH WAR PRODUCTION. BY M. M. POSTAN. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1952, 512 p. 32/6.

Three further volumes of the United Kingdom Civil Series in the History of the Second World War. The first draws largely on Board of Trade documents for its exposition of British wartime trade policy. The second, somewhat more specialized, deals with government and industrial coöperation in the building program. The third, a comprehensive and authoritative history of the growth of the British munitions industry from the mid-thirties to the end of the war in 1945, complements the study on the British war economy by Hancock and Gowing.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THE COMMONWEALTH. BY O. HOOD PHILLIPS. London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1952, 826 p. 42/.

This reference work is a revised edition of Chalmers and Hood Phillips' "Constitutional Laws of Great Britain, the British Empire and Commonwealth" (1946), now out of print. The present volume includes some entirely new chapters on the general characteristics of the British constitution, delegated legislation and Ceylon, and a revision of most other chapters.

A HISTORY OF IRELAND UNDER THE UNION, 1801 TO 1922. BY P. S. O'HEGARTY. London: Methuen, 1952, 811 p. 50/. (New York: British Book Centre, \$9.50.)

Mr. O'Hegarty, who himself has played an active rôle in recent Irish history, here traces the history of the separatist movement from the Act of Union. A partisan but substantial story.

THE INCREDIBLE CANADIAN. BY BRUCE HUTCHISON. New York: Longmans, 1953, 454 p. \$5.00.

A candid though not wholly rounded biography of Mackenzie King, Canadian Prime Minister for nearly a quarter of a century.

AUSTRALIEN ÖFFNET SICH FÜR MENSCHEN UND WAREN. BY HERBERT GROSS. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1952, 391 p.

Designed primarily for persons interested in commerce with, or emigration to, Australia.

HONG KONG. BY HAROLD INGRAMS. London: H.M.S.O., 1952, 307 p. 27/6.

An attractively-written and informative survey, the first of a series—the Corona Library—sponsored by the British Colonial Office. Good bibliography and maps.

The Middle East

MIDDLE EAST DILEMMAS. BY J. C. HUREWITZ. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1953, 273 p. \$3.75.

A concise and objective discussion of the origins and growth of American interest and responsibilities in the Middle East, with particular chapters devoted to Iran, Egypt, the Arab-Israel area, Turkey and economic and technical assistance. In Mr. Hurewitz's view this is not a region in which the United States has "excelled in solid accomplishments" and the future promises to be exceedingly difficult and trying.

PROGRESS OR THE PASHAS? BY RICHARD WILLIAMS-THOMPSON. London: Muller, 1952, 160 p. 10/6.

Impressions of a tour of the Arab world in 1952.

ISRAEL. BY NORMAN BENTWICH. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952, 224 p. \$3.75.

A former British Mandate official writes a brief but judicious survey of contemporary Israel.

LEARNING LAUGHTER. BY STEPHEN SPENDER. New York: Harcourt, 1953, 201 p. \$3.50.

The report of a journey to Israel in 1952, particularly devoted to a study of Youth Aliyah, the organization which has cared for the children brought from all parts of the world.

THE MAGIC CARPET. BY SHLOMO BARER. New York: Harper, 1952, 243 p. \$3.50.

The story of the migrations in 1949 and 1950 of the Yemenite Jews to Israel.

THE LAND SYSTEM IN PALESTINE. BY A. GRANOTT. London: Eyre, 1952, 359 p. 21/. (New York: British Book Centre, \$4.50.)

This study, a translation from the original Hebrew edition, attempts a comprehensive description of the system of land tenure in Palestine and adjacent areas, down to the end of the Mandate.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF PERSIA 1917-1923. BY NASROLLAH SAIFPOUR FATEMI. New York: Moore, 1952, 331 p. \$5.00.

This book, which is primarily concerned with the activities of British and Russian diplomacy during and immediately after the First World War, leaves a good deal to be desired with respect both to the source employed and the analysis of the events.

IRAN. BY RICHARD N. FRYE. New York: Holt, 1953, 126 p. \$2.50.

A concise handbook.

South and Southeast Asia

THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA AND PAKISTAN. BY W. NORMAN BROWN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 308 p. \$4.50.

This new addition to the Foreign Policy Library series is, despite its title, primarily concerned with the recent history of India and Pakistan. A valuable, concise account.

THE BRITISH IMPACT ON INDIA. BY SIR PERCIVAL GRIFFITHS. London: Macdonald, 1952, 520 p. 45/. (New York: Macmillan, \$8.50.)

A learned and comprehensive study of the political, administrative and economic effects on India of British rule. The author was formerly a member of the Indian Civil Service.

PUNJAB PRELUDE. BY L. F. LOVEDAY PRIOR. London: Murray, 1952, 218 p. 18/. (Hollywood-by-the-Sea, Fla.: Transatlantic Arts, \$4.50.)

An Englishwoman's explicitly pro-Pakistan report on the Punjab.

MAHATMA GANDHI. BY HARIDAS T. MUZUMDAR. New York: Scribner, 1952, 127 p. \$2.00.

A brief and devoted exposition of Gandhian philosophy and practice by a fellow Hindu, now a professor of sociology in the United States.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

NATIONALISM AND COMMUNISM IN EAST ASIA. BY W. MACMAHON BALL. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press (for the Institute of Pacific Relations), 1952, 210 p. 25/. (New York: Cambridge University Press, \$4.50.)

An Australian surveys the threefold revolution—against colonialism, against poverty, and against the West—now in train in the area from Japan to India.

REPORT ON MAO'S CHINA. BY FRANK MORAES. New York: Macmillan, 1953, 212 p. \$3.75.

A perceptive and critical report on Communist China from an Asian point of view. Mr. Moraes, editor of *The Times of India*, spent a number of weeks in China in 1952 as a member of an Indian cultural mission.

L'ASCENSION DE MAO TSE-TUNG (1921-1945). BY GENERAL L.-M. CHASSIN. Paris: Payot, 1953, 216 p. Fr. 750.

General Chassin, who previously traced the postwar victory of the Chinese Communists (noted here July 1953), sketches the rise of Mao Tse-tung during the civil conflicts from 1921.

CAPTIVE SURGEON. BY ERNEST M. LIPPA. New York: Morrow, 1953, 280 p. \$4.00.

Distressing experiences of an Austrian surgeon in Communist China.

ON THE BATTLEFRONTS OF THE LIBERATED AREAS. BY CHU TEH. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1952, 91 p.

A translation of the Chinese Communist general's report at the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in April 1945.

SIEBEN JAHRE IN TIBET. BY HEINRICH HARRER. Vienna: Ullstein, 1952, 266 p. Schillings 84.

An account of several wartime years spent in Tibet and at the court of the Dalai Lama.

KIMONO UND KHAKI. BY AAGE KRARUP NIELSEN. Vienna: Ullstein, 1952, 191 p.

A Swedish traveller's generally optimistic report on Japan during the American occupation.

THE RIVER AND THE GAUNTLET. BY S. L. A. MARSHALL. New York: Morrow, 1953, 385 p. \$5.00.

An account of the defeat of the Eighth Army by the Chinese Communists in November 1950 and the subsequent retreat down the peninsula, the longest in American history. Exceptionally vivid and dramatic, the story is based to a large extent on interviews with the troops engaged. In General Marshall's view the key to the defeat lay in faulty intelligence on the American side and superior knowledge of troop disposition by the Chinese.

LA GUERRE N'EST PAS POUR DEMAIN. BY E.-N. DZÉLÉPY. Paris: Julliard, 1952, 262 p. Fr. 690.

A hostile criticism of American policy in the Korean war, stressing the theme that it was, and remains, Europe's function to prevent the United States from stampeding the world into a general war.

THE SOUTH SEAS IN TRANSITION. BY W. E. H. STANNER. SYDNEY: Australasian Publishing Co. (for the Australian Institute of International Affairs and the International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations), 1953, 448 p. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, \$6.00.)

A study, by an anthropologist, of postwar rehabilitation and reconstruction in three British Pacific dependencies: Papua and New Guinea, Fiji and Western Samoa.

Africa

STRUGGLE FOR AFRICA. BY VERNON BARTLETT. London: Muller, 1953, 251 p. 15/.

A popular survey, by a British journalist, of the contemporary scene in Africa. Special attention is devoted to South Africa.

HISTOIRE DU MAROC. BY HENRI CAMBON. Paris: Hachette, 1952, 384 p. Fr. 850.

The author, a son of Paul Cambon, is himself a diplomat. He surveys the history of Morocco—especially the diplomatic events after 1901 which led to the establishment and consolidation of the French protectorate. A brief section is devoted to Tangier and Spanish Morocco.

THE SUDAN. BY J. S. R. DUNCAN. Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1952, 283 p. 12/6.

A descriptive history by a member of the Sudan Political Service.

CIRENAICA SCONOSCIUTA. BY ESTER PANETTA. Florence: Sansoni, 1952, 206 p. L. 1500.

A monograph of native life and organization based on extensive residence in Cirenaica.

MADAGASCAR. BY OLIVIER HATZFELD. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1952, 126 p. Fr. 150.

A brief résumé of the French administration of the island.

Latin America and the West Indies

PERÓN'S ARGENTINA. BY GEORGE I. BLANKSTEN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, 478 p. \$6.50.

Although the exposition is uneven and the style occasionally facetious this is a substantial, informative and critical analysis of the Peronist régime. Of particular interest is the author's extensive examination of the components of *peronismo*.

COLOMBIA: A GENERAL SURVEY. BY W. O. GALBRAITH. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953, 140 p. \$2.50.

A brief introduction by the head of the Latin American Service of the B.B.C.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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AFRICA

SHAPING a people's destiny; the story of Eritrea and the United Nations. New York, 1953. 32 p. (1953. I. 19.) 25¢.

DOCUMENTS concerning constitutional development in the Sudan and the agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom . . . and the Egyptian Government concerning self-government and self-determination for the Sudan. 17 Feb. 1953. London, 1953. 70 p. (Cmd. 8767. Egypt 2.) 2s.

DRAFT agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom . . . and the Egyptian Government concerning self-government and self-determination for the Sudan. Feb. 1953. London, 1953. 11 p. (Cmd. 8766. Egypt 1.) 6d.

GROWTH of a nation; the story of the Sudan. London, 1953. 28 p. 2s.

AUSTRIA

THE ECONOMIC reconstruction of Austria, 1945-1952, by Franz Heissenberger. Washington, Library of Congress, 1953. 153 p. \$1.00.

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

CONTRACTING Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Publications. Geneva, Author, 1953.

1. Analytical index of the general agreement. 114 p. 2. Basic instruments and selected documents. First Supplement. 109 p. (GATT/1953—I.) \$1.50.

JAPANESE foreign trade during 1934 by commodity and country. Tokyo, Economic Counsel Board, 1953. 117 p.

A TRADE and tariff policy in the national interest; prepared by the Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security. Washington, 1953. 78 p. 40¢.

EXTENSION of Export Control Act of 1949. Hearing before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 4882, Apr. 29, 1953. Washington, 1953. 27 p. —. Report, Apr. 30, 1953. Washington, 1953. 4 p. (H. Rept. 335.)

AMENDING section 12 of the Export Control Act of 1949. Report from the Committee on Banking and Currency, Senate, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., to accompany S. 1739, Apr. 30, 1953. Washington, 1953. 5 p. (S. Rept. 207.)

COPPER import tax suspension. Hearings before the Committee on Finance, Senate, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 568, Feb. 3-4, 1953. Washington, 1953. 73 p.

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—. Report, House, Jan. 16, 1953. Washington, 1953. 3 p. (H. Rept. 4.)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

OVERSEAS economic surveys. London, 1953.

British East Africa. 156 p. 5s. Finland. 100 p. 4s.

SPECIAL study on economic conditions and development in non-self-governing territories. New York, 1952. 415 p. (1953. VI. B. 2.) \$3.00.

EUROPEAN FEDERATION

PROJET de traité portant statut de la Communauté Européenne; informations et documents officiels de la Commission Constitutionnelle. Strasbourg, Communauté Européenne, 1953. 127 p.

DENKSCHRIFT der Bundesregierung zur frage des beitrtritts zum Europarat. Bonn, Universitäts-Buchdruckerei, n. d. 62 p.

REGIONAL organizations; a description of their development and functions. Washington, 1953. 34 p. (Dept. of State. International Organization and Conference Series II, European and British Commonwealth 3.) 15¢.

FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

AMENDMENT to the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 4465, Apr. 20-21, 1953. Washington, 1953.

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MOBILIZATION of domestic capital: report and documents of the first working party of experts. New York, 1952. 206 p. (1953. II. F. 2.) \$1.50.

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ECONOMIC survey for 1953. London, 1953. 50 p. (Cmd. 8800.) 1s. 6d.

PRELIMINARY estimates of national income and expenditure 1948 to 1952. London, 1953. 11 p. (Cmd. 8803.) 6d.

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NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

THE NATO handbook. Paris, NATO, 1953. 55 p.

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PHILIPPINE land tenure reform; analysis and recommendations. Manila, Special Technical and Economic Mission, Mutual Security Agency, 1952. 42 p. and 11 appendices.

THE RURAL Philippines (partial report), by G. F. Rivera and R. T. McMillan. Pts. II and V. Manila, Cooperative Project of the Philippine Council for United States Aid and the United States Mutual Security Agency, 1952. 34 p.

RAW MATERIALS

EUROPEAN timber statistics, 1913-1950. New York, 1953. 30 p. (1953. II. E. 5.) \$1.75.

COAL and iron ore resources of Asia and the Far East. New York, 1952. 155 p. (1952. II. F. 1.)

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION

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